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PREFACE 
The  present volume  is part  of a  series of sectoral studies on  the 
evolution of concentration in the member  states of the European 
Community. 
Those reports were  compiled by  the different national Institutes and 
experts,  engaged  b,y  the Commission  to effect the study programme  in 
question. 
Re&arding  the specific and general interest of these reports and the 
responsibility taken by the Commission  with regard to the European 
Parliament,  they are published wholly in the original version. 
The  Commission refrains from  commenting,  only stating that the 
responsibility for the data and  opinions 
1appearing in the reports, 
rests solely with the Institute or the expert who  is the author. 
Other reports  on  the sectoral programme  will be  published by the 
Commission as  soon as  they are received. 
The  Commission  will also publish a  series of documents  and tables of 
syntheses,  allowing for  international  comparisons  on  the  evolution of 
concentration in the different member  states of the Community. CONTENTS 
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SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
Part  I  of  this  study  (Chapters  1  and  2)  provides  a  variety of statis-
tical measures  of  concentration,  based  upon  individual  company  data 
obtained  largely from  their Annual  Reports.  It concludes  that  turnover 
and  employment  concentration measures  are  likely to  be  the most 
meaningful,  and  that during  the period  1968-72  concentration ratios 
of  turnover  have  been broadly stable  (whether measured  on  an  'enterprise' 
or a  'units of economic  account'  basis), while  the  concentration 
ratios of  employment  have  been  declining slowly. 
Concentration  levels  based  on  'units of  economic activity'  do  not 
appear  to  have  been very high  (the  four-firm concentration ratio of 
turnover  - the  simplest and  most meaningful  figure  - was  in  the  region 
of 40%),  but  those  based  on  'enterprise'  data were  much  higher. 
Part II of  the  study is on  an entirely different basis.  It examines 
the  overall competitiveness  of  the U.K.  pharmaceutical  industry  from 
a  retail marketing point of view  (excluding  the hospital market),  and 
over  a  longer period  than  in Part  I  - generally covering  1964,  1968 
and  1973.  This  longer  time  perspective  shows  some  different trends  in 
1964-68  than  from  1968  onwards.  The  focus  is on  retail products, 
grouped  initially into 14 principal  therapeutic classes  or  categories 
(all being products  that have  to  be  prescribed by  a  qualified medical 
doctor).  This  part of  the  study  covers  Chapters  3,  4  and  5. 
No  small  group  of manufacturers  or of products dominates  over  this 
entire market,  but within each  of  the  industry's major market  segments 
(therapeutic categories)  a  few  firms  do  occupy  large  shares  of  the 
market,  and  their  share  increased over  the  pe~iod 1964-73.  Moreover, 
the largest companies all hold  strong market  positions  in one  or more 
of  the  14 largest categories. 
However,  within each  ~rket segment  the  leading brands  and  companies 
changed  significantly between  1964  and  1973.  Thus,  while  the overall 
concentration ratios  shown  in Part  I  exhibited  some  stabilit  or even 8 
occupy  the  same  positions over  the whole  period.  During  those years 
over  400  completely  new  products were  introduced;  and  this  largely 
accounted  for  the  rise or  fall of particular companies. 
Thus  a  complex pattern of cause  and  effect relationships appears  to 
exist between  concentration and  various  elements  in  the  marketing mix, 
and  unique  product characteristics - as well as  a  variety of largely 
unexpected  factors  - appear  to  influence market  shares. 
The  development  of  replacement products within therapeutic categories 
has  been  successfully used  by  some  companies  to protect high market 
share  positions;  on  the  other hand,  price  reduction  strategies appear 
to have  been generally ineffective  in achieving market  dominance.  But 
dominance  once  having been  achieved  through  product  success  provides 
J  } 
the cash  flow  to attempt  to  sustain that position.  This  is not,  however 
always  successful. 
A  separate  study  (Chapter  6)  was  carried out of  'over-the-counter'  (OTC) 
sales  through  retailers  (products  for the  treatment of common  ailments 
that  do  not  require  a  doctor's prescription).  Ten  large  companies 
control  over  one  half of  sales  in this market,  and  of  the  leading  25 
products.  A high  degree  of concentration exists within  each  OTC 
market  segment. 
And  in  this market  the  leading companies  changed  in only  5  out of  30 
separately identified market  segments,  and  only  50  ne\v  products  \vere 
introduced  between  1968  and  1973.  Market  trends  indicate also  that 
the  OTC  market will  be  increasingly  dominated  by  the  large companies 
that already  can  exert considerable marketing  power. 
Thus  concentration ratios  that are  based essentially on different ways 
of measuring  the  size distribution of  firms  may  be  a  very misleading 
guide  to  the  intensity of  competition.  Market positions of competitors 
may  change  dramatically within a  seemingly  stable  framework,  and  the 
uncertainties  that are  inherent  in product  invention  and  innovation 
create a  climate  of  competition much  more  dynamic  and  powerful than 
might at first appear.  But  clearly the  dynamic  element  in competition 
....  - - ~ -- ~  ~ --9 
products are  sold,  and  in pharmaceuticals  this  is an  important  factor. 
Competition would  appear  to  be  a  more  dynamic  process  in the 
market  for ethical pharmaceuticals,  v1here  the products are  supplied as 
a  result of a  doctor's prescription,  than  in  the  'over-the'counter' 
market. PART  I 
CtLAPTER  1  - G~NERAL INTROpUCTION 13 
PART  I 
CHAPTER  1  GENERAL  INTRODUCTION 
1.  PURPOSE 
This  study  is part of  a  systematic  series of studies concerned with 
the  devaopment  of concentration in certain  indus~rial sectors of 
Member  States,  and with the analysis of  the effects of concentration 
on  the structure  of product  markets  and  on  competition. 
Iq  the U.K.  the  London  Business School has  studied  three  industrial 
sectors:  Mechanical Engineering;  Pharmaceutical Products;  and 
Photographic  Film.  This  report relates only  to Pharmaceutical Products. 
2.  OBJECTIVES 
In Part  I,  Chapter  2,  the  report  examines  the  concentration data  in 
the  format  required  for this series of studies.  In Part II the report 
examines  the  overall competitiveness  of  the U.K.  Pharmaceutical 
Industry  from  t~vo main  points of  view:  the marketing process  in  the 
industry,  as  reflected  in  sample  surveys  of  the prescribing behaviour 
of doctors,  and  in  the advertising and  promotional  expenditure of 
companies  in  the major  product markets;  and  secondly,  the competitive-
ness  of  the  industry  in  the  'over-the-counter'  retail market.  The 
intention in Part II is to make  some  general observations  on  the 
industry's marketing process  and  to present  the  results of empirical 
work  on: 
The  extent  to which  concentration among  the  leading brands 
and  manufacturers has  remained relatively stable or other-
wise  over  the  period  1964  to  1973  in the various  therapeutic 
product categories. 
The  nature  and  extent of  new  product  introductions,  together 
with  some  measure of their market  success. 14 
In addition to analysing the market  structure,  the  report examines 
more  specifically the  interaction between  concentration and  selected 
elements of  the  marketing mix.  Little research has  been undertaken 
in this area  and  therefore  the  results must  be  considered as  explorator) 
rather than definitive  in nature. 
Nevertheless,  empirical analysis of promotional  expenditure,  new 
products and pricing strategies for  a  representative  sample  of thera-
peutic categories was  undertaken with a  view  to obtaining  insights 
into  the  following: 
The  effects of patent expiration on  price levels. 
The  use of pricing strategy to  achieve market  share. 
The  use  of price,  new  products  and  promotional  strategies 
to protect market  share. 
The  level of promotional  expenditure  required  to  achieve 
a  significant market  share  for  new  products. 
3.  INDUSTRY  DEFINITION 
The  pharmaceuticals  industry manufactures  and  sells products  that can 
be  categorised into  the  following  broad classifications: 
(a)  Ethical  Pharmaceuticals:  Products  that have  to  be  prescribed 
by  a  qualified medical  doctor  (e.g.  penicillin).  They  may  be 
patented or non-patented products.  All ethical products  have  a 
generic  name  describing  the  indgredients.  Many  also have  a  brand 
name  for  the  purpose of  identifying  the  generic  products with a 
specific manufacturer. 
(b)  Over-the-Counter  (OTC)  Products:  Products,  usually  for  common 
ailments,  that do  not  require  a  prescription and  can  be  purchased 
in retail pharmacies,  and  sometimes  other retail outlets,  by  the 
consumer.  These  are  sometimes  referred  to  as  proprietary 
products,  although  some  observers of  the  industry use  the word 
'proprietary'  exclusively for  OTC  products  that have  been  subject 15 
patent drugs,  but  this  term will not  be  used  to avoid  possible 
confusion with patented ethical products. 
(c)  Veterinary Products: 
animals. 
Products  designed  for use  in treating 
(d)  Bulk Chemicals,  Capsules,  etc  ..  :  Products  sold  by  one  manufac-
turer to another at an  intermediate  stage  in  the manufacturing 
process. 
For  the  purpose  of  this paper,  inquiry has  been  confined  to  the markets 
for ethical and  OTC  products  in the United Kingdom.  A number  of 
pharmaceutical companies have diversified  into  the wider  'health care' 
field  by acquiring companies  manufacturing hospital  and  laboratory 
supplies  and  equipment.  These are excluded  from  the  definition of 
the pharmaceutical  industry used  in this report, 
4.  DATA  SOURCES 
The  data  included  in this report have  been  obtained  from  (i) a  broad 
background  of ongoing work  in all areas of pharmaceutical marketing, 
(ii) certain confidential reports prepared by  an international  firm 
of management  consultants,  (iii) a  review of published materials, 
(iv)  in-depth interviews with the marketing management  of  one 
pharmaceutical  company,  (v) analysis of market  research  reports, 
and  (vi)  the annual  audited accounts of pharmaceutical  companies 
(used  for both Parts  I  and  II). 
The  market  reports mentimed  in (v),  used  only  in Part II of this 
study,  are  the  standard market  research  sources used  by  all the 
major  pharmaceutical  companies.  They  are generally regarded  as 
reliable and  accurate.  A wide  range  of such reports are published, 
by Intercontinental Medical  Statistics Ltd.(IMS).  Those  used  for 
this research were: 
•  British Pharmaceutical  Index, 1964-1973:  an  annual  summary 
of estimated cash value  and percentage market  shares 
for  each ethical and  OTC  pharrr~ceutical product 16 
marketed  in the  U.K.  Ethical  products are divided  into 
92  therapeutic  categories  or  sub-markets,  and  OTC  products 
into 30 sub-markets.  The  reports are  based  on  a  monthly 
audit  of  600 retail chemists. 
Medical  Promotion  Index  1968-1973:  an annual  summary 
of estimated  promotional  expenditure  by  product.  This 
relates to the  same  ethical  sub-markets  as  the British 
Pharmaceutical  Index and  summarises data  from  several 
sources.  It does  not  cover  promotion  expenditure  on  OTC 
products.  The  following  points  should  be  noted  concerning 
this data: 
The  costs of sampling  and  company-sponsored functions 
are  excluded. 
Journal advertising and  direct mail  figures  are estimates 
reasonably  close  to  amounts  companies  actually spend. 
Costs  assigned  to sales respresentatives are  casted, 
observations  of  exposure and  impact achieved,  and  may 
differ greatly from  the  amounts  actually spent. 
The  number  of doctors  used  each  month  in  the  sample  for 
one  of  the  data  series was  100  up  until mid  1971  and 
200  thereafter. 
Up  to July 1972  the  estimated costs of sales representa-
tion is  likely to  be  understated  since  the  data  is based 
on  a  cost-per-call of  £2.5  from  1968-1970 and  £3.5  for 
1971.  This was  increased  to  £5.26  per call  in July  1972 
with  a  built-in inflation of  6%  p.a.  thereafter. 
The  market  reports  (used  in Part  II)  refer only  to products  sold  through 
retail pharmacists  (in otqer words,  they exclude  sales  made  to hospitals, 
and  all sales  of  OTC  products made  to non-pharmacist outlets).  This  data, 
therefore,  gives  a  me3sure  of ~ale only and  does  not provide  information 
on  absolute market  size and  absolute  oromotion expenditure.  Moreover, 
a  number  of  companies  included in the  survey  reporurl as  separate  companies 
are operating divisions  of  the  same  company,  due  to  recent mergers  and 
acquisitions,  but  from  a  marketing point of  view are in reality still 
separate  companies  (and  are  registered as  such).  Their advertising and 
promotion  expenditures are  shown  separately,  their individual  company 17 
them as  separate entities.  So  they are also  shown  as  separate companies 
in  this report.  Among  the  top  30 companies, 
common  ownership  are: 
Glaxo  - Allen & Hanbury 
Ciba  - Geigy 
those 
Warner  Lambert  - Parke  Davis 
Eli Lilly - Dist~ 
Beecham  - Bencard 
Hoechst  - Roussel  (as of  1975) 
that have 
To  preserve  the  obvious  confidentiality of this data  to  the pharmaceutical 
industry,  all references  to  individual  companies  and  individual products 
have  been  coded.  In Chapters  2  to  5,  companies  have  been  coded  alpha-
betically  from A  to Z,  AA  to AZ  and  BA  to  BZ,  according  to  their 1973 
sales of ethical pharmaceutical  products  via retail pharmacists.  Thus, 
company  A  is the  industry  leader,  company  Z is  the  26th  largest company, 
company  AA  is the  27th  largest,  etc.  In Chapter  6,  which  describes 
competition  in the ore  market,  companies  have  been  coded  alphabetically 
according  to  1973  sales of  OTC  products.  Consequently  companies A  to  Z 
in Chapter  6  are  not the  same  as  companies A  to Z  in  the earlier chapters. 
Where  individual products are  discussed  these are  referred  to by  company 
code  and  a  sub-scrips which  indicates  the relative  importance  of  that 
company's  product  in  the  therapeutic class under  discussion.  For  example, 
product  R1  is company  R's  largest product  in a  given  therapeutic class. 
Statistical data relating  to  39  'enterprises'  over  the period  1968-72  that 
form  the  basis of Part  1  of this  Report  are  given  in Appendix  I  (Tables A 
and  B). 
5.  OFFICIAL  REPORTS  ON  THE  INDUSTRY 
Before  corrrrnencing  our study,  we  should  mention  four official publications 
that also  thrm-1  light on  issues relating to concentration and  competition 
in pharmaceuticals,  to which  references  are  made  later.  These  are: 
(a)  Report  of  the  Committee  of Enquiry  into the  Relationship  of the 
Pharmaceutical  Industry with  the National Health Service,  1965-67 
(Cmnd  3410,  September  1967).  The  terms  of reference  included 18 
(b)  Focus  on  Pharmaceuticals  (National Economic  Development  Office, 
HMSO  1972).  This also  reported on  "the structure of the industry", 
and  some  of its statistical sources were  the  same  as  in this report. 
(c)  Beecham  Group  Limited  and  Glaxo  Group  Limited:  The  Boots  Company 
Limited  and  Glaxo  Group  Limited  (Monopolies  Commission  Report,  July 
1972).  This  report on  the  likely consequences  to  tffipublic  interest 
of  the  relevant mergers  contains also an analysis of  the  size of  fi~ 
and  R & D in the  industry. 
(d)  Chlordiazepoxide  and  Dia~epam (Monopolies  Commission  Report,  April 
1973).  This  is a  study of whether  a  monopoly  exists  in the  supply  o 
these products  (sold  in  the U.K.  by  Roche  Products Ltd.),  and,  if so 
whether  the prices of these  goods  are against the  public  interest. 19 
CHAPTER  2  CONCENTRATION  IN  PHARMACEUTICALS 
1.  DEFINITION  OF  THE  SECTOR 
As  already stated,  data for Part I  of this  study  (the Concentration 
Study  that forms  part of  the  larger series of E.E.C.  studies), was 
derived  from  the annual  audited  accounts of conpanies classified to 
the pharmaceutical  sector  (1968-72).  Companies  were  identified using 
membership  lists of the Association of  the British Pharmaceutical 
Industry and  the list of the  top  50  companies,  ranked  by  sales,  is 
published  in  the British Pharmaceutical  Ind~x.  Since collection was 
done  at the  company  level,  it was  possible to  include  the  financial 
variables  specified by  the  Commission:  turnover;  number  employed 
wages  and  salaries;  net profit before  tax;  gross cashflow;  'own  means' 
(share capital and  reserves);  exports.  (Basic  data are  given  in Appendix  L; 
In line with other E.E.C.  studies a  50%  cut-off point was  used:  that 
is,  individual  companies  are classified as  'enterprises'  entirely 
producing '..rithin  that sector if 50%  or more  of their turnover  is 
accounted  for  by  the  sales of products  classified to  that sector. 
Data was  only collected  for  companies manufacturing in the U.K.; 
importing companies  were  excluded  in  this part of our work. 
However,  coll~cting data at company  level brings its own  problems. 
For  example,  the  use  of  a  50%  cut-off point for  defining an enterprise 
meant  that both  Beecham  and I.C.I,,  along with some  other major manu-
facturers  such  as Fisons  and  Reckitt & Coleman,  could  not be  included 
in the  'enterprise'  analysis.  But  such companies  were  included  in 
'units of economic  activity'  where  any  company  (with over  100  employees) 
making  pharn~ceutical products would  be  included as  a  unit, but only 
to  the extent of its sales of pharmaceuticals.  It was  possible  to 
do  this only  for  'turnover',  because  company  accounts  do  not  reveal 
other  information  (and  even if such  data were  collected privately, 
much  of it would  be  very arbitrary).  The  1unitsof economic  activity' 
data  should,  nevertheless,  give  a  good  indication of market  concentration. 20 
The  pharmaceutical  industry covered  by  this  study employed  about 
56,000 persons  in 1971  (in  'enterprises'), with  'enterprise'  turnover 
of about  £536  million,  as  shown  in Table ·2.1.  The  'units of  economic  1 
activity'  (UEA)  data  showed  a  turnover of  £509  million - rather lower 
than  the Census  of Production figure  for  the  same  year of  £572  million 
(no  employment  data was  available on  a  UEA  basis).  These  figures 
demonstrate  that  the  firms  in  this  study covered a  high proportion of 
the  Census  defined  industry  in 1971;  and it is relevant  to  note  that 
in 1968  (the Census  year prior  to  1971)  the  correspondence was  even 
closer,  as  shown  in Table  2.1 below. 
TABLE  2.1  PHARMACEUTICALS  INDUSTRY  COMPARISONS  -----
L.B.S.  Study: 
1 Enterprises  1 
'UEA' 
Census  of Production: 
Year  1968 
Turnover  Employment 
(£million)  ('000) 
380 
344 
347 
49 
56 
Year  1971 
Turnover  Employment 
(£million)  ('000) 
536 
509 
572 
56 
62 
Source:  Census  of Production and  L.B.S.  Study. 
However,  Table  2.1  does  not directly reveal  the  fact  the  the  'enterprise' 
definition  includes  the  turnover  (and  employment)  of  the  non-pharma-
ceutical activities of companies  allocated  to  the pharmaceutical  sector; 
so while  the  'enterprise'  data  is more  statistically accurate,  the 
'UEA'  data  is perhaps  a  better estimate. 
Data  on  the  size distribution of  employees  reveals  that,  while  the 
Census  of Production  includes  a  large  number  of firms  in  the  industry 
with  less  than  100  employees  (a  size category excluded  from our  study) 
they accounted  for  less  than  10%  of  the  total  turnovera the  industry. 
Not  surprisingly  (as Table  2.1  implied)  several  important  companies  had 
to  be  omitted  from  the  'enterprise'  tables  because  of  their  specification 
(they were  important companies'In  this industry,  but  turnover  in this TABLE  2. 2 
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PHARMACEUTICALS  :  INDUSTRY  COMPARISONS 
SIZE  DISTRIBUTION,  1971 
Number  of ComEanies 
Size  Class  by  L.B.S.  Study 
Employment  'Enterprises' 
Census  of 
Production 
Turnover(£ mill.) 
Census  of Production 
0  - 99  0  219 
100  - 199  3  26 
200  - 399  6  25 
400  - 749  7  17 
750  and  over  15  17 
TOTAL  31  304 
Source:  Census  of  Production 1971  and  L.B.S.  Study. 
2.  GROWTH  OF  MAIN  VARIABLES 
37.7 
22.7 
78.8 
90.0 
343.1 
572.3 
The  main  results  for  the years  1968-72  are  given  in Table  2.3  below. 
The  definitions are  the  standard ones  as  required  by  the  E.E.C.  Com-
mission.  They  show  that while  turnover has  increased  by  57%  during 
1968-72,  net profits have  increased by  only  28% 
TABLE  2. 3  PHARMACEUTICALS  GROWTH  DATA 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  l  1972 
I  1968=100) 
UEA:  Turnover  (£m)  344  376  448  509  584  170 
1 Enterprise  1 :  Turnover  (£m)  380  423  482  536  598  157 
Wages  and 
Salaries 
II  54  59  69  78  86  159 
Net Profit  11  57  61  62  62  73  128 
Cash Flow 
II  68  73  75  78  80  118 
Own  Capital  11  159  177  185  190  220  138 
Exports  II  78  95  115  131  145  186 
Number 
Employed  1000  49  51  54  56  54  110 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study 22 
3.  CONCENTRATION  DATA 
Tables  2.4a and  2.4b  below give  the principal measures  of concentra-
tion based  on  turnover  for  (a)  'Enterprises and  (b)  'Units of Economic 
Activity'.  They  both  exhibit stability in concentration ratios over 
1968-72,  however  measured.  There  are  some  changes year  to year,  but 
they appear to be  very minor. 
However  the  'enterprise'  Table  shows  a  significantly higher  concentra-
tion  than  does  the  'UEA'  Table - the  simplest measure of 4-firm 
concentration ratio being  61%  and  40%  respectively in  1972.  Undoubtedly 
this is because  of  the  omission of many  firms  in  the  'enterprise'  data 
for  the  reason already explained. 
TABLE  2. 4a  CONCENTRATION  MEASURES  :  TURNOVER 
'ENTERPRISES I 
Concentration Measures  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
*4-firm concentration ratio  61  61  61  61  61 
*8-firm concentration ratio  77  77  77  77  77 
Gini co-efficient  • 667  • 675  • 673  • 673  • 672 
Herfindel  Index  150.2  149.1  146.8  145.7  145.3 
Entropy  -108.4  -108.7  -109.1  -109.2  -109.2 
Co-efficient of Variation  1.87  1.90  1.88  1.88  1.87 
(  Ln"f•m  L  .321  .332  .327  .328  .321 
(  n*m  22  22  22  22  21  Linda  ( 
Indices  ( 
Ln' h  L  1.1.1  1.06  1.05  1.05  1.06  ( 
(  n~h  3  3  3  3  3 
(* concentration ratios  rounded  to  the  nearest whole  number) 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study 23 
TABLE  2.4b  CONCENTRATION  MEASURES  TURNOVER 
1UEA 1 
Concentration Measures  1968  1969 
*4-firm concentration ratio  39  41 
*8-firm concentration ratio  56  58 
Gini co-efficient  .550  .568 
Herfindel Index  67.5  68.3 
1970 
40 
57 
.568 
66.1 
Entropy  -137.8  -136.6  -137.7 
Co-efficient of Variation  1.35  1.37  1.36 
(  Ln~'<-m  L  .141  .152  .150 
Linda 
(  n"':m  30  28  30 
Indices 
-( 
Ln 4h  L  1.33  1.05  .92  ( 
(  n ""h  2  2  2 
1971 
41 
58 
.573 
65.98 
-137.4 
1.36 
.152 
30 
.81 
2 
(*  concentration ratios  rounded  to  the nearest whole  number) 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 
1972 
40 
57 
.564 
62.6 
-138.5 
1.30 
.143 
30 
.66 
2 
Concentration measures  of  'Enterprise'  employment  are given in Table  2.5 
below.  They  show  in general a  falling  trend over  the period  1968-72, 
with ratios that are  broadly  similar  in  level to  those  in Table  2.4a 
on  'Enterprise'  turnover. 
TABLE  2. 5  CONCENTPATION  MEASURES  :  EMPLOYMENT 
1 ENTERPRISES 1 
1968  1969  1970 
4-firm concentration ratio  63  61  59 
8-firm concentration ratio  78  76  76 
Gini co-efficient  • 658  • 653  • 650 
Herfindcl  Index  158.3  149.4  140.0 
Entropy  -108.2  -110.6  -112 .o· 
Co-efficient of Variation  1. 94  1.90  1.83 
(  Ln*m  L  .313  .295  .292 
Linda 
(  n*m  23  23  24 
Indices 
-( 
(  Ln<h  L  1.41  1.39  1.34 
(  n<h  2  2  2 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study 
1971  1972 
59  59 
75  74 
• 645  • 649 
140.1  136.8 
-112.3  -113.3 
1.83  1.84 
.291  •  28L~ 
22  24 
1.26  1.26 
2  2 24 
Concentration measures  by  year  for each variable are  shown  in Appendix II 
for'enterprises'.  Turnover  conc~ntration seems  fairly stable, with 
employment  and  remuneration  showing  a  decrease  over  the  period.  Profits 
and cash  flow  show  some  increase  up  to  1970,  being steady thereafter. 
Own  capital and  exports  show  some  increase  in concentration. 
Merger Activity 
Many  of the  largest firms  in  the U.K.  industry  grew  historically by 
internal  growth  and  later by  acquisition in the  1950s  and  early 1960s. 
In  the  period  1968-72  there were  no  mergers  or acquisitions of signifi-
cance.  The  attempted mergers  of Beecham-Glaxo  and  Beecham-Boots were, 
however,  the  most  significant events  relating to potential structural 
change.  These  mergers  were  referred  to  the  Monopolies  Commission,  who 
recommended  that they  should not  be  permitted. 
Financial Ties  and  Interlocking Directorships 
Some  initial exploratory work was  done  on  this but,  yielding few  concrete 
results,  was  abandoned  in  favour of  the  more  productive assessment of 
product markets. 
Concentration and  Pharmaceutical Prices 
Finally,  in  studying relationships between  concentration  and  prices  in 
the U.K.  it should  be  mentioned  thoc the prices of prescription medicines 
since  1957  have  been  subject to negotiations  under  a  series of Voluntary 
Price Regulation  Schemes  (VPRS)  operated  between  the Department  of Health 
and  the  industry(!). 
The  objective of  the  Department of Health  in voluntary price  regulation 
has  been  to ensure  so  far as  possible  that prices are  reasonable.  The 
Sainsbury Report(2)  gives  (Para.  158)  an estimate that  the  second  VPRS 
(1961-64)  may  have  achieved direct savings of about  £3-8 million with 
possible  indirect savings  of up  to  £3  million per annum.  The  report 
concluded  (Para.  178)  that  there were  great obstacles  to price competition 
and  that  the price regulation  schemes  had  serious weaknesses. 
(1}  For  an outline of the  Schemes  see  International Price Comparison, 
NEDO,  1972. 
(2)  Report of the Committee  of Enqury  into  the  Relationship of  the 
Pharmaceutical  Industry with the National Health Service  (Chairman: 
Lord  Sainsbury),  HMSO,  1967,  Cmnd  3410. 25 
Subsequently,  the National Economic  Development Office(!)  commissioned 
a  report comparing  the  general  level of prices of medicines  in U.K.  and 
other countries(2).  The  main  conclusion was  that the  U.K.  market was 
clearly one  of the  lowest priced  in  1970  among  the  nine  countries  com-
pared.  Other international comparisons  of  pharmaceutical costs  and  prices 
quoted  in  'Focus  on  Pharmaceuticals'  also indicate  that  the  U.K.  is one 
of the  lowest pricedmarkets(3).  NEDO  also report estimates  that  the 
VPRS  between  1965  and  1970-had  resulted  in cost  reductions  of about  £18 
million,  a  national  saving of about  10%  of drug  costs  to  the National 
Health Service. 
There are t\vo  concise  indices  of costs  and  prices of pharmaceuticals: 
these  are  shown  in Table  2,6  below. 
TABLE  2. 6: 
COSTS  AND  PRICES  OF  PHA&~CEUTICALS 
Average  Cost  Price  Index  - Price  Index  -
Year  ~  PrescriEtion  Pharma'cal  Chemicals  Pharma'cal  PreEarations 
(pence) 
1968  57  86.6  99.7 
1969  62  87.5  98.3 
1970  67  100.0  100.0 
1971  76  110.4  103.6 
1972  82  107.7  109.1 
1973  88  117.6  117.3 
Source:  ABPI  Annual  Report  1973/4. 
It is also possible  to  build up  from  industry  sources m historical price 
ser~s for  individual  brands.  The  Sainsbury  Report  shows  an  example  of 
this on  page  49. 
Buc  of course  there are  great statistical problems  in deriving a  reliable 
price series  covering  a  large  number  of final  products when  product  charac-
teristics and  therapeutic  effectiveness are  changing  over  time, and  generally 
because  of  improving quality price  indices  overstate  the  true price  increases 
that  have  occured.  It is partly for  this  reason we  have  not  attempted  to 
relate measures  of overall  changes  in concentration  to overall price  indices, 
but have  preferred to  study pricing over  time  in  relation  to  individual 
products  and  to  con~etition within  therapeutic  categories.  This  is  given 
in Part II of the  report. 26 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
We  conclude  from Part I  of this study that concentration ratios in  the 
pharmaceutical  industry based  on  turnover have been broadly  stable over 
the period  1968-72,  with  significantly higher  figures  for  'enterprises' 
than  for  'units of economic  activity~, while  those  based  on  'enterprises' 
employment  have  been declining over  the period. 
The  purpose  of Part II of this  study is to explore what  the  stable 
concentration ratios  look  like when  viewed  in more  detail,  based on 
competition between  therapeutic classes of products.  It will be  seen 
that a  very different picture emerges. PART  II 
CHAPTER  3  THE  MARKETING  PROCESS 29 
PART  II 
CHAPTER  3  THE  MARKETING  PROCESS 
This  section describes  the  most  important  fea+.>~.res  of  the 
marketing  process  in both  the  ethical  and  OTC  pharmaceutical 
markets.  This will  permit  the  analysis  of  C~apters  4,  5  and 
6  to  be  interpreted in  a  more  meaningful  manner.  It specifically 
excludes  any  discussion  of  the  marketing  environment  such  as 
the  incidence  of  disease  and  details  of  the  Patents  Act, 
19~9. 
The  marketing  process  in  the  ethical  market  is governed  by 
the  unique  situation whereby  the doctor  prescribes,  the  patient 
consumes  and  the  government  pays.  01'C  products,  however,  which 
do  not  require  a  doctor's  prescription before  they can be  bought 
by  the  ultimate  consumer,  are  marketed  in substantially  the  same 
way  as  other fast moving  consumer  goods  such  as  grocery  and 
toiletry products. 
According  to the  industry trade association,  sales  of ethical 
pharmaceutical  products  to the National Health  Service were  valued  at 
£215  million at manufacturers  prices in 1972.  The  market  for  ryrc 
products was  estimated at £60 million in 1972,  although  only about half 
of this  volume  was  sold  through retail  pharmacists. 
1.  THE  ET!IICAL  PIL\llMACEUTICAL  l.iAl~KET  IS  NOT  GENEHALLY  PRICE 
COMPE'fi'fiVE 
The  demand  for  any  given  ethical  plwrmaceutical  product 
is dependent  on  the  incidence  of  illness,  the  quality  of  the 
drug  and  its  level  of  promotion. 
(1)  Doctors  Tend  to  Choose  Drugs  On·  Therapeutic  Grounds 
Even  under  the  National  Health Service  (NHS)  doctors 30 
prescribe,  and  in nearly all  cases will  prescribe 
what  they  consider  to  be  the  most  effective  drug  to 
treat the  particular  symptoms. 
The  NHS  monitors  doctors'  preseribing habits  by  com-
paring  the  total  expenditure  of all  their  prescriptions 
with  the  local  averages.  If a  particular doctor is 
considerably  in  excess  of  the  average,  he  will  be 
visited by  a  NHS  official  for  "a  diseussion  about  his 
prescribing habits".  This  rarely occurs  and  is  in 
practice,  the  only  sanction that  occurs. 
Where  two  drugs  are  of  approximately  equal  therapeutic 
value,  the  doctor  may  be  influenced  by  price  (if he 
knows  it), but  price  comparisons  are  difficult due  to 
different  dosage  strengths,  forms  and  efficiency. 
(2)  Price  Competition  Among  Bthical  Pharmaceutical  Manufacturers 
Is  Not  Common,  Tetracyclines  Being  A  Major  Exception 
There  is little or  no  price  competition  in  the  ethical 
pharmaceutical  industry.  There  are  two  main  reasons 
for  this: 
The  nature  of  the  consumer  precludes  price-cutting 
as  an  effective marketing  strategy 
There  are  few  economies  of  scale in the  produ~tion 
process. 
A  number  of  studies  have  been  undertaken  both  in the  US 
and  UK,  which  have  showed  that  average  price  levels  of 
pharmaceutical  products  remained  relatively constant 
during  the  l960's0 ' 2!  With  the  high rates  of  inflation 
(1)  COOPER,  M.H.  Prices  and  Profits  in  the  Pharmaceutical  Industry, 
nT..,J"•~  0  ......  -· ....  1 (}(...{-..  I."":.  1,  I. 31 
in  the  last two  years,  this  has  changed  to  some  degree 
as  a  number  of manufacturers  have  made  successful  appli-
catiomto  ~he  Department  of Health  to  raise their  prices. 
This  has  occurred on  products,  the  price  of  which actually 
declined  in the  preceeding years. 
The  extreme  price  competition  that occurred in  the  market 
for  tetracyclines after  the  expiration  of  the  patent  on 
oxytetracycline  in 1966  can  be  regar~ed as  an  exceptional 
situation.  Price  competition of  this  nature  did  not 
occur  in  any  other market  during  the  period under  study. 
This  is discussed  in  more  detail  in  Chapter  6. 
(3}  The  Government  Controls  The  Absolute  Levels  Of  Ethical 
Pharmaceuticals  Through  Its Voluntary  Price  Regulhtion  Scheme  (VPRS) 
The  VPRS  is an  informal  agreement  between  the  DHSS  and  the  industry's 
trade association  (ABPI).  The  basic principle of  the  Scheme  is to 
enSJ re  that the profits of a  company's  total UK  sales  to  the National 
Health Service  arereasonable.  What  is reasonable varies  according  to 
each  company's  financial  and marketing  position,  but currently a  before 
tax return on  investment of  20%-30%  is considered  reasonable.  If 
overall profits are  excessive  the  DHSS  negotiates price  reductions. 
With  regard  to price  increases of existing products,  manufacturers 
have  to  negotiate  increases on  products with a  large  turnover within 
the ceiling of overall reasonable profitability.  Companies  are free, 
however,  to vary  the  prices of minor products without  reference  to  the 
DHSS,  but  such price variations affect overall profitability and are 
therefore  taken  into account  indirectly.  Under  the  Scheme,  pharma-
ceutical companies  are required  to  submit annual  returns of sales, 
costs and profits according  to  an agreed  format. 32 
2.  ETHICAL  PHARMACEliT'ICALS  ru<.E  PROMOTED  ESCLUSIVELY  TO  DOCTORS 
THROUGH  DETAILMEN(l),  JOURNAL  ADVERTISI~G, DIRECT  MAIL  AND 
SAMPLING  AT  AN  ESTIMATED  ANNUAL  COST 
The  ethical  pharmaceuticals  industry spent about  £30  million 
on  promoting its products  to doctors  in 1972.  This  is broken down 
in  the  following way: 
TABLE  3.1  ~  Tlee  of  Exeenditure 
Value  %* 
(£  millions) 
Representatives  13.5  45% 
Literature  5.1  17 
Journal  Advertising  3.3  11 
Administration  3.6  12 
samples  2.4  8 
Other  2.1  7 
£30.0  100% 
* Percentages  based  on  Sainsbury Report. 
For  companies  with  only  a  short  product line,  the  propor-
tions  spent  for  various  forms  of  promotion are  unlikely  to be 
close  to  the  industry average. 
(1)  Detailmen  Arc  The  Most  Important  Element  In  The  Marketing 
Mix  Of  Most  Pharmaceutical  Companies 
All  ethical  pharmaceutical  manufacturers  apart  from  a 
few  small  companies  with  extremely specialised product 
lines  employ  detailmen  for  the  primary  purpose  of 
(1)  Detailmen  is  the  pharmaceutical  industrv's term for  it~ (1) 
( 2) 
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persuading doctors  to  prescribe their drugs.  The 
detailmen's  job  has  been defined as: 
"To  promote  the  use  of  and  to sell ethical  drugs 
and  other pharmaceutical  products  to  physicians, 
dentists,  hospitals,  and  retail and wholesale  drug 
establishments,  utilising knowledge  of medical 
practices,  drugs  and  medicines.  Informs  customers 
of  new  drugs,  explains  characteristics and  clinical 
studies  conducted with  drugs.  Discusses  dosage, 
use  and  effect of  new  drugs  and  medical  preparations".(!) 
In  their relationship with doctors,  detailmen  perform all 
(or most)  of  the  following  functions: 
• 
• 
Sell- by  persuading  doctors  to write  prescriptions 
for  their firm's  products. 
Provide  information  to  doctors  concerning  new 
products  and  new  developments  relating  to  existing 
products.  A  study by  the  American Medical  Assoc-
iation in  1958  showed  that  detailmen  are  the  most 
important  source  of  drug  information  to  doctors(2). 
There  is  no  reason  to  think the  situution  is  any 
different  in  the  UK. 
Distribute  samples  and  product  literature  to  doctors. 
Provide  the  company with  information relating  to 
side  effects  discovered  by  the  prescribing  doctors. 
Arrange  clinical  trials and  clinical research as 
appropriate. 
Transfer  the  experiences  of  one  doctor  to  others 
(the  experiences  of  colleagues  in  the  profession 
US  Dept.  Gf  Labour,  Dictionary  of  Occupational  Titles. 
"Attitudes  of  US  physicians  toward  the  American  Pharmaceutical 
Tnt'lncd.rv".  American  Medical  Association,  1958. 34 
are  important  to  the  doctor acceptance  of  a  product). 
Besides  calling on  doctors,  most  firms  have  their detail-
men  call  on  retail  pharmacists,  and  wholesalers  to  ensure 
that  they have  adequate  distribution for  their products. 
If a  product,  once  prescribed by  a  doctor  is not avail-
able  from  local  pharmacists,  manufacturers  soon  lose  good-
will with  the  doctor.  For these  reasons,  most  manu-
facturers  have  extremely liberal  return  goods  policies, 
particularly on  new  product  introductions.  While  ensuring 
distribution is  important,  calls  on  pharmacists  have  a 
number  of  other  important benefits.  These  are  to: 
• 
• 
Provide  pharmacists with  information  on  new  drugs, 
This  is  important because  pharmacists  sometimes 
advise  doctors  on  what  dosage  forms  and  in what 
strengths  new  drugs  are  available;  and  ~ay inform 
doctors  on  the  use  of  drugs  together  with  their 
indications  and  contra-indications. 
Influence  pharmacists  to fill generically pres-
cribed prescriptions  with  their products.  While 
approximately  15%  of  all  prescriptions are  generically 
written,  a  much  smaller  percentage  are filled by 
generic drugs  per  se,  since  only brand  name  drugs 
exist in many  therapeutic  categories. 
To  check  pharmacists'  inventory both  as  a  service 
to  the  pharmacist  and for  the  manufacturers  own 
purposes.  This  includes  reminding  them  to  return 
roducts  beforP  expiry dates where  necessarv. • 
• 
• 
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To  audit prescriptions  .  This  tells the  detailmen 
which  doctors  are  prescribing his  products  and 
therefore  helps  him  plan his  call schedule. 
To  obtain information  on  both doctors  and 
competitors. 
To  promote  OTC  drugs  to  the  pharmacist  (where  the 
manufacturer  markets  these  products  but does  not 
employ  a  separate salesforce). 
The  exact configuration of  any  given  company's  detail 
force  depends  on  the  size and nature  of  the  product 
line.  However,  most  of  the  larger pharmaceutical 
companies  in  the  UK  (those  ranking  among  the  top  ~0) 
have  between  50  and  70  detailmen  calling on  doctors 
and  pharmacists.  An  additional  10-12 are usually 
involved  in field salesforce management.  A  typical 
representative  makes  about  J/q calls  on  doctors  and 
4/5  calls  on  retail  pharmacists  each  day.  Most  of 
the  larger  companies  also  employ  an additional  5  to  10 
representatives  to  call  exclusively on  doctors  and 
pharmacists  within hospitals.  Although hospitals  only 
account  for  about  16%  of  total  sales  volume,  they are 
of  relatively greater  importance  than  their  volume 
indicates  due  to  the  high  proportion of  "influential 
prescribers"  generally found  in hospitals. 
The  typical  doctor  call  involves  one  major detail 
(selling the  merits  of  one  product)  and  two  minor 
detail~ as  well  as  leaving  literature and  samples 36 
to visit doctors  about  3/~ times  per  year,  but  in 
recent years it has  become  even  more  d1fficult for 
detailmen  to  talk  to  doctors.  It is  now  estimated 
that  the  average  detailman  sees  a  doctor  only  once 
out  of  every 2.5  calls. 
(2)  Various  Forms  of  Advertising  and  Promotion Are  Usually 
Included  In  The  Typical  Marketing  Mix 
Along  with  doctor detailing,  most  manufacturers  use  a 
combination  of  advertising  in  professional  journals, 
direct mailing  and  sampling  in  an  attempt  to  gain doctor 
acceptance  of  their products. 
Whereas  a  detail  force  is  a  relatively fixed  expense 
in  the  short  term  (at least on  the  upward  size),  these 
additional  forms  of  promotional  expenditure  are  variable 
in the  short  term,  thus  providing  some  degree  of  budget 
flexibility. 
In  practice  there  is  a  considerable  degree  of  disagree-
ment  among  firms  in  the  industry as  to  the  cost  efficiency 
of  the  alternative  promotional  methods  discussed  in this 
sub-section.  This  can  be  seen  from  Table  3. 2  which 
shows  the  percentage  of  promotional  expenditure  spent  by  each 
of  the  largest  companies  on  different  forms  of  promotion  in  1973. 
Journal  Advertising:  Placing  advertisements  in 
journals  published specifically for  the  medical 
and  allied professions  is  an  important means  of 
promoting  ethical  drugs.  It is particularly 
used  by  small  companies,  and  for  establishing 
and  enhancing  the  reputation  of  a  firm  and  its 
products.  It can  reach  many doctors  at  low  cost 
and  can  make  other  forms  of  advertising  more 
effective  by  familiarising  doctors  and  J?harmacists 
-· ..Lli TABLE  3.2: 
REPRI:~SENTATIVES 
55% 
58 
46 
60 
32 
46 
58 
35 
42 
58. 
37 
BREAKDOWN  OF 
PROMOTIONAL  EXPENDITURE  OF 
TEN  LAHGEST  ETHICAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL  HANUFACTUHEns 
1973 
JOURNAL  DIRECT  MAIL  TOTAL 
29%  16%  100% 
30  12  100 
50  4  100 
23  7  100 
48  20  100 
44  10  100 
32  10  100 
62  3  100 
47  11  100 
29  13  100 38 
Direct Mail:  Direct mail  advertising  is  used  for 
disseminating  important selling points  about  products 
as  well  as  to  obtain  requests  for  samples  and  to 
obtain more  complete  and  detailed information  on 
certain products.  It has  the  advantage  of  being 
fast  and  precise;  and  may,  if it is  of  the  inquiry 
seeking variety permit neasurable  results  to  be 
obtained.  The  cost  of  each direct mail  piece  tends 
to be  greater  than  the  corresponding  cost per doctor 
impression  in  a  journal,  but  can  be  more  cost effec-
tive  depeniling  on  the  quantity and  purpose  of  the 
mailing.  The  major  criticism against direct mail 
stems  from  the  huge  quantity of  literature received 
by  doctors  on  a  daily basis.  It is unlikely  that 
more  than  10%  of  doctors  read all  advertising 
received,  although  as  many  as  70%  might  glance  briefly 
at what  they receive. 
Sampling:  Depending  on  the  product,  sampling  can  be 
a  useful  element  in  the  promotional  mix.  For  widely 
prescribed  drugs  of  well  known  efficacy  (e.g.  broad 
sprectrum antibiotics),  sampling  appears .to  have 
little influence  on  doctors'  prescribing habits. 
Many  companies  have  probably over  spent  on  sampling 
in  recent years,  although  there  is  no  empirical 
evidence  to  support  this. 
Sampling  is not  confined  to  ethical  products  and  so 
manufacturers  that also sell  a  range  of  OTC  drugs 
(e.g.  antacids,  mild  laxatives,  etc.) often utilise 
doctor  sampling. 
In  terms  of  value,  the  three  types  of  promotion discussed 
above  account  for  the  vast majority of  promotional  expend-
iture.  However,  four  other  types  of  expenditure  are 
noteworthy: 
•  Films  - both general and  product specific 
•  Convention  exhibits 
•  Pens,  pads  and  "give-away"  items 
•  Doctor meetingsand  symposia  • 
The  last category  - doctor  meetings  - has  become  an 
increasingly important  means  of  communicating  with  doctors 
since  1969.  In 1969  it was  estimated thut 132,000 
doctors  attended meetings  whereas  in 1974  this  had 39 
(3)  Promotional  Expenditure Varies  Considerably  Both  By 
Product  Group  And  By  Company 
While  overall  industry promotional  expenditure  as  a 
percent  of  sales  is about  15%,  this varies  considerably 
between  the  various  therapeutic  product  categories. 
In 1973  for  example  - a  typical  year  - promotional 
expenditure  as  a  percent of  sales varied  from  zero  to 
~2%.  The  largest therapeutic  categories  showed  con-
siderably less  variation as  shown  in Table  3.3: 
TABLE  3. 3: 
Therapeutic  Category 
Broad  spectrum antibiotics 
Systemic  anti-inflammatories 
Bronchodilators 
Diuretics 
Promotional  Expenditure  as 
%  of  Sales 
1968 
6.6% 
~.7% 
8.5% 
4.7% 
1973 
8.9% 
5.7% 
6.5% 
5.2% 
It should  be  pointed  out  that  the above  percentages  only reflect 
the  competitive  situation at the  time.  For  example,  it is likely 
that  the  percentages  in the anti-inflammatory market  increased 
substantially after 1973  as  a  large  number  of new  products were 
introduced. 
For  the  50  leading pharmaceutical companies  competing  1n 
the  ethical drug market,  promotional  expenditure as  a  percentage 
of sales varied  in  1973  from  2%  for  one  of  the  most  prominent  com-
panies  to 999%  for  a  new  company  trying  to enter  the  ethical  pharma-
ceutical  industry for  the  first  time.  These  percentages did  not vary 
significantly over  the period  1968-1973.  A  few  of  the very 
small  companies,  particularly those  just entering  the U.K. 
market,  spent money  on  promotion  in excess of sales value. 40 
) •  BESIDES  PROMOTION,  MOST  COHPETITION  OCCURS  THROUGH  'l'HE 
INTRODUCTION  OF  NEW  PilODUCTS  CAPABLE  OF  GAINING  DOCTOH  ACCEPTANCE 
Besides  total  promotional effort (detailing,  advertising 
and  other  promotional  expenditures),  the  introduction  of  new 
and  improved  products  is  the  key  to  obtaining market penetration 
in  the  ethical  pharmaceutical  industry. 
Where  a  patented product is  a  major  therapeutic  advance 
unrivalled by better "substitute"  products,  it can  maintain  a 
strong market  position for  a  prolonged period of  time,  but most 
patented  products  have  a  product life  cycle  of  no  more  than 
6-10  years.  After allowing  for  the  fact  that it now  takes  from 
3  to  5  years  after  the  patent bas  been  granted before  the  product 
can  be  marketed,  one  can  see  thut many  products  reach  the  peak 
of  the  life cycle  before  the  16  year patent protection afforded 
by  the  1949  Patents  Act  expires.  A  typical  example  of  a  new 
product strategy  to  replace  a  patented  product  whose  rate  of 
sales  growth  has  started  to  decline  was  the  introduction  in  1972 
of  Amoxil  by  Beecham's  Bencard  division  to  extend  the  product 
life cycle  of  the  semi-synthetic  penicillins. 
Where  products  do  not  have  patent protection  - as  with 
penicillin and  streptomycin,  for  example  - product variations 
have  beeu  extensively used  to  extend the  life cycle  of  individual 
products (l).  Further  dis~ussion of  the  extent  of  new  product 
introductions  is  postponed  to  Chapter  4. 
(1)  This  was  noted by  Comanor  in  the  US  (Economica  196~)  and 
applies  equally  to  the  UK. 41 
q.  ABOUT  TWO-THIRDS  OF  ALL  ETHIC.AL  PJHRMACEUTICALS  HI  TIIE  UK 
ARE  DlS'fRIBUTED  VIA  1JliOLESJ\.LERS  TO  'i'HE  ll,  500  RETAIL  ChEMISTS 
(1)  The  Typical  Pharmaceutical  Manufacturer Sells Direct  Only 
To  The  Major  Retail  Chemist  Chains 
The  following  diagram  indicate& the  major  channels  of 
distribution for  a  medium-sized  pharmaceutical  manufac-
turer and  the  p~rcentage of  its domestic  sales  revenue 
that  passes  through  each  channel: 
jwholesale rs I 
;it  '  6\  L66%  ~.-?A-=----
Ph7rmaceuti cal  l-·-8%~~  All  Retailer--:1 
Manufacture_~.~.J  I  (Except  Boots) I 
Boots  1<-·10%--
1400 
Stores 
The  percentage  going  to  hospitals  is  likely to  vary 
between  companies  according  to  its product line.  However 
the  central  importance  of wholesalers  in  the  chain  of 
distribution is  evident in all  companies. 
(2)  Retailers  Receive~ Dispensing  Fee  And  A Maximum  Price 
For  Each  Drug  From  The  National  Health Service 
The  pharmacist is obliged  to  stock  those  products  listed  in  the 
formulary.  He  is re-imbursed  a  maximum  price for  each  product, 
plus  a  fee  of  about  10%  to  cover  overheads,  a  dispensing  fee  (at  the 
time  of writing)  of  b  0,24,  and  a  small  payment  for  the container. 
The  main  ways  in which  pharmacists  control  their margin 
is by taking  advantage  of  quantity discounts  offered by 
manufacturers  and  filling generically written prescrip-42 
(J)  The  Number  Of  Retail  Stores  Has  Declines  By  20%  Since  1955 
And  Is Expected  'fo  Continue  To  Do  So  In  The  Near  Future 
The  past 20  years  have  seen  a  decline  in  the  number  of 
retail pharmacies  in England  and  Wales  from  over  15,000 
in the  mid 1950's  to  12,500  in  1970.  This  number  is 
estimated  to have  declined  to  11,?00 in 1974,  and  is projected 
to fall to about  10,000 in  1980-85. 
After  the  advent  of  the  National  ileal th Service  in  l94B 
there  was  a  sharp  increase in the  number  of  pharmacies, 
as  the  volume  of  prescriptions  rose  sharply;  but the 
decline  over  the  last twenty years  has  occurred  in 
spite  of  an  increased volume  of  prescriptions  in the  1960s. 
TABLE  3.4: 
!M!!  STORES  Prescrietions Handled 
(in Millions) 
1937  13,000  65 
1949  14,848  202 
1957  15,192  207 
1967  13,618  271 
Source:  D.H.  Maddock  unpublished dissertation, 
1970. 
Chart  3.1  shows  graphically the  trend  in  the  number 
of pharmacies  in  the  U.K. NUMBER  OF 
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2·  THE  MARKETING  OF  OTC  PHODUCTS  DIFFERS  SUBSTANTIALLY  FROM  THAT 
OF  ETliiCAL  PIL-\iU:A.C.lWTIC •  .\LS 
(1)  All  The  Leading  OTC  Products  Are  Heavily  Promoted 
No  OTC  product  has  patent protection.  Manufactuers 
compete  with  each  other using all the  marketing variables 
at their disposal. 
The  nature  of  the  products  and  the  competition  in  the 
market  require  companies  to  use  bot~ "push-through" 
and  "pull-through" marketing  techniques.  Push-
through  techniques  aim  to  sell  products  to  the  retailer 
or wholesaler  and  therefore  include  marketing variables 
such  as  incentive  dis counts,  whereas  pull-through 
marketing is  designed  to create  consumer  demand.  In-
store  merchandising  and  special  promotion  offers  are 
key  elements  in  the  marketing  process  of  these  products, 
and may  have  both  push-through  and  pull-through  charac-
teristics. 
(2)  OTC  Products  Are  Characterised  By  Multi-Channel  Distribution 
Grocery Stores  (particularly the  larger  ones),  depart-
ment  stores  and  discount  stores  have  become  incrr,asingly 
important  channels  of  distribution for  OTC  products  in 
addition  to  the  traditional  retail  pharmacy outlets. 
Generally,  however,  it is  only  the  fast  moving  products 
(i.e.the heavily advertised brands  with  the  largest sales 
volumes)  that are  sold in  these  channels.  This  is 
because  the  concept  of  inventory turnover  is signifi-
cantly more  important for  grocery  and  discount stores 45 
The  existence  of  these  additional  channels  has  major 
repercussions  on  the  marketing  strategies  of  the  manu-
facturers  primarily because  separate  salesforce  from 
that  calling  on  retail pharmacists  is usually necessary. 
(3)  Doctor-Recommended  OTC  Products  Are  Rarely  Promoted  Direct 
To  The.  Consumer 
By  their nature,  a  few  OTC  products  tend to be  doctor-
recommended  (or  pharmacist  recommended)  products.  Certain 
laxatives  and  antacids  for  example,  fall  into  this  category. 
These  products  may  be  detailed to  doctors,  and  prescrip-
tions  may  be  written  for  them at the  doctor's  discretion. 
Doctor-recommended  products  are  rarely advertised to  the 
consumer  since  many  doctors  refuse  to  recommend  adver-
tised products.  Companies  generally have  a  choice  of 
which  strategy they  wish  to  follow. 
(~)  The  Different Characteristics  Of  The  OTC  Market  Are 
~ecognised In  The  Organisations  Of  The  Competing  Companies 
Although  six of  the  ten  lending  companies  in  the  OTC 
market are  also  among  the  ten  leading  companies  in  the 
ethical pharmaceutical  mamet,  the  internal  organisations 
of  these  companies  reflect the  different market  conditions 
for  ethical  and  OTC  products.  Manufacturers  have  either 
created separate  divisions  for  their  OTC  products  (e.g. 
Beecham  and  Burroughs-Wellcome)  or  have  created separate 
companies  as  have  Pfizer  and  Smith  Kline  & French: 
PARENT  CO. 
Pfizer 
Smith,  Kline 
& French 
NAME  OF  PlLLll11ACEUTICAL 
SUBSIDIARY 
Pfizer Ltd. 
NAME  OF  OTC 
SUBSIDIARY 
Unicliffe Ltd. 
S.K.F.  Laboratories  Ltd.  Menley & James  Ltd. 46 
CHAPTER  4  COMPETITON  IN THE 
ETHICAL  PHARMACEUTICAL  MARKET 
This  chapter measures  the  market  concentration among 
the  leading  brands  and  manufacturers  in the  UK  pharmaceutical 
industry,  and  the  extent  to which  these  levels have  remained 
relatively stable over  the  period  from 1964  to 1973. 
The  data source  used  for  this analysis was  the 
British Pharmaceutical Index 1964-1973 already described  in 
Chapter I.  As  this report  only covers  sales  through retail 
chemists,  the  market  shares do not  include  sales  to hospitals. 
Also  excluded  from  the  market  share  totals are  sales  of generic 
products,  but  these  only account  for  5%  of industry sales vol-
ume.  Only  in  three  of  the  30 largest therapeutic  classes does  the 
total  of generic sales  exceed  10%  of  the  total.  These  are non-
narcotic analgesics  (14%),  cough  remedies  (16%)  and  anti-systemic 
hormones  (19%). 
The  measure  of  market  share  used  to measure  concentration 
for  both  companies  and  brands was  cash value market  share  of 
branded  products.  Different results may  have  been  obtained if 
the  volume  of prescriptions written had  been  taken as  the measure. 
Due  to the relatively high  volume  of generic  prescriptions  in  some 
therapeutic categories which are in fact  filled  by  branded  products 
(because  no  generic  product is available),  cash value was  considered 
to be  a  more  meaningful  measure. 47 
The  separate  market  segments  in the  pharmaceutical 
industry are  probably better defined  than in many  other 
industries with the  result  that  the cross-elasticity 
of  demand  between the various  therapeutic markets  is 
low.  This  does  not  mean  however  that  the  market 
boundaries  are  clearly delineated.  Indeed,  some 
products  are  marketed in more  than one  therapeutic  class 
and  not all products within  the  same  therapeutic class 
are direct competitors.  Thus,  in the  market  for broad-
spectrum antibiotics  there  are  three distinct· sub-
markets;  the  cephalosporins,  the  tetracyclines  and 
the  semi-synthetic penicillins.  While  each of these 
sub-classes  treats  the  same  basic  symptoms,  the  manu-
facturers  make  different claims  for  each product  group 
and  charge  widely different prices.  Furthermore, 
market boundaries  are  dynamic  - a  fact not  often rec-
ognised  - and  many  companies  seek,  as  part of  their 
overall marketing  strategy,  to  make  new  claims  for 
their products  over  time  (product  differentiation), 
thereby continually shifting their market  segment  and 
trying  to  create  a  unique  market  niche. 
While  all therapeutic  classes  were  reviewed  the 
fourteen  leading  therapeutic  classes  which  accounted 
for  61.8%  of  industry volume  in 1973  have  been analysed 
in greater detail.  These  classes,  together with an 
indication of their relevant  importance  are  summarised 
in  Table  4.1.  Each has  a  1973  sales value  in TABLE  4.1: 
THERAPEUTIC  CLASS 
BROAD  SPECTRUH  ANTIBIOTICS 
SYSTE~HC ANTI-INFLAr1NATORIES 
BRONCHODILATORS 
OTHEH  HYPERTENSIVES 
DIUHETICS 
NON-NARCOTIC  ANALGESICS 
.NNTI-DEPRl:.SSANTS 
THANQUILLIZEHS 
*ANTI-A.t\GINA 
PLAIN  SKIN  HORMONES 
COUGH  HEHEDIES 
*PLAIN  .ANTACIDS 
*CONTRACEPTIVES 
*NO:-J -BARBITU  eLATE  SEDATIVES 
Sub-total 
78  OTHER  THEP..APEUTIC  CLASSES 
TOTAL 
48 
FOURTEEN  LEADING  THERAPJ 
PRODUCT  CLASSES 
RA.l'JKED  ACCORDING  TO  197: 
SALES  VOLUME 
PERCENTAGE  OF 
INDUSTRY  SALES(l) 
9.5% 
6.8 
6.4 
5.5 
5.1 
4.5 
4.0 
4.0 
3.1 
3.0 
2.9 
2.5 
2.5 
2.1 
61.9% 
38.1 
100.CY{o 
(l)  Industry sales are  those  estimated to  occur  through 
retail chemists  only based  on audit.  Hospitals 
are  excluded.  as  are  sales  of  non-branded  ethical  products 
*  Indicates  th&t  therapeutic  class  did not  appear  among 
leading  14  classes  in 1964. • 2: 
.3: 
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l.  NO  St-!ALL  GROUP  OF  HANUFACTURERS  OR  PRO DUCTS 
DONINATES  THE  ENTIRE  HAHKET 
( l)  The  Ten Largest  Companies  Accounted For  32%  of 
Industry Sales  in  1964  and  4J%  in 1973 
The  concentration of  market  power  among  the  ten 
leading  companies  in the  industry increased signifi-
cantly between  1964  and  1973. 
Companies  ranked 
according  to  annual 
sales  volume 
Cumulative  percent of  total ethical 
Top  5 
Next  5 
Next  10 
Next  10 
Next  10 
Next  10 
All Other 
pharmaceutical market 
20.6% 
32.2 
60.3 
72.7 
78.1 
81.3 
lOa% 
29.3% 
40.1 
64.2 
69.7 
76.8 
83.9 
lOa% 
26.6% 
43.2 
66.3 
71.3 
81.1 
85.8 
100'1~ 
The  share  of the  market  held by  the  largest  company 
varied between  6.1%  and  9.4%. 
(2)  The  Percentage  of  The  Total Market  Held  By  the 
Leading  BrandsH.emained Relatively Stable  Between 
1964  and  1973 
The  concentration levels  of  leading  brands  have 
remained  relatively constant: 
Products  ranked 
according  to  annual 
sales volume 
Top  .3 
Next  5 
Next  10 
Next  10 
Cumulative Percent  of  total ethical 
pharmaceutical  market 
14.9% 
21.9 
31.4 
J7.9 
16.  4~~ 
22.5 
31.2 
:n.3 
14.  0% 
21.5 
30.8 
36.8 -· 
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2.  WITHIN  EACH  OF  THE  INDUSTRY 1 S  N.AJOR  NARKET  SEG~iENTS 
AN  OLIGOPOLISTIC  STHUCTUHE  EXISTS 
While  the  overall levels  of  concentration in the 
ethical pharmaceutical market are not high,  most of the 
therapeutic market  segments  are dominated by  no  more  than two 
or three manufacturers.  In some  instances these manufacturers 
have more  than one  brand with Hhich  they maintain market 
dominance. 
(1)  The  Harket  Shares  Held  By  The  Leading  Companies 
In Each Therapeutic l-1arket  Did Not  Chan~ 
Significantly Between  1964  and  1973 
Table  4.4  shows  the  degree  of  market  concen-
tration among  the  leading  companies  for  the  30  largest 
therapeutic categories,  both for  1964  and  1973. 
Comparisons  between  the  t>vo  sets  of data indicate 
that  there  has  been  no  significant shift in the  degree 
of concentration in  the  industry during  the  period 
under  study: 
Comparison of  the  market  leaders  show·ed  that: 
•  In fifteen therapeutic  classes  there  was  an 
increase  in concentration and  in fourteen  there 
was  a  decrease  • 
•  In 13  of  the  30  categories,  market  shares 
changed  by  over  ten percentage  points  • 
•  In the  14  largest categories,  the  degree  of 51 
TABLE  4.4~  DEGREE  OF  CONCENTRATION 
IN  JO  LEADING 
THERAPEUTIC  CATEGORIES 
1964  Ai~D  1973 
. ( 1) 
:t-tARKET  LEADER  TOP  T\W  CO •  TOP  FOUR  CO. 
THERAPEUTIC  CLASS  1964  .!2.U  1964  1973  1964  197~  ' 
BROAD  SPECTRUH  ANTIBIOTICS  J9'%  42%  72%  58%  99%  80% 
SYSTEHIC  ANTI-INFLAHHATORIES  80  40  92  64  98  88 
BRONCHODILATORS  32  42  46  72  6J  82 
OTHEH.  HYPEH.TEI\'SIVES  62  67  94  82  98  91 
DIURETICS  51  4o  61  62  75  80 
NON-NAllCOTIC  ANALGESICS  29  JO  49  55  68  70 
A:\TI-DEPRESSANTS  J9  2J  6J  44  89  61 
TH.A~Q.UILLIZEHS  45  53  61  66  88  83 
ANTI-ANGINA  J4  6J  54  80  74  93 
PLAIN  SKIN  HOH:t-fONES  44  53  76  77  88  87 
COUGH  REHEDIES  41  42  55  62  66  69 
PLAIN  ANTACIDS  Jl  J4  45  48  68  65 
CONTHACEPTIVES  2J  33  40  65  65  82 
NON-BAHBITUHATE  SEDATIVES  34  72  59  86  86  95 
PERIPHERAL  VASODILATORS  42  Jl  60  61  75  80 
SYSTENIC  ANTIBIOTICS  41  32  64  62  86  90 
HAENATINICS  26  31  35  60  51  81 
ANTI-NAUSEANTS  55  34  74  61  91  82 
PENICILLINS  26  26  42  46  69  74 
ANTI-INFECTIVE  SKIN  HORMONES  17  2J  J4  41  64  59 
A~TI-OBESITY PREPARATIONS  23  60  45  79  77  94 
LAXATIVES  Jl  30  47  54  72  70 
ACTH-SY;:iTE~liC HOHMONES  27  20  5J  37  76  60 
OHAL  DIABETIC  57  44  91  65  99  9J 
l'Aill\INSON  A~TICONYULSANTS  41  40  76  66  87  89 
A:~TISPAS~!ODICS  35  16  54  31  7J  54 
SYSTI~MIC ANTIHISTAl'HNES  JO  24  55  48  8J  66 
Tl3  PREPAtl.ATIONS  4o  34  71  64  86  95 
O:tAL  COLD  PHEPARATIONS  44  53  68  74  92  90 
OTHER  VITANINS  60  40  76  66  9J  92 
(1)  Raru~ed according  to  1973  sales  volume. 52 
A  comparison  o~ the  concentration ratios  o~  the 
top  ~our companies  in each  therapeutic  class  between 
1964  and  1973  indicates  that  there  were  approximately 
as  many  increases  as  decreases  in concentration.  No 
noticeable  di~~erences exist,  however,  between  the 
larger  and  smaller  therapeutic  categories. 53 
(2)  There  Appears  To  Have  Been  An  Increase In The 
Degree  of Market  Fragmentation Among  The  Minor 
Brands  Between  1964  and  1973 
While  degrees  of  concentration have  remained 
relatively static,  the  total number  of  brands  has 
increased by  15%,  primarily during  the  period  1964  to 
1968. 
TABLE  4.5:  TOTAL  NUMBER  TOTAL  N""U~1BER  OF 
DATE  OF  BRANDS  SIGNIFICANT  BRANDS* 
1964  1109  1028 
1968  1265  1086 
1973  1274  934 
*  For  the  purpose  of  this section only,  a 
significant brand is  one  having  a  market 
share  greater  than  0.5'}'~. 
While  the  total number  of  brands  has  increased, 
the  number  of  significant brands  has  decreased  such 
that in 1973,  934  brands  with market  shares  of 0.5% 
or greater  supported  340  brands  with smaller  market 
shares.  This  indicates  that  there  has  been  increased 
fragmentation at  the  "bottom-end"  of  the  market:  a 
similar finding  to  that  of  a  study  undertaken  in the 
u.s.A. (l) 
The  14  leading  therapeutic  classes  have  been chiefly 
responsible  for  the  increase  in  the  total number  of 
brands.  From  Table  4.6  it can be  seen  that  between 
1964  and  1973,  the  total number  of brands  increased by 
During  this  same  period  the  number  of  signifi-
cant  brands  increased by  only  13~,  with  the  result  that TABLE  4.6: 
THERAPEUTIC 
CLASS 
BHOAD  SPECTRUN 
A~TIBIOTICS 
...,fSTEHIC  ANTI-
INFLANHATORIES 
lJHONCHODILATOH.S 
OTHEH  HYPERTENSIVES 
DIUHETICS 
NON-NARCOTIC  ANALGESICS 
AXTI-DEPRESSANTS 
THANQUILLIZERS 
ANTI-ANGINA 
PLAIN  SKIN  HORr·10NES 
--OUGH  REMEDIES 
PLAIN  ANTACIDS 
CONTRACEPTIVES 
NON-DARUITURATE 
SEDATIVES 
TOTALS 
54 
NUMBER  OF  BRANDS  Cot.tPETIXG 
IN  TOP  14  THERAPEUTIC 
CATEGORIES  1964,  1968  and  19( 
'  TOTAL  NO.OF  BRANDS  TOTAL  NO.OF  BRANDS  HITHl 
MARKET  SHAHE  > 0.  5~~ 
I  1964  1968  1973  Diff.  1964  1968  1973  Diff. 
1964/73  1964/73 
I 
19  32  45  +26  12  22  22  +10 
8  14  20  +12  7  10  14  +  7 
26  )2  44  +18  13  26  18  +  5 
13  15  18  +  5  8  8  10  +  2 
20  2.7  30  +10  20  20  19  - 1 
27  )4  37  +10  27  28  22  - 5 
17  23  29  +12  15  17  19  +  4 
16  21  29  +13  13  14  20  +  7 
15  16  18  +  3  13  13  10  - 3 
14  19  24  +10  13  11  16  +  3 
29  35  38  +  9  23  30  22  - 1 
24  28  33  +  9  20  23  25  +  5 
16  27  28  +12  15  20  14  - 1 
11  13  11  - 11  7  7  - 4 
255  336  4o4  +149  210  249  238  +28 55 
by 1973,  41%  of all brands  in these  14  categories  had 
market  shares  of 0.5%  or less.  In  the  balance  of  the 
market  - among  the  78  smaller  therapeutic  classes 
that  comprise  38%  of industry volume  - only  2o%  of 
the  brands  had  market  shares  of 0.5%  or  less in 1973. 
The  direction of  the  trend  over  the  period under  study 
how·ever  has  been  the  same,  as  is indica  ted by  the  table 
below. 
TABLE  4. 7: 
PERCENTAGE  OF  BRANDS  ~VI  TH  l'lARKET  S HAHE 
OF  0.  5S  OR  LESS 
YEAR 
1964 
1968 
1973 
14  LEADING 
THERAPEUTIC  CATEGORIES 
78  SHALLER 
THERAPEUTTC  CATEGOFIES 
Some  significant differences in the  degree  of 
fragmentation  that  has  occurred  among  minor brands 
exist  between different  therapeutic  classes.  For 
exMtple,  in the  market  for  broad-spectrum antibiotics, 
patent expiration on  oxytetracycline in 1966  caused  a 
flood  of  new  market  entrants,  many  of ·which  \vere 
successful in achieving  a  small market  share  in this 
large  market.  In other markets  ho1.;ever,  there  was  a 
reduction in the  number  of significant  ( -~;)  brands  in 
spite  of  large  increases in the  number  of brands. 
In contrast  to  the  trends  in the  number  of brands  described 
above,  the  number  of companies  competing  in the  top  14  therapeutic 
categories  remained  static between  1964  and  1968,  and  increased  by 
14%  between  1968  and  1973.  This is  shown  in  Table 4.8. 56 
TABLE  4.8: 
TOP  14  THERAPEUTIC 
CLASSES  1964 
BROAD  SPECTRUM  ANTIBIOTICS  6 
SYSTEMATIC  ANTI-INFLAMMATORIES  5 
BRONCHOD I LA TORS  16 
OTHER  HYPERTENSIVES  4 
DIURETICS  10 
NON-NARCOTIC  ANALGESICS  11 
ANTI  DEPRESSANTS  8 
TRANQUILLIZERS  7 
ANTI-ANGINA  10 
PLAIN  SKIN  HORMONES  7 
COUGH  REMEDIES  13 
PLAIN  ANTACIDS  14 
CONTRACEPTIVES  7 
NON-BARBITURATE  SEDATIVES  9 
TOTAL  127 
NUMBER  OF  COMPANIES  COMPETIN 
IN  TOP  14  THERAPEUTIC 
CATEGORIES  1964,  1968  AND  19 
INCREASE 
1968  1973  1973  OVER  1 
10  16  +10 
5  7  +  2 
12  10  6 
4  6  +  2 
10  12  +  2 
14  12  +  1 
9  13  +  5 
9  10  +  3 
10  6  - 4 
8  9  +  2 
9  13 
14  17  +  3 
8  8  +  1 
5  6  - 3 
127  145  +  18 57 
3.  THE  LARGEST  COMPANIES  ALL  HOLD  STRONG  MARKET  POSITIONS  IN  ONE 
OR  MORE  OF  THE  LARGEST  THERAPEUTIC  CATEGORIES 
(1)  The  Leading  Companies  Have  Strong Market  Positions 
In  One  Or  More  Theraoeutic  Classes 
Table  4.9  shows  the number  of  therapeutic classes  in which 
each  of  the  30 leading companies  rank among  the  top  four 
companies.  The  data  shows  that: 
•  All  companies  rank  among  the  top  4  companies 
in from  three  to  sixteen  therapeutic  classes. 
The  median  number  of'  classes in  1-:hich  a  com-
pany  ranks  among  the  top  four  is six. 
•  All  companies  rank  among  the  top  t\.Jo  in  f'rom 
( 2) 
one  to  nine  therapeutic  classes.  The  median 
is  four. 
Eight  companies  (six  of'  which  rank  among  the 
top  10  companies)  rank  among  the  top  4  com-
panies  in more  than  10  therapeutic  classes. 
The  Ten Largest Companies  All Hold  Dominant 
Market Positions  In At  Least  One  or  The  Top  14 
Therapeutic  Classes 
The  28  leading  companies  in 1973  ( shmvn  later in 
Table  4.15  competed  in at least  two  of  the  top 
14  therapeutic  classes;  however for  a  company  to 
rank  among  the  largest in the  industry  - in the  top 
10 for  example  - it needs  to  have  a  dominant  market 
position in at least  one  of  the  large  therapeutic  classes. 
The  matrix  in  Table  4.10  shows  those  therapeutic 
classes  in which  each  of the  fifteen leading  companies 
are  the  market  leaders,  and/or  have  products  with 
market  shares  totalling more  than lo%.  The  six largest 
companies  have  the  leading  position in eight  of'  the  ten TABLE  4.9: 
COMPANY 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
L 
M 
N 
0 
p 
Q 
R 
s 
T 
u 
v 
w 
X 
y 
z 
AA 
AB 
AC 
AD 
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TOP  30  COHPANIES  PARTICI!'A~ 
IN  DIFFERENT  THERAPEUTIC 
CLASSES  (1973) 
NO.  OF  THERAPEUTIC  CLASSES 
IN  WHICH  CO:HPANY  RANKS 
IN  TOP  2  IN  TOP  4 
5  8 
5  10 
3  3 
7  9 
7  11 
6  11 
5  14 
9  11 
3  4 
8  10 
3  4 
3  7 
2  4 
7  9 
8  11 
5  8 
4  10 
1  3 
3  6 
2  5 
2  5 
3  5 
2  5 
1  6 
2  8 
4  6 
2  3 
6  9 
4  5 
3  5 TABLE  4.10: 
COMPANIES*>'<* 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
v 
VI 
VII 
VIII 
IX 
X 
XI 
XII 
XIII 
XIV 
1%* 
XV  16% 
24% 
15% 
40"/;/< 
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30% 
40%*, 
67%  22%  23% 
53" 
0%* 
15% 
DOMINANT  MARKET  POSITIONS 
HELD  BY  15  LEADING  COl.IPA~IES 
IN  TOP  1~ TIDJRAPEUTIC 
CLASSES  IN  1973** 
13% 
2%* 
72%* 
63%*  25% 
i53% 
17% 
*  Indicates  leading  company  in  therapeutic  class. 
**  Participation of  company  only  shown  if market share 
exceeds  10%. 
***  New  rankings  used  to protect data confidentiality. bU 
(3)  The  Success  Of  Individual  Companies Is Dependent  On 
Obtaining  Between  One  and  Three  Leading  Products 
Table  4.11  shows  the  number  of products which  each 
of  the  15  leading  companies  have  among  both  the  top  25  and 
top 50  products.  The  data  shows  that: 
No  compan  has  more  than  four  products. 
21  out  of  25  of  the  leading  products  are  marketed 
by  12  of  the  15  leading  companies. 
All  manufacturers  have  at least  one  major  product. 
The  importance  of  one  or a  few  products  to any  one 
company is illustrated by  the  example  of  Pfizer and  Lederle  in 
the list of  leading  companies.  In  1964  Pfizer was  the  largest 
company  in  the  U.K.  ethical  pharmaceutical  market,  and  Lederle 
was  second.  Lederle had  the  largest  product  on  the  market  and 
the  sixth largest  product,  while  Pfizer had  the  second  largest 
product.  With  these  three  products,  the  two  companies  are 
reported  to have  controiled  over  two-thirds  of  the  large,  broad 
Spectrum antibiotic market.  The  introduction of  a  new  product 
by ICI  (Imperacin),  coupled with  the  expiration  of  patent  pro-
tection,  caused  these  companies'  products  to lose  market  share 
rapidly.  By  1973  none  of  the  three  products  ranked  among  the 
top 50 products.  As  for  the  companies,  neither  ranked  among 
the  top  15  companies. TABLE  4.11: 
Leading  Companies 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
L 
M 
N 
0 
All.  other  manufacturers 
61 
NUMBER  OF  LEADING  PRODUCTS 
BY  COMPANY  (1973) 
Number  of Products 
Among  Top  Among  Products 
25  Products  ranked  26-50  TOTAL 
4  4 
J  J 
1  2  J 
3  l.  4 
J  J 
l.  l.  2 
1  2  3 
l.  l. 
2  2 
l.  l. 
l.  l.  2 
2  2 
l.  l. 
l.  l. 
2  2 
4  l.2  l.6 
25  25  50 62 
4.  WITHIN  EACH  HARKET  SEGMENT  THE  LEADING  BRANDS  AND 
COI-!PAL"l"IES  CHANGED  SIGNIFICANTLY  BETi~'EEN  1964  AND  197~ 
Although an oligopolistic market  structure exists 
in each  o~  the  therapeutic  classes,  analysis  o~ the 
individual brands  indicates  that  the  market  dominance 
o~ any  one  product is relatively short-lived.  The 
market  dominance  o~ any  one  company  also  tends  to  be 
short-lived although  a  ~ew companies  have  been able  to 
introduce  success~ul replacement  products  to  maintain 
their market  dominance (l) • 
( 1) 
Table  4.12  shows  ~or each  o~ 1964,  1968  and 
1973,  the  leading  companies  in the  JO  largest thera-
peutic  c~tegories.  Analysis  indicates  that: 
•  There  were  twice  as  many  changes  in market 
leadership in  the  ~ive year period  ~rom 1964 
to  1968  in  the  top  14  therapeutic  classes  than 
there were  in the  ~o11owing  ~ive year period, 
1968  to  1973. 
More  than  one  change  in market  leadership 
occurred in only  ~ive  classes~  and  in two  o~ 
these  the  company  that  was  dominant  in 1964 
had  regained by  1973  the  market  leadership 
that it had  lost in 1968. 
•  In one  third  o~ the  classes,  the  dominant 
position  o~ the  market  leader did not  change 
over  the  nine  year period. 
0 . fABLE  4.12: 
THERAPEUTIC  CLASS 
(ranked  according  to 
1973  sales) 
1  Broad Spectrum Antibiotics 
2  Systemic  Anti-Inflammatories 
3  Bronchodilators 
4  Other Hypertensives 
5  Diuretics 
6  Non-Narcotic Analgesics 
7 Anti-Depressants 
8  Tranquillizers 
9  Anti-Angina 
0  Plain Skin  Hormones 
1  Cough  Remedies 
2  Plain Antacids 
3  Contraceptives 
4  Non-Barbiturate  Sedatives 
5  Peripheral Vasodilators 
.6  Systemic Antibiotics 
.7  Haematinics 
.8  Anti-Nauseants 
.9  Penicillins 
!0  Anti-Infective  Skin Hormones 
!1  Anti-Obesity Preparations 
!2  Laxatives 
!3  Acth-Systemic  HormoneE 
!It  Oral  Diabetic 
!5  Parkinson Anticonvulsants 
!6  Antispasmodics 
!7  Systemic Antihistamines 
!8  TB  Preparations 
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CHANGE  IN  MARKET  LEADERS 
BETWEEN  1964  AND  1972  IN  30 
LARGEST  THERAPEUTIC  CLASSES 
NUMBER  OF  CHANGES 
IN  MARKET 
LEADERSHIP 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1968-73 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 64 
When  the  top  four  companies  in each therapeutic 
class  in 1964  and  1973  are  compared,  less  change  is 
evident.  57%  of  the  companies  that  comprised  the  top 
four  in 1964  were  still among  the  top four  in 1973. 
{2)  Changes  In Company  Rankings  Between  1964  And  1973 
Provide  Inconclusive  Evidence 
To  assess  the  overall  competitive  movement  within 
the  industry,  the first five  companies  in each  of  the 
14  leading  therapeutic  classes  were  ranked  (by  cash 
value  market  share)  for  each  year  from  1964  through 
1973.  Each  change  in ranking  was  regarded  as  one 
change  (such  that if two  companies  changed position, 
that would  count  as  two  changes).  Actual  movements 
between  the  years  was  then  taken as  a  percentage  of 
possible  number  of  changes.  The  results  are  shown 
belmv. 
TABLE  4.13: 
COMPANY  RANKING  CHANGES  BETiv'EEN  ADJACENT 
YEAHS  :F'OR  TOP  14  THERAPEUTIC  CLASSES 
to 
the 
Actual  No.  of'  Possible No.  of  Actual as % 
changes  changes  of'  Eossible 
1964/65  18  70  25.7% 
1965/66  28  70  40.0 
1966/67  33  70  47.1 
1967/68  24  70  34.3 
1968/69  17  70  24.3 
1969/70  29  70  41.4 
1970/71  25  70  35.7 
1971/72  17  70  24.3 
1972/73  16  70  22.8 65 
Cooper  undertook  a  similar analysis  covering all 
92  therapeutic  classes  for  the  period 1961-64,  and 
noted  "a marked  decline  in the  competitive  interchange 
••••  from  5o%  between  1960  and  1961  to  JJ%  in 196J/1964"(l). 
By  taking  a  longer  period,  suc:h  a  conclusion appears 
less  easy  to  substantiate. 66 
5.  OVER  400  CO:r.IPLETELY  NE1v  PRODUCTS  WERE  INTRODUCED 
BET\·iEEN  1964  A1'JD  1973 
The  extent of new  product  competition and  the 
success  of new·  products  provides  a  usefu1 measure  of 
the  degree  of  competitiveness  of  a  market.  This  section 
presents  the  results of analysis  undertaken  to  determine 
how  many  ne1v  products  were  introduced into  the  UK 
market  together with  some  measure  of  their market 
success during  the  period 1964  to  1973. 
No  clear definition of'  exactly what is a  new 
ethical pharmaceutical product exists.  For  the  pur-
poses  of  this study,  only those  products  appearing as 
nel'i  brand names  in the  market  research reports 
are  regarded  as  new  products.  This  definition 
obviously excludes  improvements  to  existing products, 
and  does  not  count  as  a  new  prod 
strength of an  existing  product~ 
( 1)  The  Rate  0£ New  Product  Int_ 
To  Have  Slo•,red  Down  Since  tht. 
The  1950's  and  early 1960's  was 
9W  f'orm  or dosage 
n  Appears 
~960' s 
period of un-
precedented  nel..r  product activity in the  pharmaceutical 
industry.  During  this period pharmaceutical remedies 
were  discovered  £or  many  o£  the  common  diseases,  but 
as major  research breakthroughs  became  narder  to  obtain 
(as  in the  field  of'  cancer  f'or  example),.  the  rate  of' 
new  product  introductions  has  slowed  down. 
The  fo11owing  table gives  an  indication of'  how 67 
TABLE  4.14: 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
Number  of'  N e\v  BFanded Products 
Introduced That Gained Harket 
Share  of'  1.0%  or More 
37 
44 
38 
45 
47 
21 
30 
25 
_j.J! 
305 
The  above  table  should  be  interpreted cautiously 
since  the  most  recently introduced products  have  had 
less  time  to  achieve  a  1.0%  market  share,  coupled with 
the  f'act  that it has  become  more  diff'icult  to  obtain 
even  a  small market  share (l)  •  However,  since  most 
new  products  achieve  their maximum  market  penetration 
(2) 
in under  two  years  ,  the  sudden drop after 1969  is 
f'airly significant.  The  exceptionally high level  of' 
product  introductions  from  1966  to  1969  is due  in large 
measure  to  the  expiration of  the  patent  on oxytetracycline 
in 1966. 68 
(2)  Most  New  Product  Introductions Have  Been 
Concentrated In The  Larger  Therapeutic  Classes 
The  top  14  therapeutic  clas~es accounted  £or 
235,  or  57%  o£ all new  product  introductions between 
the  beginning  of  1965  and  the  end  o£  1973.  This  high 
degree  o£  ne\v  product activity is  commensurate  with 
the  total  importance  of  these  classes in the  market: 
in 1973  they  accounted  for  62'{o  of industry sales. 
As  might  be  expected  by  far  the  largest number 
of new  brands  have  been  introduced in the  broad  spectrum 
antibiotic market  and  in  the  oral  contraceptive market. 
The  expiration of  the  patent  on  oxytetracycline  in 1966 
caused  a  large  influx of new  brands  (JO)  into  that 
market.  In the  market  for  oral  contraceptives,  rapid 
product  development  occurred  as  manufacturers  and  the 
medical  profession learned more  about  this relatively 
ne\v  field  of  pharmaceuticals,  and  28  new  products  were 
introduced. 
There  is substantial variation between  other 
therapeutic  classes  as  to  the  number  of  new  brands 
intro  due ed.  No  correlation appears  to  exist between 
the  number  of  new  brands  introduced  and  either  the  size 
of  the  therapeutic  markets  or  their average  growth 
rates  over  the  past  five  years.  Large  numbers  of  new 
brands  appear  both  in rapidly  growing  and  declining 
therapeutic  classes,  and  vice versa.  Only in one  of 
the  top  JO  therapeutic  classes  - Anti-obesity Preparations  -
have  no  new  brands  been  introduced. 69 
(3)  28  of  the Top  30  Companies  Moved  Into New  Therapeutic  Classes 
Between  1964  and  1973 
Among  the  top  30 companies,  the  introduction of  products  into 
therapeutic classes where  they  had  not  previously competed  tended 
to be  heavily concentrated  in  the  larger  therapeutic classes. 
There  is little or  no  correlation between  company  size and  the 
number  of new  brands  introduced  or new  markets  entered.  Among  the 
30  top  companies  - ranked  according to 1973  sales  of  ethical  pharma-
ceuticals in retail chemists  - the  number  of  brands  introduced 
varies  between  one  (for  company  M)  and  16  (for  ~ompany F).  The 
average  is eight.  Similarly,  entry by  companies  into new  therapeutic 
classes varies widely,  between  none  for  company  M and  ten  for 
company  U.  It is of interest that  the  largest  company  through-
out  the whole  period  (company  A)  entered  only  one  new  therapeutic 
class. 70 
(4)  Only One-Third  Of  The  407  New Products  Introduced 
Obtained A  Market  Share  of  5~b  Or Hore 
The  following  table  shows  the  number  of new  products 
that achieved  the  following  market  shares  in their res-
pective  therapeutic  class  from  1964  to  1973: 
TABLE  4.15  Market  Share Achieved 
Over  15% 
10.0  - 14.9% 
s.o - 9-9% 
1.0 - 4.9% 
Under  1% 
Number  of Products 
49 
22 
70 
164 
102 
Analysis  of  new  product  introductions into  the 
top  14  therapeutic  classes  (which account  for  57%  of 
all new  product  introduction)  indicates that it is 
considerably more  difficult to  obtain a  5%  market  share 
in these  classes.  Of  the  141  products  obtaining  a  5% 
market  share  only forty  (28%)  achieved  this  in the  14 
largest  therapeutic  classes.  This  finding  supports 
that of section 2.2  of this chapter which  indicated 
that it is considerably more  difficult to  obtain a 
reasonable  market  share  in the  larger sub-segments. 
Table  4.16  shows  the  forty  new  products  that achieved at least 
a  5%  share,  and  shows  their market  share and  its value  for 
1973. 
Some  analysis  of  which  companies  have  introduced 
the  successful products is shown in  Table  4.17 
This  shows  the  market  shares  obtained by  the  30  largest 
companies  for  their new  products,  both by existing 
...... • 
• 
71 
More  companies  :failed  to  achieve  market  shares 
o:f  5.0%  on  introducing  new  products  into  their 
existing markets  than  when  they  introduced  new 
products  into  therapeutic  clas::.es  where  they 
had  not  previously competed.  One  possible 
explanation :for  this is that  when  a  pharmaceutical 
company  enters  a  new  therapeutic  class it is 
more  likely to  have  a  product  which represents 
a  major  research breakthrough  than  i:f it is 
introducing an  improved  product  in its existing 
markets. 
The  larger  companies  tended  to be  more  success-
:ful  in introducing  new  products  than  the  smaller 
compani.es 
classes. 
particularly in new  therapeutic 
O:f  the  26  new  products  introduced 
by  the  ten  largest manu:facturers  into  ne\v  thera-
peutic  classes,  lO  achieved market  shares  in excess 
o:f  15%  and  3  o:f  between  5%  and  15%. TABLE  4.16: 
% 
THERAPEUTIC  CLASS  Market 
Share 
BHOAD  SPECTRUM  AN'l'llHO'riCS  16.3 
2.8 
SYSTEMIC  ANTI-INFLAMMATORIES  24.3 
39.6 
6.4 
9.1 
DRONCHODILATORS  6.6 
21.4 
47.3 
DTUHETICS  17.3 
NON-NARCOTIC  ANALGESICS  9.2 
ANTI-DEPHESSANTS  4.8 
6.4 
5.4 
5.5 
1.9 
6.2 
4.6 
9.0 
6.6 
'fH.ANQUILLIZERS  5.0 
A~TI-AXGINA  16.9 
24.7 
38.2 
PLAIS  SKIN  IIORMONr:S  5.1 
5.0 
4.5 
COUGH  RE~iEDIES  8.2 
11.6 
9.5 
PLAIN  ASTACIDS  9.2 
CUSTRACEPTIVES 
12.4 
3.9 
19.8 
23.3 
10.4 
9.8 
NON-BARBITURATE  SEDATIVES  71.1 
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NEW  PHODUCTS  ACHIEVING  A 
MARKET  SHARE  GREATER  TIL\N  5% 
IN  MAJOR  THERAPEUTIC  CATEGORII 
Value  of  No.of  years 
Market  to  achieve  Share  5%  share 
(range  in 
£millions} 
3.5-4.0  2 
0.5-1. 0  2 
3.5-4.0  1 
6.0-6.5  1 
0.5-1.0  1 
1. 0-1.5  3 
0.5-1. 0  2 
3.0-3.5  2 
6.0-6.5  1 
2.0-2.5  2 
0.5-1. 0  4 
<  0.5  2 
0.5-1. 0  5 
<:o. 5  4 
<:0. 5  7 
<:0.5  2 
0.5-1. 0  2 
<o.5  2 
0.5-1. 0  2 
0.5-1. 0  3 
<o.5  3 
1. 0-1.5  2 
1.5-2. 0  2 
2.5-3.0  2 
(0.5  1 
<0.5  3 
(0.5  5 
0.5-1. 0  2 
0.5-1. 0  2 
0.5-1. 0  2 
0.5-1. 0  3 
2 
0.5-1. 0  3 
<o.5  2 
1. 0-1.5  1 
1. 0-l.  5  2 
0.5-l.O  2 
0.5-1. 0  4 
3. 0-3.5  2 73 
TABLE  4.1J: 
Companies  (ranked  Existing Markets 
according  to  1973 
sales  volume)  .::::5%  5.0-11!.9%  715% 
A,  B.  C  3  5  2 
D,  E~ F  9  5  -
G,  H,  I  8  - 2 
J, K,  L  11  1  1 
M,  N,  0  7  2  -
P,  Q,  R  13  1  -
S,  T,  U  6  2  2 
V,  W,  X  9  1  -
Y,  Z,AA  5  4  -
AB,  AC,  AD  - - 1 
TOTAL  71  21  8 
<5% 
3 
2 
6 
6 
4 
4 
12 
5 
4 
3 
49 
MARKET  SHARES  OF  NEN  PRODT:CT 
INTRODUCED  INTO  30  LARGEST 
THERAPEUTIC  CLASSES 
1965-1973 
New  Therapeutic 
Classes  Total 
5.0-14.9%  >15% 
- 3  16 
1  2  19 
- 4  20 
3  2  24 
1  - 14 
3  - 21 
1  - 23 
2  - 17 
1  - 14 
1  1  6 
13  12  174 74 
(6)  Most  Successful New  Products Take  Two  Years  Or 
Less  To  Achieve  A  57o  Harket  Share 
The  £allowing  table  shows  that  7o%  of all new 
products  that  achieved  a  5%  market  share  in the  top  14 
therapeutic  classes did  so  in under  tlvo  years. 
TABLE  4.18  No.  of  years  required  to 
obtain  5%  market  share 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5+ 
No.  of products 
7 
21 
6 
3 
3 
40 
Since  the  market  share data f'or  the year  of' 
introduction covers  a  f'ull  twelve  month period  and 
many  of'  the  products  were  not  introduced until  the 
latter half of  the  year,  the  above  table is more  likely 
to  overstate  than  understate  the  amount  of  time 
required. 
Analysis  of  the  highly successf'ul  ne1v  products  -
those  that  eventually obtained  a  market  share  in excess 
of'  15%  - in  Table  4.16  indicates  that  none  of  the 
thirteen ne\v  products  in this category  took  longer  than 
two  years  to  achieve  a  5%  share. 
For  a  "typical"  product,  the rapid initial market 
penetration is f'ollowed  by  a  peak  market  share,  which 
then declines at varying  speeds  but usually considerably 
more  slowly  than it initially grew.  Analysis  of  the 
products  th:-1t  were  introduced  during  the  three  year 75 
or bef'ore  indicated that  46%  of all new·  product  intro-
ductions achieved  their maximum  market  penetration 
within  three years  of  their date  of  introduction: 
TABLE  4.19: 
Market Penetration of New  Products* 
Introduced  1965-67 
No.  of years after 
introduction to 
achieve  maximum 
market  penetration 
l. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Market  share  still 
increasing 
No.  of products 
7 
21 
27 
11 
13 
17 
3 
1 
1 
1.8 
119 
*  Only  products  that  achieved  1%  market 
share  in 1973  or  be~ore. 76 
6.  THE  EFFECT  OF  PATENT  EXPIRATIONS  ON  MARKET  SHARES 
HAS  ONLY  BEEN  BOTICEABLE  IN  THE  ANTIBIOTIC  ~~KET 
Up  to the  end  of  1973  there were  few  patent expirations  on 
products holding  dominant  market  positions.  Furthermore  many 
products are  covered  by multiple  patents and  multiple patent 
expiration dates. 
(1)  In The  Broad  Spectrum Antibiotic Market  The 
Introduction of  Semi~ynthetic Pencillins Had 
More  Impact  On  Market  Share  Than  Patent  Expiration 
The  expiration of  the  patent  on  oxytetracycline  in  1966 
is the best  known  example  of  patent expiration in the U.K. 
pharmaceutical  industry.  By  the  time  of  patent expiration, 
Beecham's  semi-synthetic penicillin,ampicillin  (Penbritin)1 is 
estimated  to have  achieved  a  market  share approximately equal  to 
that of  the  leading  products  of both Pfizer and  Lederle.  The 
introduction  by I.C.I.  of a  branded  oxytetracycline  (Imperacin) 
on  the  day  of  patent  expiration, at a  substantially reduced 
price,  undoubtedly hastened  the  reduction  of  the  leaders' 
market  share,  but at no  point did  this new  product  achieve  a 
substantial market  share.  Generically,  neither of Lederle's 
products were  oxytetracyclines,  but  in  terms  of therapeutic 
effectiveness  they were  substantially similar,  and  therefore 
suffered  the  same  fate as  Pfizer's  products. 
Other  introductions  of oxytetracycline  products were 
considerably less successful,  and  are generally believed  not 
to have  achieved  market  shares  in excess  of  2%. 77 
(2)  Most  Other  Patent Expirations Have  Had  Litt.le  Or  No  Effect 
On  Market  Shares  Due  In  Part  To  The  Low  Level  of Generic 
Prescribing  Of  The  Products  Concerned 
In addition  to oxytetracycline,  there have  been  patent 
expirations  on  a  number  of other leading  products  between 
1966  and  1973.  Table 4.20 shows  the market  share histories 
of  five  products  in four different  therapeutic classes before 
and  after patent expiration, 
TABLE  4. 20 
Market 
Share 
Market  Market  3  Years 
erapeutic  Share  Share  At  After  Expiration 
\farket  ( 1964)  Expiration  Expiration  Date 
ychostimu1ants  33%  24%  14%  1970 
anqui1lizers  15  7  5  1969 
::tnquil1izers  8  2  2*  1971 
ti- 17  19  18  1966  stamines 
inary  71  68  43  1966 
tibacterials 
*  1973  market  share 78 
Examination  of  the individual  products  and  their markets 
indicates that: 
Most  products  that lost market  share after patent 
expirations were already beginning  to lose their 
market  position before  patent expiration.  The  first 
two  products  in Table 4.20 are classic examples  of 
this, although  even with  the  leading  product in the 
urinary antibacterial market a  superior competitive 
product was  introduced  just prior to patent expiration. 
Patent expiration does  not necessarily mean  the  loss 
of market  share as  is evidenced  in the market  for 
anti-histamines. 
A large number  of new  generically equivalent  products  do 
not usually enter  the market after patent expiration. 
Those  that have  entered  the  market have  not  usually 
been  successful.  In the market  for  urinary anti-
bacterials,  one  company  was  able  to enter  the market 
with a  generically equivalent  product before  patent 
expiration,  but never gained  a  market  share greater 
than 2.  9.%  • 
One  of  the  key  factors  that determines  the extent  to which  new 
generically equivalent  products are successful  in gaining market 
share  from a  product whose  patent has  expired,  is the  level  of generic 
prescribing of  the  product  concerned.  Where  there is a  low level  of 
generic prescribing,  patent expiration is }ess likely to be  associated 
with a  loss  of  market  share due  to an  influx of new  generically equiva-
lent products. 
In  the  case  of  the  urinary antibacterial  product  (and  its generic 
equivalents)  more  than  15%  of. prescriptions are written generically, 
and  in the  tranquillizer and  anti-depressant markets,  virtually no 
generic  prescriptions are written.  This  contrasts sharply to  the 79 
CHAPTER  5  INTERACTION  BETWEEN  CONCENTRATION 
AND  MARKETING  IN  THE  ETHICAL  PHARMACEUTICAL  MARKET 
Marketing strategy can  be  de£ined as  a  set  o£ 
principles  (or decision rules} .that adjust  the  firm's 
marketing mix  to  react  to  environmental  changes  over 
time,  where  the  marketing  mix  re£ers  to  "the  amount 
and  kinds  of marketing variables  a  £irm is  using at  a 
particular time  to  stimulate  company  sales"(l).  The 
major  marketing variables  used  in the ethical pharma-
ceutical industry are  limited by  the  nature  of  the 
product  and  market  to: 
• 
• 
• 
Promotion (selling,  advertising,  direct 
mail,  sampling  etc.) 
Price 
Ne~ product  introductions 
Other  variables  commonly  used  in the  marketine 
mix,  such as  decisions relating  to  channels  of distri-
bution are  the  same  for all manufacturers  in the  UK 
ethical pharmaceutical industry.  These  are  excluded 
£rom  consideration in this  chapter. 
Most  o£  the research that  has  been  undertaken  to 
date  on  the  interaction between  concentration and 
marketing  strategy  has  looked  £or  a  simple  correlation 
between concentration and  advertising promotion  ou an 
inter-industry basis( 2).  One  such  study  has  been 
( 1) 
( 2) 
Kotler,  P.  l-1arketing Hanagement  1967,  Prentice-
Hall,  p.  266-67. 
See  :for  example:  Telser L.G.,  ''Advertising  and  Competition" 
Journal of Political Economy  1964.  ' 
Mann,  H,  Henning J,  and  Heehan J, 
"Advertising  and  Concentration:  An 
Empirical Investigation",  Journal  of  - ..... ,_ 80 
undertaken  on  a  cross-sectional basis  between  the various  therapeutic 
markets  in  the  UK  pharmaceutical  industry(!)•  In an  attempt  to  progress 
beyond  this  type  of analysis,  this chapter introduces a  broader  frame-
work  for analysing  the  possible  inter-relationships and  measures certain 
selected relationships within  the  limits of the available data. 
1.  NO  SIMPLE  CORRELATION  EXISTS  BE~~EN CONCENTRATION  AND 
SELLING  EXPENDITURE 
The  relationship  between  advertising and market  concentration has  been 
for  decade~ a  subject for  debate  and analysis.  The  debate  has  been  stimu-
lating and  productive,  the analysis  less  so:  It is worth  recalling the 
main propostions of the  debate  and  the  outcome  of  the  analysis. 
Traditional  theory  suggests  that product differentiation can give  sellers 
some  discretion in  their pricing policies.  Whether  this results  in profits 
over  and  above  a  normal  rate of return on  capital  remains  to  be  established. 
In addition,  the  incentive  to advertise  is stronger in oligopoly  than 
under monopoly.  A priori reasoning,  however,  does  not  indicate whether 
the  levels of advertising or profits are higher under monopoly  or oligopoly. 
The  principal question  raised by  theory is that  heavy advertising may 
lead  to  increased market concentration and  the possibility of  super-normal 
profits.  The  mechanism by  which  this might  begin  is  through  economies 
of  scale  in advertising and  the erection of entry barriers. 
Statistical investigations of  this relationship  between advertising and 
concentration have hardly been conclusive.  Scherer(2)  in  summarising  the 
evidence concludes: 
11the  net observed effect of advertising on concentration  is a  weak 
one  surrounded  by  considerable variance." 
The  issue  is clouded  by  a  methodological  problem:  does  advertising  lead 
to  concentration, or is an oligopolistic structure more  conducive  to 
advertising rivalry  than  a  competitive  industry  structure1 
The  'barriers  to  entry' argument allmvs  a  restatement  of the advertising-
competition hypothesis  in  terms of advertising-profits.  Where  entry is 
easy,  profits  through differentiation can  be  competed  away  by 
(1)  W.D.  Reekie,  "The  Economics  of Innovation with Special  Reference  to 
the  UK  Pharmaceutical  Industry",  1971,  Ph.D.  thesis published by  ABPI. 
(2)  F.M.  Scherer,  "Industrial Market  Structure and  Economic  Performance", 
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new  entrants.  Moreover,  high advertising may  be  used  defensively 
resulting in a  negative  effect on  profits.  With high entry barriers, 
however,  possibly  arising through  some  combination of research  and 
advertising costs,  then  firms  may  consistently earn  monopoly  profits. 
The  definitive study  here  is  by  Comanor  and Wilson(!).  They  found  a  posi-
tive and  statistically significant relationship between  the  advertising/ 
sales ratio and  return  on  stockholders'  equity over  43  common  goods 
industry groups,  taking into account capital  requirements,  productive 
scale economies,  and  concentration in the market.  Industries with high 
advertising expenditure were  found  to command  profits  roughly  50%  higher 
than  the average  (i.e.  12%  return on  equity other than  8%  for  1954-57). 
These  results  provide fairly strong support  for  the hypothesis that 
advertising is an  important  source  of monopoly  profit.  However,  it is 
fair to  say  that  the majority of  studies have  provided very  inconclusive 
evidence  - possibly due  to  data  limitations and  occasionally  due  to 
faulty  methodology. 
In the  context of pharmaceuticals,  the  dominant  features  seem  to  be: 
Research  expenditure  leads  to  improved  and  new  brands. 
Very little price competition. 
Intense rivalry  in selling expenditures. 
Highly oligopolistic structure  in therapeutic classes. 
In  these  conditions  simple  correlations between  advertising/sales ratios 
and  concenttatim are very  likely  to  be  uninformative.  In a  published 
Ph.D.  thesis(2)  Reekie  does  indeed  find  low  correlations.  These  findings 
do  ~ot, of course,  prove  that no  causal  relationship exists:  it is  simply 
that none  can  be  identified statistically. 82 
2.  A  CO.t-1PLEX  PATTERN  OF  CAUSE  AND  EFFECT  RELATIONSHIPS 
EXIST  BET"'EEN  CONCENTRATION  AND  VARIOUS  ELEMENTS 
OF  THE  rvlAI<KE'riNG  HIX 
While  no  direct relationship exists between  con-
centration levels  and  the  sales/promotion ratio,  the 
nature  of  competition in the  individual  therapeutic 
categories is still likely  to  have  an  effect  on most 
marketing  decisions.  Decisions  relating  to  new  products, 
product pricing and  levels  o£  promotional  expenditure 
cannot  be  made,  particularly in an  oligopolistic market, 
without  regard  to  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  o£ 
competitors.  In  turn,  these  marketing  decisions  - which 
in aggregate  make  up  £irms 1  marketing  strategies  - also 
affect  the  levels  of  economic  concentration.  The  inter-
relationship of  concentration and marketing  strategy 
should  thus  be  viewed  in both directions.  For  this 
reason,  the  possibility with which  individual  cause 
and  effect relationships  can be  identified and  measured 
is limited. 
Where  an oligopolistic market  structure exists, 
as  in most  therapeutic  classes,  two  to  three  companies 
will usually  have  a  large  market  share  and  the  rest  o£ 
the  market will be  fragmented  among  many  small  com-
petitors with  low market  shares.  The  event  that  deter-
mines  whether  a  company's  products  achieve  a  high  or 
low market  share is whether  or not it obtains doctor 
acceptance; 83 
an event  which itself is  a  function of the  level of 
promotional  expenditure at the  time  of product  intro-
duction and  the  inherent  therapeutic quality of  the  drug. 
The  quality of  the  drug vis-a-vis existing competitors 
is,  in turn,  a  function  of  the quality and  direction 
•  of  the  firm's  research and development  efforts. 
Having  obtained  a  given market  share,  the  market 
share  is in itself likely to  be  one  ~f the factors  that 
determine,  or at the  very least  act as  a  constraint 
on  marketing decisions.  This  flow  of relation-
ships is  shown  in  Chart  5.1.  It indicates  that 
where  a  company  obtains a  high  market  share  in a  given 
therapeutic class,  this will lead  to  high profits with 
the  result  that  the  company \vill be  able  to: 
•  Support  high  levels  of promotional  expend-
iture  to  defend its market  position. 
This  means  high barriers  to  market  entry, 
which  in turn reinforces  high levels  of 
concentration. 
•  Spend  huge  sums  on  promoting  new  products 
in new  therapeutic  classes as  well  as  those 
in which it already  has  a  strong market 
position.  This  increases  the  Likelihood 
of  gaining  doctor  acceptance,  obtaining  a 
high market  share  and  reinforcing  the  oligo-
polistic  nature  of  the  market. 
•  Support  a  large research  and  development OTHER 
THE:l.APEUTIC 
CLAS:-:iES 
84 
CHART  5.1: 
POSSIBLE  IKTEJ'l.-HELATIONSHIP  OF  ECONONIC 
CO.NCENTRATIOl\  A.'i 0  HIHl.hETING  STHATEGY  IN  A 
TYPICAL  THEHAl'EUTIC  CLASS 
LEVEL  OF 
PROMOTIONAL 
EXPENDITUHE 
ON  NE\v 
PRODUCTS 
FLO\/  OF 
NE\{ 
PRODUCTS  PATE~\ 
LAI~S~ 
HIGH  PROHOTIONAL 
EXPENDITUHE  TO 
MAINTAIN  SHARE 
L0\1~ 
PiWHOTIONAL 
EXPENDITUHE 
PRICE  l 
~--~---------____:,~  REDUCTIO~~ t-
STRATEGY 
l 
~
IZE,  QUALITY ANj 
L---~  DIHECTION  OF'  R  &  D 1"';--------------E--------------
EFFORT  ~------------------~-------------------
INCIDEN'E 
OF 
KEY: 
0 
0 
- Company  dec~sions 
- Events  which  can be 
influenced  by  company 
decisions 
Factors  outside  company 
contr~l or  sphere  of 
influence 85 
Vhere  a  company  obtains  only  a  low market  share, 
the  reverse situation occurs.  There  is  some  evidence 
from  a  study in the United States  that  companies  having 
products with  10\v  market  shares  tend  to use  price 
reduction strategies  to  increase  their share  of  the 
(1) 
market.  This  appears  to  hold  true  in the United 
Kingdom,  and  has  therefore  been  included in  Chart 5.1. 
The  rest of this  chapter will discuss  in greater 
detail,  and  quantify where  the  available  data permits, 
the  major  inter-relationships discussed  in this 
section. 
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3.  ACHIEVING  SIGNIFICANT  HAR!\.ET  SHARES  FOR  NEW 
PRODUCTS  REQUIHES  LARGE  INITIAL  PRONOTION 
EXPENDITUHES 
To  determine  the  relationship,  if any,  between 
the  market  share  obtained by  naw  products  and  promotional 
expenditure,  all products  that  \vere  introduced during 
the  four  years  from  1968-1971,  and  obtained  a  15%  market 
share  by  1973  were  analysed.  In addition,  all products 
introduced in  the  same  years  into  the  top  14  therapeutic 
categories  and  achieving  a  market  share  of between  5% 
and  157b  were  analysed. 
(1~  Entrants Achieving  At  Least  15~ Market  Shares 
Typically Incur  29~ Of Market  Promotion 
Expenditure In The  Initial Years 
While  the  brands  had different patterns  of 
promotional  mix  (i.e.  the  allocation of'  expenditure  to 
detailing,  journals,  direct mail},  each marketer  con-
ducted  intensive  promotion campaigns  during  the brand's 
first  three  to  four  years  on  the  market. 
With  only  one  exception,  all brands  incurred 
a  share  of  marketing  expenditures  well  in excess  of 
share  of  market  sales  in  the  start-up years.  The 
level of  promotional  expenditure  was  so  high that  only 
5  out  of  22  brands  succeeded in reducing  their promo-
tional  expenditure  to average  market  levels  (as  indicated 
by  share  of'  promotions  equalling  share  of'  sales)  within 
three  years  of'  entering  the  market.  The  following 
table  shm;.·s  the  relationship between average  promotional 87 
class promotion expendi  tur~  and  market  shares  during 
the  i"J..rst  four  years  after  product  introduction: 
Promotional  Expenditure(%) 
Harket  Share(~b) 
Year  1 
27% 
7% 
Year  2 
32% 
197; 
Year  3 
2% 
246b  I 
Brands  that  achieved market  shares  of between 
5%  and  15<]'~  did  not  promote  as  intensively as  those 
achieving  market  shares  of  15%  or more.  However  in 
most  cases  the  share  of  promotions  well  exceeds  sales 
Year  4 
share  in the initial years.  This  is  indicated by  the 
fo llo,dng  table: 
Promotional  Expenditure(%) 
Market  Share  (%) 
Year  1  Year  2  Year  3  Year  4 
Chart  5.2  shows  comparative  sales  and 
promotion expenditure  shares  for  the  two  groups  of 
successful  manufactur~rs.  Chart  5.3  shows  pro-
motion and  sales  patterns  for  four  successful  new 
products.,  two  of which  (products  A  and  C)  are  in the  same  therapeutic 
class. 
( 2)  High Promoti·on  Levels  Are  Bv  Themselves 
Insufficient To  Gain Hlgh  Marhet  Share 
While  a  strategy of  incurring  promotion expend-
itures at  a  high level is required  to  achieve  a  sig-
nifican~ market  share within a  3-to-4 year  period 
after  entry,  it does  not  guarantee  success.  Many  of 
the  products  that  failed  to achieve market  shares  of 
5%,  or  even  1%,  incurred  shares  of  market  promotion 
expenditures  well in excess  of  share  of  sales  during mCENT  OF 
~RKET SALES 
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incurred promotion expenditures  that  exceeded  the  absolute 
levels  of sales during  the  three  year period.  Among  the 
products  that  currently look  as  though  their sales '\vill 
fail  to  reach their levels  of  promotion  expenditure are 
three  new  entrants into  the  market  for  combination topical 
steroids: 
TOTAL 
SALES 
TOTAL  PRO?-IOTION 
EXPENDITURE 
MONTHS  SINCE 
INTRODUCTION 
Product  1 
Product  2 
Product  1 
£90,000 
£18,000 
£57,000 
£94,000 
£36-,000 
£i79,·000 
24 
12 
18 
For  each  therapeutic class,  there  appears  to be 
a  threshhold  level  of promotional  expenditure  below 
which  the  manufacturer  (or brand)  is  so  marginal  that 
his marketing message  is dro,,med  out  by  competing 
marketing messages.  If a  company's  promotion  of  a 
product  is belo'\v  this minimum  leve  1,  the  fact  that its 
share  of market  promotion expenditure  is  in excess  of 
its market  share  is unimportant.  This is illustrated 
by  the  fact  that  where  promotional  expenditure  exceeded 
20%  o:f  market  promotion expenditure  :for  each  o:f  three 
years,  all but  a  :few  brands  in minor  therapeutic  classes 
(e.g.  dermatological  scalp products}  achieved market 
shares  o:f  at least  15~  o:f  sales. 
(J)  The  Required Levels  O:f  Promotion Expenditure  Act 
As  Significant Barriers  To  ?-Jarket  Entry 
Using  the  levels  o:f  promotion  expenditure  required 
to  launch  a  successful  ne'"  product,  minimum  promotional 
requirements  can be  estimated  :for  each  o:f  the  therapeutic 
classes.  To  obtain a  15%  market  share  in each of the 91 
10 therapeutic classes with  the highest absolute levels of  promotion 
expenditure  in 1973,  this is estimated  to have  varied  between  £51,000 
and  £560,000 per year  for  each of three years.  The  mean  for all ten 
classes was  £249,000,  an  increase  of  111%  over  the  mean  level  in 1968. 
The  barriers in  these  largest market  segments are  unlikely to be 
higher  than in  the  remaining  segments  since  these  ten~rapeutic 
classes account  for approximately the  same  percentage  of  promotion 
expenditures as  they do  of total  industry sales  • 
. ----· 92 
4.  THE  DEVELOPHENT  OF  HEPLACE'HENT  PRODUCTS  HAS  BEEN 
SUCCESSFULLY  USED  BY  SOHE  COf·fPANIES  TO  PROTECT 
HIGH  MARKET  SHAHE  POSITIONS 
There  are  a  number  of  examples  in the  ethical 
pharmaceutical industry where  companies  have  developed 
and  marketed  substitute  products  to  attract the  sales 
of its  own  threatened brand.  This is  a  defensive 
marketing  strategy and  relies heavily  on  the  goodwill 
that  the  company  has  developed  •vi th doctors  for 
providing  effective  products  in a  given  therapeutic 
class.  Examples  of  such new  product  strategies  have 
occurred in the  following  four  therapeutic classes: 
Therapeutic  Class 
Psychostimulants 
Medium/Narrow 
Spectrum Anti-
biotics 
Penicillins 
Non-narcotic 
analgesics 
As  a  practical tool with which  to  defend  market  sharP 
positions,  the  development  of new  products appears  to be  most 
effective where  the  threatened  brand  has  a  high market  share, 
and where  high promotional  expenditure  is used  to  launch  the 
replacement  product.  For  example,  one  company  in the  market  for 
medium  and  narrow  spectru,n antibiotics was  successful  in 
transferring its promotional  support  from  one  product  to 
another  in 1970.  This  is  shown  in Chart  5.4. 
Timins:!:  as well  as  nromorinn::~l  <>vnonrHt-..  ,..,.  ,~ 1> 
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CHART  5.4:  SELECTED  PATTERNS  OF  REPLACE-
MENT  PHODUCT  CATEGORIES 
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important - both of which  are illustrated by  one companys comparatively 
unsuccessful attempt  to  replace its leading product  in  the market 
for psychostimulants.  In this case,  promotional  expenditure  in  the 
first full year after introduction was  only  11.5%  of the  sub-market 
total,  and  declined  thereafter.  Furthermore  by  the  time  the  second 
product was  introduced,  the first product's market position had 
already been declining for  3  to  4  years  due  to competition  from 
another company's  product.  This is also  shown  in Chart 5.4. 
In  the penicillin market  - where  there has  never  been  any 
patent protection - the continual  introduction of new  products  has 
been  an  important  means  of maintaining market position. 95 
5.  PRICE  REDUCTION  STRATEGIES  HAVE  NOT  GENERALLY  BEEN 
EF'l''ECTIVE  IN  ACHIEVING  LAHGE  HARKET  SHAHES 
As  was  explained in Chapter  3,  the  ethical 
pharmaceutical market  is not  generally price compet-
itive.  HO\~·ever,  examples  of'  price reductions  being 
used  to  gain market  share  have  occurred.  These  are 
of'  two  types  - those  related  to patent expiration and 
those  unrelated  to  patent expiration.  Direct  govern-
mcnt  pressure  to  lo~er prices,  as  in the  case  of'  Roche 
and  Librium,  has  rarely occurred. 
(·1)  Only  One  Product Has  Achieved  A Significant Market  Share 
Wi.th  A Price Reduction  Strategy At  The  Time  of  Patent 
Expiration 
When  the  patent  on  oxytetracycline expired  in 1966  and 
I.C.I.  introduced  a  branded  equivalent  product,  a  full  scale 
Price war  started in the market  for broad  spectrum antibiotics. 
I.C.I.  set its price  56%  below  the  price  of Terramycin,  Pfizer's 
oxytetracycline  product,  and  was  successful  in obtaining a  reason-
able market  share  through a  combination  of its price reduction 
strategy and  the  goodwill attached  to the  name  of  the  company. 
Although  the  synthetic antibiotics were  growing  fast at this  time, 
I.C.I. 's product  obtained  market  share at the  expense  of both 
Pfizer and  Lederle's  products.  Because its product was  identical, 
Pfizer also reduced  its price,. as  can  be  seen in Table 5.2, but 
to little effect.  I.C.I. 's success in achieving a  substantial 
market  share with a  price reduction strategy relied  on  an  unusual 
combination  of  market  characteristics, which,  so far,  have not 96 
TABLE  5,2 
DATE  OF 
PRODUCT/COMPANY  INTRODUCTION  1966  1967  1968 
Ach ,r0mycin/-Lederle  Pre-1955  £3.26  3.26  1.55 
Le dermycin*/Lederle  Pre-1955  6.83  6.83  6.83 
rt"amycin/Pfizer  Pre-1955  4.19  4.19  3.78 
Im peracin/I,  C. I.  1966  1.85  1.40  1.26 
Pe nbritin/Beecham  1961  6.25  5.48  3.95 
My steclin/.Squibb  1957  4.25  4.25  4.25 
*  Only  sold  in  300mg.  tablets. 
Source:  Monthly  Index of Medical Statistics. 
SELECTED  PRICES  IN  BROAD 
SPECTRUM  ANTIDIO'riC  HAHKI 
1966-1973  FOR  100-250mg 
TABLETS 
(Year  end  prices) 
1969  1970  1971  1972 
1.53  1.53  1.52  I.  52 
b.83  6.83  6.82  8.18 
3.78  3.78  3.21  3.21 
1.26  1.26  1.17  1.17 
3.45  3.45  3.10  3.10 
3.19  3.19  3.19  3.19 97 
In the  1964-66 period,  antibiotic manuracturers 
were  coming  under  strong  pricing pressures  at 
the  government  level. 
There  was  a  relatively high  average  prescrip-
tion price  and  yet  tetracyclines  were  the  most 
commonly  vrescribed  of all drugs. 
The  market  was  characterised byyextensive 
generic  prescribing.  In 1968,  for  example, 
Jl%  of all prescriptions for  broad  spectrum 
antibiotics,  were  generically written  - thus 
permitting easier entry for  a  new  product. 
No  such  significant product  has  had its 
patent  expire. 
I.C.I. 1s  entry success  (as measured  in  terms  of market 
share) has  not  been  encountered  in other  therapeutic classes.  Berk  Pharm~ 
ceuticals  has  introduced  a  large  number  of new  products  into well 
established markets  - often generically equivalent  to  existing 
products  - but has  failed  to  achieve  significant market  share \'lith 
them.  For  example: 
TABLE  5.3 
The 
Therapeutic  Year  of 
Class  Intro. 
Broad-
spectrum 
antibiotics  1966 
Urinary 
anti-
bacter-ials  1965 
Generic 
Equivalent 
Oxytetra-
cycline 
Nitro  fur-
antoin 
Berk 's  Price 
as % of 
Existing 
Products 
86% 
*  As  % of price of the  price  of  Terramy.cin. 98 
(2)  Price Reduction Strate  ies  Before  Patent  Ex  iration 
Or  Of Non-Patented Products  A  ·ear  To  Have  Been 
lvlost  Effectively Used  To  Increase  Total Harket  Size 
Rather  Than Harket  Share 
Price  reduction strategies  have  been used by  com-
parries  to  enlarge  the  market  for  their products.  This 
is particularly true  lvhere  the  products  have  significant 
therapeutic  advantages  over existing  substitute products, 
but  are  initially much  more  expensive.  Tlvo  examples, 
both in the  broad  spectrum antibiotic market,  illustrate 
this  point,  although  the  extent  to  which  the  cephalosporin 
products  have  been  successful is questionable: 
Beecham reduced  the  price  of ampicillin  from  £5.48  to 
£3.10  (for 100-250 mg  tablets)  between  1967  and  1971. 
It was  competing with  the  tetracyclines and  yet was  a 
superior  product  being  a  semi-synthetic penicillin.  In 
this particular  situation Beecham's  price reduction strate-
gy was  undoubtedly influenced  by  the  price levels in  the 
rest of  the antibiotic market. 
Both Glaxo  and  Lilly introduced  identical cephalosporin 
products  into the antibiotic market  in Nov/Dec  1969. 
These  products are generally more  effective  than ampicillin, 
but cost  over  four  times  as  much  (£13.50 per  100 250 mg. 
tablets).  Host  doctors are aware  of  the  large  price differ-
entiat, and  for  this reason  do not  prescribe it as  a  drug 
of first choice.  In an attempt  to expand  the  cephalosporin 
market,  both  companies  reduced  their prices by  15%  in 
December  1972. 99 
Only  one major  company  appears  to have  used  a  price 
reduction  strategy in an attempt  to gain market  share.  This 
occurred  in  1973 when  Boots  reduced  the price  of its already 
successful  systemic  anti-inflammatory  dru~ Brufen  from £2.50(per 
lOG-250  mg. tablets) to  £2. 00.  It appears doubtful whether  this had 
any direct  impact  on  the  product's market  share,  although Boots 
sales representatives  made  strong  use  of  the  reduction  in their 
detailing  themes. 
The  effect of  the  government-enforced price reduction of 
60%  on Librium and  75%  on  Valium was  to  low·er  Roche's  market 
share  by  an  equivalent amount(l),  thereby having little or no 
effect on  the  company's unit sales.  A  similar result occurred 
earlier,  in  1962,  when  the  government  invalidated a  patent 
belonging  to  Smith  Kline & French,  causing  the  company  to  implement an 
immediate  price  reduction of 86%. 
(1)  See  also Chorodiazepoxide  and  Diazepam,  Report  of the  Monopolies 
Commission,  April  1973.  This  was  the  report  that led  to  the 
pr·ice  reduction mentioned. 100 
6.  UNIQUE  PRODUCT  CJ-L,\HACTERISTICS  AND  A  VARIETY  OF 
LARGELY  UNEXPLAINABLE  FACTOHS  INFLUENCE  .HAHKJ.;T 
SHAH.E 
Besides  promotion  expenditure,  product quality 
is the  main  factor  determining whether  or not  a  manu-
facturer  obtains  doctor  acceptance  for its products. 
Discussion of  this  factor is beyond  the  scope  of  this 
report,  but  would  seem  to  be  related  to  the  quality of 
the  research and  development  efforts as  ,,;ell  as  a  fair 
amount  of'  what  can  only  be  called  "luck".  Besides 
product quality,  per  se,  certain product  characteristics 
undoubtedly  affect market  share  as  do  a  number  of other 
factors  that  cannot  easily be  explained. 
(1)  Product  Characteristics  And  Manufacturers  Claims 
For  Their Products Affect Market  Share 
The  nature  of'  markets  per  se  was  discussed briefly 
at  the  beginning  of'  Chapter  4,  where  it was  mentioned 
that  many  products  even  though  competing in  the  same 
therapeutic  class are not direct  substitu~es with all 
the  other  products.  This  usually arises  due  to  the 
characteristics  unique  to  many  of'  the  individual products 
which  affect  the  volume  of prescriptions written.  T\·ro 
examples  should  help  clarify this: 
In  the  market  for  psychostimulants,  one  company's 
major  product  tends  to  be  prescribed primarily 
for  mild  anxiety  and  mild depression with  the 
result  that  patients rarely receive  more  than 
two  prescriptions  per  course  of  treatment. 101 
class  however  are  used  for  more  severe  cases 
of depression,  and  the  average  number  of 
prescriptions  per patient per  course  of treat-
ment  is four  instead of  two. 
Similarly,  in the  tranquillizer market,  81% 
of all prescriptions for  one  company's  product  are  for 
neurotic  conditions  and  only  2!{b  of prescrip-
tions  are  for  psychoses.  On  the  other  hand, 
26%  of all prescriptions  for  a  second  company's  product  are 
for  psychoses  and  only  39%  for  neuroses. 
Since  psychoses  tend  to  be  treated more  often 
than not  in hospitals, the  second  company's  product  tends  to  be 
a  hospital as  opposed  to  a  general practitioner 
product. 
It is  the  characteristics of the  individual 
products  that  cause  these  differences.  Clearly  the 
products  are  not  direct substitutes with  those  against 
which  they are  ostensibly competing for  market  share. 
There  can  be  little doubt  therefore  that  such product 
characteristics  can  have  a  great  effect  on  market  share. 
If it was  available,  measuring  a  product's  success  as 
a  percentage  of  market  potential  would  give  more 
accurate  results  of  product  success. 
Manufacturers  are  also able  to  "position"  their 
products  in a  particular market  by  making  claims  as  to 
the  uses  of  their product.  The  "':ay  a  product  is 
ositioned  can  have  a  ma·or  im  act  on  market  share 102 
During  the  lif'e  of'  a  productt  manufacturers  are  con-
stantly making  new  claims  for  their  product  to  differentia· 
it from  competitors  and/or  to  widen  the  potential market 
f'or  the  product. 
For  example,  in March  1973  one  company  claimed 
that one  of its plain  topical steroid products is also highly effective 
treating scalp conditions.  Within  four  months  the  product increased  it1 
market  share  from  11.0%  to  15.5%, 
{2)  Identical Products Launched At  The  Same  Time  With 
Identical Promotion  Can  Varv  .'/idely In Their 
Success 
There  are at least  three  examples  in the  period 
under  study  ( 1968-1973)  in >vhich  two  branded products have  been 
generically identical,  been  launched at  the  same  time 
by  reputable  companies  with about  the  same  levels  of 
promotion  expenditure,  at identical prices,  and  yet  one 
has  achieved  a  significant market  share  and  the  other 
has  not.  All  three  examples  are  in the  large  broad 
spectrum antibiotic market: 
Chart  5.5  compares  relevant  market  share  and  market  promotion  expe 
ditures  for  each  product.  In  terms  of  the  effectiveness of  the marketing 
operations,  both  companiesmarketing generic  product  No.2  achieved  an  80% 
level  of doctor  awareness  in  the  first year after introduction,  thereby 
indicating  that nctors  other  than  marketing  strategy are  important  to 
a  product's  success. 103 
CHART  5. 5  COMPARISON  OF  MARKET  SHARES 
AND  MARKET  PllOHOTI ON 
EXPENDITURES  FOR  GE'1'->"ERICALLY 
IDENTICAL  PRODUCTS 
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CHAPTER  6  COMPETITION  IN  THE 
'OVER-THE-COUNTER'  (OTC)  MARKET 
In Chapter  3  it was  stated that  the  nature  o~ 
the  market  ~or Over-The-Counter  drugs  is  considerably 
di~~erent  ~rom that  o~ ethical pharmaceuticals. 
The  only historical data available  on  this  market 
was  market  share  for  the  ~ive years  from  1969  to  1973, 
~or sales  through retail chemists.  Promotional data 
was  not  available nor  was  data concerning  the  increasing 
percentage  o~ OTC  sales  made  through  non-chemist  out-
lets such  as  grocery  stores,  discount  stores  and  depart-
ment  stores.  For  these reasons,  the  analysis  of  com-
petition in this  section of  the  pharmaceutical  industry, 
and  how  it has  changed,  is necessarily limited in scope. 
Ho1.\•ever  basic data  on  the  structure  of the  market  and 
its major  market  segments  is  provided.  Particular 
attention has  been  given  to  the  ten  largest product 
groups,  that  together account  for  72%  o~ the  OTC  market. 
These  are  listed in  Table  6.1 • 
Also  included is  a  brief qualitative  assessment 
of some  of  the  marketing  trends  that  are  already 
becoming  evident  in  the  OTC  market. lOS 
TABLE  6.1: 
TEN  LARGEST  OTC  PRODUCT  GROUPS(l) 
Infant milk  products(2) 
Analgesics 
Anti-obesity  preps. 
Cough  remedies 
Antacids 
Vitamins 
Tonics 
Oral  cold  preparations 
De~matological preps. (3) 
General antiseptics 
(1)  Ranked  according  to 1973  sales  volume 
(2)  Not  strictly part  of  the  OTC  market  but  included  as  such  in 
IMS  reports  for historical reasons 
(3)  Excluding  scalp and  acne  preparations 106 
1.  TEN  LAHGE  COMPANIES  CONTROL  OVER  HALF  OF  THE  OTC 
MARKET  AND  OF  THE  TOP  25  PHODUCTS 
{1)  The  20  Largest  Companies  Accounted For  77%  Of 
OTC  Sales In 1973 
The  following  table  shows  the  concentration of 
marketing  power  among  the  companies  in the  OTC  market 
in 1973: 
TABLE  6.2:  Companies  Ranked 
according  to annual 
sales volume 
Percent 
of total 
Market  Cumulative  percent 
TABLE  6.4: 
Top  5  36.6% 
20.6 
12.4 
36.6% 
57.2 
69.6 
77-5 
85.1 
89.4 
92.4 
98.9 
6  - 10 
11  - 15 
16  - 20 
21  - 30 
31  - 40 
41  - 50 
51  - 100 
All other 
7-9 
7.6 
4.3 
3.0 
6.5 
1.1  100.  01h 
Table  6.3  lists the  twenty  leading  manufac-
turers  of  OTC  products  in 1973  together with  the  number 
of products  they market,  and 
their  share  of  the  total OTC  market. 
( 2)  The  Ten Largest Companies  Have  19  Of  The  Top 
25  Products 
The  leading  products  - like  the  individual  com-
panies  - account  for  a  significant  percentage  of  the 
total market.  This  percentage  changed very little 
between  1969  and  1973: 
Products  ranked 
according  to  annual 
sales volume 
Top  5 
6  - 10 
11  - 20 
21  - JO 
Jl - 40 
41  - 50 
All  other 
Cumulative 
percent  of 
Total Market  1969 
2J.6% 
JJ.7 
45.0 
5J.O 
59.4 
65.J 
)4.7 
lOO.o% 
Cumulative  percen~ 
of Total Harket 
1973 
20.9% 
)0.3 
4).0 
51.9 
58.) 
64.0 
J6.o 
100.  oo;. lA~ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
·J(-
TABLE  6.3: 
NUMBER  OF 
MANUFACTURER  PRODUCTS 
A  29 
B  12 
c  2 
D  16 
E  19 
F  11 
G  14 
H  8 
I  13 
J  16 
K  11 
L  8 
M  10 
N  1 
0  8 
p  18 
Q  6 
R  3 
s  10 
T  6 
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PERCENTAGE  OF  OTC  MARKET 
ACCOL~TED FOR  BY  20  LARGEST 
COMPANIES  IN  1973 
fa  OF  INDUSTRY  CID1ULATIVE 
TOTAL  PERCE~'l"TAGE 
9.9%  9.9% 
8.6  18.5 
6.6  25.1 
6.1  31.2 
5.4  36.6 
5.2  41.8 
4.5  46.3 
4.1  50.4 
3.8  54.2 
3.0  57.2 
2.7  59.9 
2.6  62.5 
2.5  65.0 
2.3  67.3 
2.3  69.6 
2.1  71.7 
2.0  73.7 
1.5  75.2 
1.2  76.4 
1.1  77.5 
Indicates  company with no  significant involvement  in 
ethical pharmaceutical market. rABLE  6. 4: 
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The  position of the  leading  companies  appears  to 
be  dependent  on  their  having  one  or  more  products  that 
are  ranked  among  the  25  leading  products  in the  market: 
Ten  Lar~est Companies 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
No.of' products  ranked 
among  top  25  products 
1 
1 
2 
.3 
.3 
2 
2 
2 
.3 
19 109 
2.  AN  OLIGOPOLISTIC  STRUCTURE  EXISTS  l'iiTHIN  EACH  OTC 
MARKET  SEGHENT 
As  with  the  market  for  ethical pharmaceuticals 
discussed in Chapter  4  ,  two  or  three manufacturers 
dominate  each  market  segment. 
(1)  The  Degree  Of  Market  Concentration By  The  Leadin~ 
Companies  Did  Not  Change  Significantly Between 
1969  And  1973 
Table  6.5  compares  the  degr-ee  of  concentration 
in the  ten largest OTC  market  segments  for  1969  and 
1973.  Four  years  is not  a  very  long  time  over  which 
to measure  changes  in market  concentration and  there-
fore  it is not  surprising that no  major  shifts in con-
centration appear  to  have  occurred.  In three  of the 
four markets  where  noticeable  change  has  occurred,  there 
has  been  a  decrease  in the  levels  of concentration.  In 
only  one  market,  oral  cold  preparations,  has  an  increase 
occurred.  This  has  been largely due  to  the  market 
penetration of  one  product. 
(2)  The  Number  Of  Brands  And  Manufacturers Increased 
Slightly Between  1969  And  197J 
In the  ten largest  market  segments there  was  an 
increase of  14%  in the  number  of  companies  and  2o;:..  in 
the  number  of brands  between  1969  and  1973.  One  product 
group  - dermatological preparations  - accounted  for  a 
substantial portion of  ~hese increases.  Only  in one 
product  group  did  the  number  of  competitors  decline. 110 
TABLE  6, 5: 
MARKET 
RANK  MARKET  SEGHENT  1969 
1  Infant Milk Foods  46% 
2  Analgesics  28 
Anti-obesity preparations  52 
4  Cough  remedies  12 
5  Antacids  JO 
6  Vitamins  J6 
7  Tonics  28 
8  Oral  cold  preparations  2J 
9  Dermatological  preps.  J7 
10  General antiseptics  Jl~ 
*  Only  three  competitors 
DEGHEE  OF  CONCENTRATION  n; 
TEN  LARGEST  OTC  HARKET 
SEGMENTS 
1969  AND  197  J 
LEADER  TOP  T\'10  CO,  TOP  FOUR  CC 
.!.21.2  1969  197J  1969  197" 
48%  85%  86%  lOO'jb  lOO'f< 
25  50  42  80  69 
5J  7J  74  92  9J 
12  22  2J  J8  40 
27  49  45  75  79 
J5  67  6J  84  82 
29  51  5J  70  68 
J2  46  57  72  8J 
22  58  J9  76  62 
27  59  50  91  79 TABLE  6. 6: 
HARKET  S  EG"r·lENT 
n:fan  t  !-Ii 1k Products 
nalgesics 
nti-obesity preps. 
ough remedies 
ntacids 
itamins 
·onics 
ral cold  preps. 
1erma to logical preps. 
~enera1 antiseptics 
TOTAL 
111 
NO.OF  COHPANIES 
DIFF. 
CO:t-f..PARISON  OF  NUNBER  OF 
COMPANIES  AND  PH.ODUCTS 
COMPETING  IN  TOP  10  l-1ARKET 
SEGNENTS  IN  1969  AND  1973 
NO.  OF  BRANDS 
DIFF. 
1962  1212  1969/73  1962  1973  1969/7:J 
4  3  -1*  4  5  +1 
10  12  +2  13  16  +3 
6  8  +2  8  10  +2 
21  23  +2  22  25  +3 
11  11  14  14 
6  7  +1  9  11  +2 
14  14  16  17  +1 
6  7  +1  7  10  +3 
9  14  +5  11  17  +6 
7  8  +1  7  8  +1 
94  107  +13  111  133  +22 
~  One  competitor acquired by  another  already competing 
in this  product  group. 112 
the  smallest competitor  was  purchased  by  the market  leader. 
The  net  gain in the  number  of  products  equals 
the  number  of new  product  introductions  since no 
products  were  withdrawn  from  the  market  ~mong these 
market  segments) during  the  period under  study.  Table  6.6 
sho,·:s  the  comparison  b~t\v~~n  ~:I_969_<:!ndl97J--f'_ar__b_oth the 
number  of  companies  and  number  of brands. 
(3)  There  Appear  To  Be  More  Companies  And  Brands 
Competing  In Those  Market  Segments  ~here The 
Degree  Of  Concentration Is  Lowest 
It is noticeable  that  in those  market  segments 
where  the  percentage  of the  market  held  by  the  top  four 
companies  in 1973 is  below  7CY/o,  more  companies  and 
brands  exist  than  in the  other markets: 
TABL~· 
Degree  of  I 
Concentration in 
Harket  Segments 
Over  7CPP 
*•  Market  Segment 
Infant milk  foods 
Anti-obesity preps. 
Oral  cold  preps. 
Vitamins 
Antacids 
General  antiseptics 
Analgesics 
Tonics 
Dermatological  preps. 
Cough  remedies 
No. of 
Companies 
3 
8 
7 
7 
11 
8 
12 
14 
14 
23 
No.of 
Brands 
5 
10 
10 
11 
14 
8 
16 
17 
17 
25 
*  In order of descending  levels  of concentration. 113 
3.  THE  HARKET  LEADERS  CHANGED  IN  ONLY  FIVE  OUT  OF 
THE  30  HAH.KET  SEGMENTS 
There  appears  to  be  more  stability in the  OTC 
market  segments  than  there  is in the various  therapeutic 
classes in the  ethical pharmaceutical  market. 
(1}  With  Very  Few Exceptions,  The  Same  Companies  And 
Brands  Dominated  The  Individual Market  Segments 
In 1973  As  In 1969 
The  market  leaders (i.e.  the  companies  with  the 
largest  cash value  market shares)  changed  in only  five  of 
the  30  market  segments  over  the  four  year  period  :lor 
which  data is available.  The  following  table  shows 
these market  segments  together  with  the  market  shares 
of  the  leading  companies  in both  1969  and  1973. 
TABLE  6. 8: 
~larket Leader 
Market  Segment  Narket 
.!ill 
1~§2 
Share 
191.2 
Market  Le~der 1973 
Market  Shar 
191.2  l9b9 
Infant  milk  foods  46%  38%  39~~  48~~
1 
Vitamins  36  28  32  35 
Oral  cold preps.  23  25  14  32 
Gen.  antiseptics  34  17  24  27 
Acne  preps.  55  29  19  zw 
Of'  the  three  changes  in market  leadership,  only 
one  was  due  to  a  new  product  introduction in the  time 
period  under  study.  This  product  was  the  leading  new 114 
Analysis  of  the  top four  companies  in each market 
segment  also  indicated  a  high  degree  of  market  stability. 
Taking all  29  markets,  84%  of  the  companies  comprising 
the  top  four  in 1969  still comprised  the  top  four in 
1973. 
The  fact  that  the  leading  products  did not 
change  substantially over  time  is indicated by  the  fact 
that  the  top  8  products  in 1969  and  1973  were  the  same 
{although in a  slightly changed  order);  and  18  of  the 
25  leading products  in 1969  were  still ranked  among  the 
top  25  in 1973. :  6.9: 
115 
(2)  In Spite  Of  Relative Stability,  There  Were  Some 
Significant Shifts In The  ~~rket Shares  Of 
Individual  Products 
Although  the  OTC  market is characterised  by a  greater 
degree  of stability than  the ethical market,  measuring  the overall 
changes  can  fail  to show  quite large  changes  in  the  market  positions 
of both products and  companies  - particularly when  the  time  period 
is relatively short.  Eighteen  products in  twelve  market  segments 
changed  their market  shares  by ten percentage  points  or more  between 
1969  and  1973,  but  only  three out of  the  18  products were  in the 
ten largest market  segments. 
MARKET  SEGNENT 
Oral  cold preps. 
Dermatolog.preps. 
Gen. antiseptics 
Nasal  cold  preps. 
It 
II 
Scalp preps. 
Acne  preps. 
II 
Antidiarrhoeals 
Bronchodilators 
" 
Haematinics 
" 
Special  foods 
" 
Contraceptives 
Sedatives 
CHANGES  IN 
MARKET  SHARES 
1969  1973 
14% 
37 
33 
37 
4 
19 
55 
19 
38 
55 
20 
83 
83 
1 
56 
33 
32% 
22 
17 
13 
54 
5 
23 
30 
40 
25 
72 
10 
so 
37 
1~ 
46 
24 
43 116 
4.  ABOUT  50  NEh'  PH.ODUCTS  lvEHE  INTRODUCED  INTO  THE 
OTC  HAHKET  BETl•iEEN  1968  AND  197J 
The  exact  number  of new  product  introductions 
is not  included in the  data available  to  us, but it indicates 
that  across all market  segments  about  50  new  products 
were  introduced.  Of  this  number,  26  had  sales in 
excess  of £10,000  per  year  in 197J. 
(1)  Sixteen Products  Introduced  Dtiring  the Period 
Had  Sales In Excess  of £50,000 Per Year  in 197J 
The  ten  largest  companies  introduced  nine  of the 
sixteen most  important  products  in the  period  from 
1969  to  197J.  Two  of  these  companies  introduced  six 
of these  products,  as  can be  seen  from  the  following 
table: 
TABLE  6.10: 
CONPANY 
ranked  according  to 
197J  sales  volume 
1.  A 
2.  B 
J.  c 
4.  D 
5.  E 
6.  F 
7.  G 
8.  H 
9- I 
10.  J 
All  other  companies 
NUMB EH  OF  NE  ~·! 
PRODUCTS  ACHIEVIN"G 
SALES  IN  EXCESS  OF 
£50,000  IN  197J 
1 
1 
1 
J 
7 
16 
(2)  Only  One  New  Product Achieved  A  Market  Share 
In Excess  of  15'~~  In The  10 Larp:est Harket  Segments 
Few  of  the  16  leading  new  products  achieved  sub-
stantial market  shares  by l97J.  Most  obtained sales in 117 
largest market  se , .tents.  In fact  of  the  16  products, 
11 were  introduced  into  the  ten largest market  segments. 
Only  3  of the  16  products  achieved market  shares  in 
excess  of  15~·t,  and  only  one  of'  these  was  introduced  into 
the  ten largest market  segments. 
LE  6.11:  1973 Sales  1973 Market 
LE 
Market  Segment 
Oral  cold  preparationE 
Scalp  preparations* 
Nasal  cold  preparations* 
*Not  included  among  ten largest market  segments. 
Value  Share 
(£ 1 000) 
424 
126 
1.04 
32% 
23% 
46~i 
A  number  of'  new  products  Here  unable  to  maintain 
their initial sales  success.  This  was  true even for 
those  products  that  managed  to  obtain a  sigr.ificant 
market  share within  the first  2/3  years  after intro-
duction: 
6.12:  Market  Share 
MArket  Year  1  Year  2  Year  3  Year  Segment 
Nasal  cold  preparations  83'7o  74%  35%  17% 
Haematinics  25'7o  43%  37'7o  n/a 
Haematinics  12'7o  11'7o  4%  2'7o 
With  the  possible  exception  of  the  nasal  cold  which 
appears  to  be  a  classic  example  of  a  product  that  was 
subsequently replaced  by  a  superior product 
the  other  examples  are  typical of  new  product  intro-
ductions  in  the  OTC  market. 
Very  few  new  products  are  successful in obtaining 
a  strong market position very rapidly.  This  l.s  in 
marked  contrast  to  the  observed  patterns in the  ethical 
pharmaceutical  industry. 
4 ll8 
5.  HARKET  TRENDS  INDICATE  THAT  THE  OTC  DRUG  MAHKET  HILL 
BE  INCREASINGLY  DO:t-UNATED  BY  THE  LARGER  CO:i'IPA.!"iiES 
\ffiiCH  HAVE  CO:N SIDEHABLE · NAHKETING  FORCE 
Certain long  term  trends are  evident in all areas 
of the  branded  OTC  drug market.  Although most  of 
these  trends  cannot  be  quantified,  they  have  major 
implications  for  the  future  degree  of competition in 
this  market  segment. 
(1)  Competition Among  Manufacturers  Of  Branded  OTC 
Drugs  Is Likely To  Intensify 
A  number  of elements  in the  marketing  mix  are 
unlikely  to  expand  considerably in the  next  ten years. 
Included  among  these will be: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The  number  of retail outlets 
The  number  of different  items  carried by  the 
typical store 
The  number  of hours  that  a  consumer lvill devote 
to  shopping 
The  number  of brands  that  a  consumer  can recall 
and in which  he/she  can believe 
The  number  of promotional,  advertising,  and 
store-display items  that  a  retail outlet can 
use  in a  given  week 
The  number  of advertising vehicles  that  can 
carry  the  advertisers'  messages  to  the  mass 
market  consumer,  and  the  number  of  hours  per 
week  available  for  a  consumer  to  receive  these 
messages. 
Manuf'ac turers will,  ho1•, ever,  probably request  more 
promotions  and  greater retail  space  utilization.  This 
will encourage retailers  to: 
•  Reduce  duplicate  items  and  lines  to  increase 
turnover  and  diminish  inventories • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
119 
Cut  average  margins  on all fast-moving  items 
regardless  of manufacturers'  suggested retail 
prices 
Promote  private label merchandise 
Eliminate  slow-moving  items 
Insist that manufacturers  wi thdralv  slow-moving 
items  when  new  products  are  added  to  the  line 
Offer  new·  products  only if there is assurance 
:from  the  manuf'acturer  that adequate  promotional 
efforts will be  employed  to  sell the  products 
through  the  store 
Seek  products  usually sold by  other  types  of 
outlets if these  products  can generate  good 
sales  and/or pro:fit margins 
These  changes  in the  marketing  environment will 
place  increased competitive  pressures  on manufacturers, 
and  they will have  to respond  to  these pressures  i:f 
product profitability is to  be  maintained.  It is 
likely that  shorter product life cycles will become  more 
prevalent  because  innovations  \'rill  be  quickly  copied 
and  improved  upon;  and  that competition for  available 
innovative  and marketing  talent will be  greater.  The 
risks and  costs  of  new  product introductions will un-
doubtedly  increase as will  the  costs of defending 
existing brand  and  market positions.  This will involve 
having: 
• 
• 
• 
Advertising pull-through  pm..rer  for branded  i terns 
First class retail store  servicing  to fatten 
the  pro1'i  t  margins  of retailers 
Better promotional offers  and  in-store  support 
than  the  competition 120 
(2)  Giant Marketers  Will  Increasingly Dominate  The 
Market  Due  To  Their Marketing,  Advertising;,  And 
Field Selling Skills 
The  growth  pressures  on  companies  will require 
most  leading  consumer  products  manufacturers  to  find 
new  areas  of  profit growth,  both  through acquisitions 
and  new  product  introductions.  This  means  that  a  number 
of  large multinational  companies  not  currently competing 
in the  OTC  drug market  may  move  into  this  area in  the 
future;  possibly  through  the  acquisition of  some  of the 
smaller  companies  in  the  market.  For example,  trade 
reports  and press releases  have  indicated  that Gillette 
intends  to  market  proprietary medicines  in the future. 
The  giant  companies  who  have  both push-through and 
pull-through marketing  power  >vill  be  at an  obvious  ad-
vantage  in marketing  their products  because  they will 
be  able  to: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Meet  unique  or  demanding  store service  requirements 
Service retailers more  effectively than competition 
Advertise  to  such  a  degree  that  other brands 
cannot  support  a  minimum  effective level 
Obtaining advertising buying  power  so  great  that 
networks  and  other media  will offer the  most 
effective  advertising vehicles  to  a  specific  manu-
facturer  before  approaching  any  other manufacturer 
Utilize advertising and  sales  forces  more 
effectively  than competition 
Using  large,  multi-channel  sales forces  to  ensure 
fast sell-ins  and  minimum  out-of-stock conditions 
in more  than  one  channel  of distribution 
Taking  major financial  risks  on  new  products 
Attract  and  hold  superior marketing management, 
innovative personnel  and  advertising  talent 121 
These  factors  will cause  the  entry barriers, 
into  major  areas  where  other  brands  are  already esta-
blished,  to  be  so  high  that  only  the  largest manufacturers 
will  have  the  critical mass  in terms  of  the  resources 
required  to  compete  e.ffectively. 
The  trends  described in this section will cause 
the  OTC  drug  market  to  be  increasingly dominated  by 
large  companies  V'hich  have  considerable  marketing force. 
Survival in this  marketing  environment  will be  increasingly 
difficult for  small  companies  or  small  operating units  by 
1985. APPENDIX 125 
APPENDIX  I 
~: 
toFITABILITY  OF  1 ENTERPRISES1 :  1968 
Own  Value  Net  Net Profit  Net Profit  Net  Profit 
ttererises  Turnover  caeital  Added  Profit  Turnover  Own  Means  Value  Added 
(£ mill)  (£ mill)  (£  mill)  (£ mill)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
1  3.1  1.4  1.1  .6  19  43  55 
2  1.3  n/a  .3 
3  1.0  .3  .3 
4  .9  .2  .3 
5*  19.3  9.5  n/a  2.5  13  26  n/a 
6  1.5  .2  .5  .3  20  150  60 
7  1.2  n/a  .2 
8 
9  .6  .3  .2  .1  17  33  50 
10  11.6  4.1  4.1  2.9  25  71  71 
11 
12  3.9  .6  1.4  .8  21  133  57 
13 
14  .9  .4  .3 
15  10.0  6.0  5.4  1.5  15  25  28 
16  24.2  13.5  8.2  3.5  14  26  43 
17  15.6  6.1  5.6  4.3  28  70  77 
18  3.2  .7  .9  .3  9  43  33 
19  1.2  .1  .4  .1  8  100  25 
20  2.8  1.1  1.2  .5  18  45  42 
21  12.5  12.6  3.9  .1  1  1  3 
22 
23  3.7  1.2  1.3  .8  22  67  62 
24  .5  .1  .3  .1  20  100  33 
25  14.1  1.5  2.5  1.1  8  73  44 
26  6.3  4.3  .9  .3  5  7  33 
27  .6  .2  .2 
28  4.7  6.6  2.1  1.4  30  21  67 
29  6.6  4.0  2.9  1.7  26  43  59 
30  4.0  1.1  ;9  .2  5  18  45 
31  21.8  12.8  6.1  3.4  16  27  56 
32 
33  3.3  1.9  1.7  1.1  33  58  65 
34 
35  7.3  4.1  1.7  .9  12  22  53 
36*  123.2  28.5  n/a  19.0  15  67  n/a 
37*  62.  5'~*  33.  9·k1<i<  n/a  7.7***  n/a  23  n/a 
38 
39  7.6  1.5  2.7  1.5  20  100  56 
*  Cannot  complete Value Added  because  data  for profits and  remuneration  refer 
to world  and  U.K.  activities respectively. 
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TABLE  A  (continued): 
PROFITABILITY  OF  'ENTERPRISES'  1969 
Own  Value  Net  Net  Profit  Net Profit  Net  Profit 
Enteq~rise  Turnover  CaEital  Added  Profit  Turnover  Own  Means  Value Addec 
(£ mill)  ( £  mill)  (£ mill)  (£ mill)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
1  3.61  1. 61  1.44  .87  24  54  60 
2  1.37  .16  .26  .11  8  69  42 
3  1.09  .34  .37  .08  7  24  22 
4  1.10  .27  .59  .28  25  104  47 
5*  20.36  9.53  n/a  2.57  13  27  n/a 
6  2.11  .19  .54  .28  13  47  52 
7  1.58  .06  .21  .L4  3  67  19 
8 
9  • 68  .34  .20  .10  15  29  50 
10  10.42  4.17  3.72  2.54  24  61  68 
11 
12  4.20  .77  1.47  .80  19  104  54 
13 
14  .97  .44  .33  .10  10  23  30 
15  11.08  6.52  4.11  1.96  12  21  33 
16  28.12  14.06  8.63  3.53  13  25  41 
17  18.02  6.59  5.52  4.04  22  61  73 
18  3.34  .82  1.06  .40  12  49  38 
19  1.43  .19  .39  .11  8  58  28 
20  3.32  1.30  1.25  .42  13  32  34 
21  12.62  12.53  3.92  .03  1 
22 
23  3.98  1.07  1.24  .66  17  62  53 
24  .74  .13  .30  .17  23  131  57 
25  16.92  1.98  2.38  .84  5  42  35 
26  7.52  4.44  1.81  • 68  9  15  38 
27  .70  .22  .19  .06  9  27  32 
28  6.70  6.79  2.40  1.01  15  15  42 
29  6.64  3.92  2.73  1.61  24  41  59 
30  4.30  1.02  .86  .05  1  5  6 
31  23.03  12.18  6.85  3.87  17  32  56 
32 
33  3.49  1.70  1.52  .95  27  56  63 
34 
35  7,97  3,93  2.21  .64  8  16  29 
36>~  134.25  42.43  n/a  22.08  16  52  n/a 
37*  75.13**  34. 60>':**  n/a  9. 62*>b'<  n/a  28  n/a 
38 
39  7.96  2.74  2.41  1.17  15  43  49 
*  Cannot  complete  Value Added  because  data  for profits and  remuneration  refer 
to world  and  U.K.  activities respectively. 
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BLE  A (continued): 
~FITABILITY OF  'ENTERPRISES'  1970 
Own  Value  Net  Net  Profit  Net  Profit  Net  Profit 
teq;!rise  Turnover  ca:eital  Added  Profit  Turnover  Own  Means  Value  Added 
(£ mill)  (£ mill)  ( £  m:ill)  (£ mill)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
1  3.99  1.77  1.45  .80  20  45  55 
2  1.54  .22  .34  .11  7  50  32 
3  1.23  .44  .20  .10  8  23  50 
4  1.08  .23  .40  .20  19  87  50 
5*  8.13  9.90  n/a  3.03  37  31  n/a 
6  2.04  .19  • 68  .35  13  184  51 
7  1.92  .10  .28  .06  3  60  21 
8 
9  .77  ,37  .22  .11  14  30  50 
10  11.28  4.5  4.04  2.75  24  61  68 
11 
12  4.29  .92  1.46  .78  18  85  53 
13 
14  1.09  .49  .37  .10  9  20  27 
15  12.91  6. 76  4.47  .47  4  7  11 
16  21.79  14.52  9.3  3.79  12  26  41 
17  19.96  7.41  6.01  4.26  21  57  71 
18  3.92  1.17  1.35  • 62  16  53  46 
19  1.47  .22  .36  .07  5  32  19 
20  3.20  1.45  1.29  .30  9  21  23 
21  12.69  12.46  4.14  .11  1  1  3 
22 
23  3.98  1.34  1.15  .so  13  37  43 
24  .95  .26  .37  .22  23  85  59 
25  19.08  2.56  2.96  .94  5  37  32 
26  8.91  4.87  1.36  .04  1  3 
27  .85  .24  .22  .06  7  25  27 
28  16.08  7.29  4.63  1.31  8  18  28 
29  7.31  4.09  2.83  1.53  21  37  54 
30  5.  37  1.15  1.11  .22  4  19  20 
31  27.26  13.95  7.99  4.39  16  31  55 
32 
33  3.89  1.78  1.44  .82  21  46  57 
34 
35  8.63  4.30  2.27  .49  6  11  22 
36*  150.75  39.85  n/a  24.33  16  61  n/a 
37*  18.52**  37 .09**"k  n/  a  8.  77•'<1:*  n/a  24  n/a 
38 
39  8.09  2.93  2.25  .86  11  29  38 
*  Cannot  complete Value Added  because  data for profits and  remuneration refer 
to world and U.K.  activities respectively. 
**  U.K. 
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TABLE  A (continued):  ---
PROFITABILITY  OF  'ENTERPRISES'  1971 
Own  Value  Net  Net Profit  Net  Profit  Net  Profit 
Enteq~rise  Turnover  Capital  Added  Profit  Turnover  Own  Means  Value  Added 
(£ mill)  (£  mill)  (£ mill)  (£  mill)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
1  4.90  1. 99  1.64  .86  18  43  52 
2  1.87  .35  • 61  .23  12  66  38 
3  1.34  .46  .20  .10  7  22  50 
4  1.14  .29  .40  .19  17  66  48 
5>'<  8.76  10.30  n/a  2.94  34  29  n/a 
6  2.85  .21  • 68  .22  8  105  32 
7  2.23  .13  .31  .05  2  38  16 
8 
9  .92  .41  .26  .13  14  32  50 
10  10.6  4.82  3.86  2.22  21  46  58 
11 
12  4.41  1.51  1.38  • 62  14  41  45 
13 
14  1.19  .53  .39  .08  7  15  21 
15  12.94  6.42  3. 67  -.40  -3  -6  -11 
16  34.61  15.12  9.96  3.69  11  24  37 
17  22.58  7.98  6.40  4.35  19  55  68 
18  4.45  l.lJ.  1. 69  .so  18  57  47 
19  1.83  .26  • 61  .25  14  96  41 
20  3.55  1. 68  1.27  .38  107  23  30 
21  14.61  12.49  4. 79  .32  2  3  7 
22 
23  5.54  1. 58  1.  73  .88  16  56  51 
2/f  1.13  .38  .40  .22  19  58  55 
25  23.26  3.02  2.61  -.16  -5  -6 
26  9.41  4.83  2.11  • 62  7  13  29 
27  .88  .27  .25  .04  5  15  16 
28  18.83  7.68  4.36  1.06  6  1l~  24 
29  7.37  4.10  2. 67  1.27  17  31  48 
30  6.14  1.41  1.50  .44  7  31  29 
31  30.71  16.32  9.10  5.10  17  31  56 
32 
33  3.88  1. 97  1.32  • 65  17  33  49 
34 
35  10.38  4.29  2.60  .59  6  14  23 
36">'<  165.65  38.39  n/a  23.79  14  62  n/a 
37>~  21. 7l>'<i<  36. 991d<i:  n/a  9.06>'ddc  n/a  25  n/a 
38 
39  8.50  3.14  2.17  .70  8  22  32 
*  Cannot  complete  Value Added  because  data  for profits and  remuneration  refer 
to world  and  U.K.  activities respectively. 
**  U.K. 129 
TABLE  A (continued): 
PROFITABILITY  OF  'ENTERPRISES'  1972 
Own  Value  Net  Net Profit  Net  Profit  Net  Profit 
Enter2rise  Turnover  Ca2ital  Added  Profit  Turnover  Own  Means  Value  Added 
(£ mill)  (£ mill)  (£  mill)  (£ mill)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
1  5.20  2.42  1. 73  .82  16  34  47 
2  1. 70  .49  .59  .25  15  51  42 
3  1.43  .48  .20  .19  6  19  45 
4  1.37  .33  .45  .20  15  61  44 
5*  9.55  10.86  n/a  2.87  30  26  n/a 
6  3.20  .28  .78  .24  8  86  31 
7  2.88  .18  .41  .09  3  50  22 
8 
9  .90  .45  .28  .15  17  33  54 
10  11.64  5.20  4.32  2.60  22  50  60 
11 
12  4.85  2.07  1. 67  .93  19  45  50 
13 
14  1.21  .56  .38  .03  2  5  8 
15  20.30  7.74  6.78  2.26  11  29  33 
16  37.58  16.16  10.16  2.89  8  18  28 
17  25.83  9.82  7.84  5.44  21  55  69 
18  4.85  1. 75  1. 93  93  21  53  48 
19  1.94  .35  .71  .25  13  71  35 
20  3.68  1.84  1.43  .55  15  30  38 
21  13.94  13.01  4.67  .93  7  7  20 
22 
23  6.52  2.11  1. 91  .97  15  46  51 
24  1. 23  .35  .49  .28  23  80  57 
25  2ll.04  .24  .64  -2.59  -11  -1079  -405 
26  10.94  5.40  2.8  1.22  11  23  44 
27  .94  .29  .25  .OS  5  17  20 
28  20.06  7.94  4.86  1.01  5  13  21 
29  8.83  3.94  2.98  1. 20  14  30  40 
30  7.44  1.  72  1.77  .49  7  28  28 
31  32.38  17.54  9.20  4. 71  15  27  51 
32 
33  4.75  2.80  1.60  .81  17  39  51 
)4 
35  10.88  4.60  3.29  1.42  13  31  43 
36>':  181.97  53.16  n/a  26.91  15  51  n/a 
37>':  25.5  6>':>':  43.  72>':id:  n/a  11. 7l"k>':i:  n/a  27  n/a 
38 
39  9. 77  3.55  2.26  • 66  7  19  29 
>'<  Cannot  complete Value Added  because  data  for profits and  remuneration  refer 
to world  and  U.K.  activities respectively. 
**  U.K. 
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SUMMARY  STATISTICS 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
(£ mill)  Turnover  3]9.7  423.9  482.2  535.8  597.8 
( 'OOO)  Employment  48.5  50.9  54.1  55.5  54.0 
(£ mill)  Wages  & Salaries  53.7  5&.9  68.9  78.1  85.9 
(£ mill)  Net Profits  56.7  60.9  62.3  61.6  72.7 
(£ mill)  Cash  Flow  67.7  72.6  75.0  77.9  77.7 
(£ mill)  Own  Capital  158.5  176.9  184.5  190.3  220.3 
(£ mill)  Exports  77.8  94.6  116.9  131.5  144.9 
(£ mill)  Value Added*  110.4  119.8  131.2  139.7  158.6 
(%)  Net  Profit/Turnover  14.9  14.4  12.9  11.5  12.2 
(%)  Net  Profit/Own Capital  35.8  34.4  33.8  32.4  33.0 
(%)  Net  Profit/Value Added  51.4  50.8  47.5  44.1  45.8 
(£/man)  Value Added/Employee  2,276  2,345  2,425  2,517  2,937 
(£/man)  Wages  Salaries/Employee  1,107  1,157  1,274  1,407  1,591 
*  Value Added  estimated as Net Profits plus Wages  & Salaries. 131  APPENDIX 'II 
TABLE  A: 
CONCENTRATION  MEASURES 
4-firm Concentration  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
Turnover  61.0  61.4  61.3  61.1  61.0 
Employment  62.9  60.7  58.7  59.1  58.8 
Wages  & Salaries  59.8  57.2  53.7  55.3  55.1 
Net Profits  61.0  65.1  67.1  68.6  67.1 
Cash  Flow  60.9  64.4  65.8  66.9  61.9 
Own  Capital  55.9  58.6  57.1  56.1  59.3 
Exports  55.2  54.4  54.6  56.4  56.1 
8-firm Concentration 
Turnover  77.2  77.5  77 .o  77.4  76.8 
Employment  77.8  76.0  75.6  74.8  74.1 
Wages  & Salaries  75.7  73.2  73.6  73.4  73.0 
Net Profits  '79.4  8L9  84.9  85.1  81.7 
Cash  Flow  78.7  80.9  83.0  82.7  79.1 
Own  Capital  77.9  78.4  77.2  76.3  78.2 
Exports  75.3  73.2  71.5  74.5  74.1 
Linda  Index  Core:  L  I  n~"m  n-l;m 
Turnover  .32122  .32122  .33122  .33122  .32/21 
Employment  .31123  .30123  .29124  .29122  .28124 
Wages  & Salaries  .28122  .26122  .26122  • 26122  • 26/22 
Net Profits  .33118  .38118  .47118  .47/19  .37/21 
Cash  Flow  .33119  .38121  .42119  .40122  .32119 
Own  Capital  .27/13  .31/13  .29/13  .28115  .32121 
Exports  .28117  .27121  .29/21  .30120  .29113 
Linda  Index  Super Powers:  Ln*  </n* <  h  h 
Turnover  1.1113  1.0613  1. 0513  1.0513  1.06/3 
Employment  1.4112  1.  39 I 2  1. 34/2  1. 26/2  1. 2612 
Wages  & Salaries  1.34/2  1.31/2  1. 24/2  1.2512  1.17/2 
Net Profits  1.2412  1.1913  1. 3912  1. 31/2  1.1512 
Cash  Flow  1.1212  1. 22/3  1. 30/2  1.1212  .91/3 
Own  Capital  .65/3  .75/3  .70/3  • 6213  .7513 
Exports  1.63/2  1.49/2  1. 3512  1.42/2  1.1112 
Coefficient of Variation 
Turnover  1.87  1.90  1.88  1.88  1.87 
Employment  1. 94  1.91  1.83  1.83  1.84 
Wages  & Salaries  1. 79  1.72  1.64  1.67  1. 70 
Net Profits  1. 90  2.06  2.23  2.13  2.10 
Cash  Flow  1.89  2.08  2.17  2.15  1.  78 
Own  Capital  1.51  1.67  1.59  1.52  1. 67 
Exports  1.65  1. 67  1. 66  1.  78  1. 67 132 
CONCENTRATION  l'fEASURES  cont. 
Gini Coefficient  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
Turnover  • 67  • 67  • 67  • 67  • 67 
Employment  .66  • 65  • 65  • 65  • 65 
Wages  & Salaries  • 64  • 63  • 62  • 63  .63 
Net Profits  .70  .71  .74  .73  .71 
Cash  Flow  • 69  .71  .73  .72  • 68 
Own  Capital  • 67  • 69  • 67  .66  • 68 
Exports  • 64  • 64  • 63  .66  • 65 
Herfindel-Hirschmann 
Turnover  150  149  147  146  145 
Employment  158  149  140  140  137 
Wages  & Salaries  140  128  119  122  122 
Net Profits  153  175  193  192  181 
Cash  Flow  153  1-72  185  182  139 
Own  Capital  110  122  114  107  123 
Exports  124  122  125  134  123 
Entropy 
Turnover  -108  -109  -109  -109  -109 
Employment  -108  -111  -112  -112  -113 
Wages  & Salaries  -112  -115  -116  -116  -116 
Net  Profits  -106  -102  -98  -98  -102 
Cash  Flow  -107  -103  -101  -101  -108 
O.vn  Capital  -112  -110  -112  -115  -111 
Exports  -113  -115  -114  -112  -113 l V/A-3 
>AY$ 
INSTHUT 
>£CTEUR 
:'NTREPRISES 
CONCtNTRAT1UN  I~DUSTKIELLE 
***********************•**** 
*******************  *  TAdlEAU  NO  1  * 
bVULUTION  DES  CLNNEES  GLU8ALES  :  TOTAL  DU  ~~CTEUR  ET  EC~ANT1LLON  *  *  *  1S6S  - 1972  * 
*********************************************•**************************  *  *  ******************* 
UNITED-K lNGOOM  PAGE 
lONDON  BUSINESS  SCHOCL  (PkOF.J.B.HEATh) 
PHARMACEUTIQUE 
*****************************************************•*************************************  *  VARIABLE  :  01  CHIFFRt  D'AFFAIRES  (000 £)  * 
*******************************************************************************************  *  *  TOTAl  I  l:CHANTILLON  I  * 
•  * ANNH 
* 
*************************************I*****~***~************************I  *  *  N  *  VALEUR  (1)  * 14o8=100  I  N*  *  VALEUR  tEl  * 1968=100  I  EJT  ~ * 
*  *  *  I  *  *  I  *  ***********************************************I*********•************************l********  *  1968  *  30  *  379.737  *  lUO  I  29  *  319.0S5 *  100  I  SS.S3  *  *  1969  *  31  *  423.885 *  111  I  30  •  423.210  *  111  1  SS.B4  * 
*  1970  *  31  *  482.248  *  126  I  30  *  481.483 *  127  I  SS.S4  * 
*  1971  *  31  *  53j.779 *  141  1  30  *  ~34.897 *  141  I  SS.B4 * 
*  1972  *  31  *  597.840  *  157  1  30  *  5S6.936 *  157  1  SS.b5  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  i  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  1  *  *******************************************************************************************  *  VARIA8LE  :  02  EFFECTIF  * 
*******************'***********************************************************************  *  1968  *  30  *  48.531  *  100  I  29  *  48.431 *  100  I  SS.79  *  *  1969  *  31  *  50.903  *  104  I  30  *  50.79D  *  104  I  SS.7S  * 
•  1970  •  31  •  54.101  •  111  I  10  •  53.~91 •  111  1  ss.ec • 
*  1971  *  31  *  55.548  *  114  I  30  *  55.432  *  114  I  99.79 * 
*  1972  *  32  *  53.974  *  111  I  31  *  53.867 *  111  l  SS.bC  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  1  * 
*  *  *  *  1  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  *  ******************************************************************************************* 
1 
t-' 
w 
w V/A-3 
AYS 
~~STITUT 
I::CTEU!~ 
I REPRISES 
CONCENTHATION  INDUSTRIHLE 
**************************** 
*******************  *  TABLEAU  NO  1  * 
*  *  EVOLUTION  DES  CO~NEES  GLGtiALES  :  TOTAL  CU  SECTtUR  ET  t:ChANTILlCN  *  19t8  1972  * 
*  *  ************************************************************************  ******************* 
UNITED-KINGDOM 
LONDON  BUSINESS  SCHOOL  (PROF.J.B.HEATH) 
PHARMACEUTIQUE 
PAGE 
*******************************************************************************************  *  VARIABLE  :  03  MASSt:  SALAIU ALE  (000  £)  * 
*******************************************************************************************  *  *  TOTAL  I  ECHANTILLUN  I  * 
*  *************************************!**********************************!  *  * ANNEE  *  N  *  VALEUR  (T)  * 1968=100  I  N*  *  VALEUR  (E)  * 1968=100  l  E/T  % * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  1  *  ***********************************************!**********************************!********  *  1968  *  30  *  ?3.656  *  100  I  29  *  53.537 *  10C  I  SS.78  * 
*  1969  *  31  *  5~.863 *  109  I  30  *  58.758 *  109  I  S9.82  * 
*  1970  *  31  *  68.918  *  128  I  30  *  68.811  *  128  I  SS.84 *  *  1971  *  31  *  78.086  *  145  I  30  *  77.960 *  145  I  SS.B4  * 
*  1972  *  32  *  85.868  *  160  I  31  *  85.734  *  160  I  SS.84  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  1  * 
*  *  *  *  l  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  *  *  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  * 
*********************************************************•*********************************  *  VARIABLE  :  04  BENEFICE  NET  (000 £)  * 
*******************************************************************************************  *  1968  *  30  *  56.730 *  100  I  29  *  5t.12l *  100  I  SS.99 * 
*  1969  *  30  *  60.874 *  107  I  29  *  60.838 *  107  I  ~9.94 * 
*  1970  *  31  *  62.255  *  109  I  30  *  62.£11 *  109  1  S9.93  * 
*  1971  *  29  *  61.629  *  108  I  28  *  61.586 *  108  I  SS.93 * 
*  1972  *  30  *  72.665  *  128  I  29  *  7~.631 *  1~8  I  SS.S5 * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  l  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  1  *  *  I  *  ******************************************************************************************* 
2 
...... 
w 
-1:'-II I A-3 
AYS 
NSTHUT 
ECTEUR 
NTI-<EPRISt:S 
CONCENT~ATIUN  INDUSTRIHU: 
**************************** 
~····~*************  *  TAblEAU  NO  1  * 
EVOLUTION  Ol:S  DONNEES  GLUBALES  :  TOTAL  CU  StCTtUR  ET  HhANT ILLON  *  *  *  1St8  - 1~72  * 
***********************************~····································  *  *  ******************* 
UN ITED-Kl  NGDOM 
LONDON  BUSINESS  SCHOOL  (PROF.J.B.HEATH) 
PHARMACEUTI QUE 
f'AGE 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••  *  VARIABLE  :  0.5  CASH  FLOW  (000 .t)  * 
*******************************************************************************************  *  *  T 0  T  A l  I  t  C  H A N T  I  l  l  0  N  I  * 
*  *************************************!**********************************'  •  * ANNEE  *  N  *  VALEUR  (T)  * 1968=100  I  N*  *  VALEUR  (E)  *  1568=1GC  I  E/T  :C  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  * 
***********************************************!***********************~**********!******** 
•  1968  •  30  •  67.661  •  100  1  29  •  61.t5o  •  1oc  I  ss.sa  • 
*  1969  *  31  *  72.601 *  107  1  30  *  72.561  *  107  I  SS.S4 *  *  1970  *  31  *  75.~29 *  110  i  30  *  75.022 *  110  I  SS.SS  *  *  1971  *  31  *  77.850 *  115  I  30  *  77.845 *  115  I  SS.99 * 
•  1972  •  30  •  79.B7H  •  118  r  29  •  7s.e7z  •  11a  1  ss.s~ • 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  1  *  *  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  *  *  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  *  *  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  *  *******************************************************************************************  *  VARIABLE  :  07  CAPITAUX  PROPRES  (000 .t)  * 
**************************************•****************************************************  *  1968  *  30  *  158.544  *  100  I  29  *  158.516 *  100  l  99.98 * 
*  1969  *  31  *  176.894 *  111  I  30  *  176.830  *  111  1  SS.S6  * 
*  1970  *  31  *  184.534 *  116  I  30  *  184.436 *  116  1  95.95 * 
*  1971  *  31  *  190.335  *  120  I  30  *  190.207  *  119  I  99.93 *  *  1972  *  31  *  220.282  *  138  1  30  *  220.102  *  138  I  SS.92  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  1  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  l  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  *  *  *  •  *  l  *  *  l  • 
***************************************************************~*************************** 
3 
1-' 
w 
\J1 OA-3 
~YS 
iSTITUT 
:CTEUR 
lTI<.EPRISES 
CONCf::NTRATION  INOUSTRIHLE 
**************************** 
*******************  *  TABLEAU  NO  1  * 
*  EVOLUTION  Df::S  UGNNEES  GLUBALES  :  TUTAl  OU  SECTtUR  f::T  EC~ANTlllUN  *  1S68 
* 
*  1972  * 
*  ************************************************************************  ******************* 
UNITED-KINGDOM  PAGE 
LONDON  BUSINESS  SCHOOL  IPROF.J.B.HEATH) 
PHARMACEUTlQUE 
*******************************************************************************************  *  V  AR IA  B L E  :  C  8  E XP UR T •  ( 000 £)  * 
*******************************************************************************************  *  *  T u  T  A  l  I  c C  H A  N  T  1  l  l  0  N  I  * 
*  * ANNEE 
* 
*************************************I**********************************I  *  *  N  *  VALEUR  IT)  * 1968=100  I  N*  *  VALEUR  (E)  *  1968=100  1  Ell  % * 
*  *  *  I  *  *  I  *  ***********************************************1**********************************1********  *  1968  *  30  *  77.817  *  100  I  29  *  77.806  *  10C  I  S9.S9  * 
*  1969  *  31  *  94.555  *  121  I  30  *  94.538  *  121  I  9S.S8 *  *  1970  *  30  *  114.649  *  147  I  29  *  114.t25 *  147  I  S9.S6 * 
*  1971  *  31  *  131.463  *  168  I  30  *  131.449  *  168  I  S9.99 * 
*  1972  *  31  *  144.851  *  186  I  30  *  144.833 *  186  I  SS.99  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  *  *  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  *  *  *  *  *  I  *  *  l  * 
*  *  *  *  I  *  *  I  *  ******************************************************************************************* 
4 
1--' 
w 
(j\ PAYS 
lNSTITUT 
S!:'CTEUR 
ENTREPRISES 
VARIABLES 
¥¥~~~~¥~T~~~~·~~~¥¥¥~·~·~~¥~ 
UNIH:D-KINGDOM 
LONDON  BUSINESS  SCHOOL  IPROF.J.B.hEATH) 
PHARMACEUTIQUE 
01  CHIFFRE  D'AFFAIRES 
04  BENEFICE  NET 
07  CAPITAUX  PROPRES 
02  EFFECTIF 
0!>  CASH 
08  EXPORT. 
IOTAL  CU  SECTEUR 
**************** 
How 
03 
06 
09 
MASSE  SALAR I ALE 
HWE:O. TIS  BRUT$ 
!MPORJ.  10 
~IAtlltAU Nl  ~  ~ 
***************** 
PAGE  ~ 
******************************************************************************************************************** 
*  *  ANNEE  * 
*VARIABLE*  * 
*  *********************************************************************************************************** 
*  *  I  *  *  *  1S68  I  1S6S  >I 
*  *  I  * 
*  *****************************************************I***************************************************** 
*  *  N  *  M  *  V  *  G  *  H  *  E  I  N  *  M  *  V  *  G  *  h  *  E  * 
***********************************************************-i<**I********************"********************************  *  0  1  *  30*  12.658*1• 87237*  .66670*  150.19190*-108.4089!>I  31*  13.o74*1.9C297*  .67466-*  149.07374*-108.68390* 
*  •  *  *  *  •  *  [  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  0  2  *  30*  1.618•1.93650*  .65815*  158.33447*-108.183201  31*  1.642*1.90538*  .65386*  l4S.37C50*-110.60933* 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  I  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  0  3  *  .30*  lo789*lo78998*  o63728*  140ol::l372*-lllo89654I  31*  1od99*lo72496*  o628799  128.24146*-114.88905* 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  I*  *  *  *  *  *  *  0  4  *  30*  1.891*1.89811*  .69522*  153.42730*-105.707641  30*  2.029*2.06162*  .71285*  175.CC941*-lC1.92415* 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  I*  *  *  *  *  * 
•  o  5  *  JO*  2.255*1.89205*  .68691* 152.6ol15*-106.507461  31*  2.342*2.07989*  .71145*  111.SC49C*-lC3.22270* 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  I  *  *  *  *  *  * 
•  o 7  *  30*  5.285*1.51211*  .6671S*  I09.549D3*-112.13o01I  31*  5.706*1.66692*  .68682*  121.89132*-110.27946* 
*  *  *  •  *  *  *  1  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  0  8  *  30*  2.594*1.65.317*  .64167* 124.43265*-113.271491  31*  3.050*1.66811*  .640o3*  l22.Cl687*-ll4.54598* 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  I  *  *  *  *  *  *  •  *  *  *  *  *  *  1  *  •  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  I*  *  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  I  *  *  *  *  *  * 
***************************************************'**********!**************************************'************** 
*  *  I  *  *  *  197C  I  1971  * 
*  *  I  * 
*  •  0  1 
*  *  0  2 
*  *  0  3 
•  *  0  4  •  *  0  5 
*  *  0  1 
*  *  0  8 
* 
*  * 
* 
*****************************************************I***************************************************** 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
*  • 
* 
*  • 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
31* 
* 
:il* 
*  .31* 
*  31* 
• 
31* 
*  31* 
*  30* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
15.556*1.88440*  .67304*  l46.8C474*-109.05995I 
*  • 
1.  745*1. 82719* 
*  *  2.22 3* t. 63564* 
*  .65043* 
*  .62491* 
•  *  * 
2.008*2-22924*  .74397* 
*  •  • 
2.420*2.17493*  .72746* 
*  • 
s.  953*1. 59255* 
*  * 
3.822*1.66102* 
*  *  •  • 
*  * 
*  * 
*  .6718ll* 
• 
.63.211* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
*  l 
139.95501*-112.015671 
*  I 
l18.~5871*-l16.34260I 
*  I 
192.56445* -98.339171 
*  I 
l84.84970*-lOO.o449ll 
*  I 
114.07124*-112.428441 
*  I 
125.29928*-113.91~101 
*  l 
*  I 
*  I  *  I 
31* 
*  31* 
*  3U' 
• 
29* 
*  31* 
* 
31* 
*  31* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
17.~~3*1.67533* .67293*  145.70541*-109.18470* 
*  •  *  *  * 
1. 792*1• 62876*  • 64507*  l't0.14C 11*-112.33046* 
*  •  *  *  *  2.519*1.66837*  .62568*  122.C4690*-115.8t641* 
*  •  *  *  * 
2.125*2.13495*  .72668*  191.t5tos• -97.98363* 
*  *  *  *  *  2.511*2-15110*  .71993*  1€1.52371*-1(1.23122* 
*  *  *  *  *  6.140*1.52450*  .65663*  107.22655*-114.56083* 
*  •  *  *  *  4.241*1.77594*  .65684*  133.~9915*-112.0&086* 
*  *  *  *  * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
*  • 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
*  * 
*  **************************************************************!***************************************************** 
,..... 
w 
-..J IV/ A-3  EVOLUTION  Of  LA  CONCENTRATION 
**************************** 
TOTAL  OU  SECTEUR 
**************** 
•••••••••••••••••  *TABLEAU  NO  2  * 
***************** 
PAYS 
INSTITUT 
SECTEUR 
ENTREPRISES 
VARIABLES 
UN IT ED-KINGDOM 
LONDON  BUSINESS  SCHOOL  lPROF.J.B.HEATH) 
PHARMACEUTIQUc 
01  CHIFFRE  D'AFFAIRES 
04  BENEFICE  NET 
02  EFHCTif  03 
06 
09 
MASSE  SALARlALE 
PAGE  6 
05  CASH  FlGW  11\\IEST IS  SRUTS 
07  CAPITAUX  PROPRES  08  EXPURT.  IMPORT.  10 
******************************************************************************************************************** 
*  *  ANNEE  * 
*VARIABLE*  * 
•  *********************************************************************************************************** 
*  *  1  *  *  *  1c;12  I  * 
*  *  I  * 
$  *****************************************************!***************************************************** 
*  *  N  *  M  *  V  *  G  *  H  *  E  I  N  *  H  *  V  *  G  *  H  *  E  * 
**************************************************************I***************************************************** 
*  0  l  *  31*  19.285*1.87230*  .67188*  145.33846*-109.169071  *  *  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  I  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  0  2  *  32*  1.687*1.83796*  .64915*  136.81507*-113.331271  *  *  *  *  *  • 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  I*  *  *  *  *  *  *  0  3  *  32*  2.683*1.70396*  .63113*  121.98342*-116.421281  *  *  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  I*  *  *  *  *  *  0 4  *  30*  2.422*2.10200*  .10892*  160.61411*-101.598191  *  *  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  1  *  *  *  *  *  * 
0  5  *  30*  2.663*1.77751*  .67598*  138.65178*-108.476861  *  *  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  I  *  *  *  *  *  *  0  1  *  31*  7.106*1.67333*  .68098*  122.58202*-110.778201  *  *  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  I*  *  *  *  *  *  0  8  *  31*  4.673*1.67314*  .65405*  122.56074*-113.40200I  *  *  •  *  *  • 
*  *  *  *  *  *  I*  *  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  I*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  I*  *  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  I*  *  *  *  *  *  *************************************************************!***************************************************** 
...... 
w 
00 -3 
HUT 
EUR 
EPRISES 
E  V 0  L  l  T 1  0  N  D  t  L  A  C  G  ~  C  E N T  R  A T  1  0  N 
****************************************************** 
INDICES  LINDA  (L)  ET  RATICS  DE  CGNCENTRATIUN  tCRJ 
************************************************* 
UNITf:D-KI NGDOM 
LUNDON  BUSINESS  SCHGCL  (PROF.J.B.HtATH) 
PHARMACEUTIQUE 
*******************  *  TABLEAU  hO  3  * 
*  *  *  1<i68 
* 
1972  *  • 
******************* 
PAGE  l 
***************************************************************"'''"''********************************************************  VARIABLE  :  01  CHIFFRE  D'AFFAIRES 
************************************************************************************************************************** 
*  *  I  *  COLRBtS  L 
*  INDICES  l  ET  CR  RElATIFS  A  N*  =  *  I  *************************************** 
T  *  *  I  ECHANT ILLUN* 1ER  MA  I  MUM  :  2EM  MAXI MUM:  fH Nl MUM 
R  ****************************************************************  1------------•------------:------------:------------
~ *  :  :  :  :  :  :  * N  I  :  L  *N*  :  L  :N*  :  L  :N*  :  l  *  4  :  8  :  10  :  12  :  20  :  30  :  40  *  1  N*:  N*  *  H<:  N*H<  :  IH  N*H  :  M:  N*M 
***********=********=********=********=********=********=*************!***=************=********=***=********=***=********  •  .88815:  .50651:  .42579:  .39485:  .33470:  .ooooo:  .• 00000*  30129  :  .40082*  3  :  1.11110:  3 :  1.11170:22  :  .32055 
R  *61.02  :77.19  :82.89  :86.81  :96.17  :  .DO  :  .00  *  I  :99.83  *  :  :  :  :  : 
***********=********=********=********=********=********=*************!***=************=********=***=********=***=********  *  .89408:  .51421:  .. 44707:  .41156:  .33812:  .41243:  .00000*  31130  :  .41243*  3 :  1.05665:  3  :  1.05665:22  :  .32231 
R *61.44  :77.46  :82.53  :86.29  :95.83  :99.84  :  .00  *  I  :9S.84  *  :  :  :  :  : 
***********=********=********=********=********=********=*************1***=************=********=***=********=***=********  *  .86745:  .50149:  .43232:  .39198:  .33754:  .414ao:  .ooooo•  31130  :  .41480*  3  :  1.C4743:  3  :  1.o4743:22  :  .32701 
R *61.28  :76.97  :82.28  :s6.47  :95.92  :99.84  :  .00  *  I  :9<;.84  *  :  :  :  :  : 
***********=********=********=********=********=********=*************I***=************=********=***=********=***=********  •  .&5883:  .48311:  .43110:  .39533:  .33401:  .41546:  .ooooo•  31130  :  .41546*  3  :  1.05233:  3 :  1.05233:22  :  .32843 
R *61.13  :77.42  :82.57  :66.49  :95.95  :99.84  :  .00  *  I  :99.84  *  :  :  :  :  : 
***********=********=********=********=********=********=*************l***=****f*******=········=···=········=···=********  •  .~;~asz6:  .49841:  .42607:  .39803:  .33l12:  .42318:  .ooooo•  31130  :  .42318*  3 :  1.C5697:  3  :  1.oscs1:21  :  .32~00 
R *61.04  :76.77  :a2.45  :86.23  :95.99  :99.85  :  .oo  *  1  :9s.a5  * 
***********=********=********=********=********=********=*************I***=************=********=***=*~******=***=******** 
...... 
w 
\0 ,-3  E  V 0  l  l  T  I  0  N  D  E  L  A  C  G  N C  E  N T  R  A T  I  G  N 
****************************************************** 
*******************  *  TABLEAU  NO  3  * 
*  *  INDICES  liNDA  (l)  ET  RATICS  D~ CCNCENTRATION  (CR) 
************************************************* 
•  1S6e  1972  * 
*  *  ******************* 
IlUT 
EUR 
EPRISI:S 
UNITED-KINGDOM 
LONDON  UUSINESS  SChOCl  (PROF.J.B.HEATHl 
PHARMACEUTIQUE 
PAGE  i 
****************************************************************•**********************************************~·········· 
VARIABLE  :  02  EFFECTIF 
******************•******************************************************************************************************* 
*  *  l  *  COI.iRBES  L 
*  INDICES  l  ET  CR  RELATIFS  A  N*  =  *  l  *************************************** 
T *  *  I  ECHANTillUN*1ER  MA  IMUfl  :  2EM  fo;AXIMt;M:  MHdMUM 
R ***************•************************************************  I------------•------------:------------:------------
1  *  :  :  :  :  :  :  * N  I  :  l  *N*  :  l  :N*  :  l  :N*  :  l 
*  4  :  B  :  10  :  12  :  20  :  30  :  40  *  I  N*:  N*  * H<:  N*H<  :  h:  N*H  :  ~:  N"*M 
***********=********=********=********=********=********=*************I***=************=********=***=********=***=********  *  .83129:  .57901:  .52050:  .46494:  .33575:  .ooooo:  .00000*  30129  :  .33834*  2  :  1.40583:  2  :  1.40583:23  :  .31255 
R *62.93  :77.78  :81.79  :€5.26  :94.86  :  .00  :  .00  *  I  :99.79  *  :  :  :  : 
***********=********=********=********=********=********=*************1***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
•  .ssoo9:  .52317:  .47562:  .41406:  .30519:  .34692:  .ooooo•  31130  :  .34692* 2  :  1.38758:  2  :  1.3d75S:23  :  .29511 
R *60.71  :76.03  :80.42  :E4.44  :94.90  :99.79  :  .DO  *  I  :99.79  *  :  :  :  :  : 
t**********=********=********=********=********=********=*************I***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
•  .82775:  .47759:  .4zcau:  .3Hl65:  .30208:  .35284:  .ooooo•  31130  :  .35284*  2  :  1.3441E:  2  :  1.34416:24  :  .29180 
R *58.67  :75.60  !80.83  :84.90  :95.0~  :99.8U  :  .00  *  I  :~9.80  *  :  :  :  :  : 
~**********=********=********=********=********=********=*************!***=************=********=***=********=***=********  •  .83647:  .50337:  .41805:  .38424:  .30294:  .32911:  .ooooo•  3li30  :  .32911*  2  :  1.25913:  2  :  1.25913:22  :  .29141 
~  *59.12  :74.83  :a0.37  :€4.43  :94.62  :99.79  :  .00  *  I  :99.79  *  :  :  :  :  : 
~**********=********=********=********=********=********=*************!***=************=********=***=********=***=********  *  .812~3:  .50440:  .4L9ll:  .37784:  .29201:  .33038:  .00000*  32131:  .33427*  2  :  1.25870:  2  :  1.25d70:24:  .28~41 
t  *58.7S  :74.07  :79.61  :83.80  :94.52  :99.55  :  .00  *  I  :s9.80  *  :  :  :  :  : 
~**********=********=********=********=********:********=*************I***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
I-'  ..,.. 
0 -:3 
ITUT 
E:UR 
EPRISES 
E  V 0  l  U  T  I  0  N  D  c  l  A  C  0  ~  C  E  N  T  k  A  T  I  0  N 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
INDICES  liNDA  (l)  ET  RATICS  DE  CGNCENTRATIDN  (CRJ 
*******'***************************************** 
UNITED-KINGDOM 
lONDON  HUSINESS  SCHOOL  (PKOF.J.B.HEATH) 
PHARMACEUTIQUE 
*******************  *  TAbLEAU  NO  3  * 
*  *  *  1S6t  1912  * 
*  * 
******************* 
PAGE  9 
************************************************************************************************************************** 
VARIABLE  :  03  MASSE  SAlARIALE 
~*****************************4******************************************************************************************* 
*  *  I  *  COliRBES  l  *  INDICES  L  ET  CR  RELAllFS  A  ~~ =  *  I  *************************************** 
*  *  I  ECHANT IllON* 1ER  MA  IMlJM  :  2EM  MAXlMIJM:  IUMMUfi 
~  ****************************************************************  1-----------·------------:----------:----------
g  *  :  :  :  :  :  :  * N  I  :  l  *N*  :  l  !N*  :  l  :~1 :  l 
*  4  :  8  :  10  :  12  :  20  :  30  :  40  *  I  Nl:  N*  *  H<:  N*H<  :  H:  N*H  :  M:  1'\*M 
~**********=********=********=********=********=********=*******•*****I***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
•  .730&5:  .50777:  .45085:  .38827:  .29981:  .ooooo:  .ooooo•  3012~:  .31656*  2  :  1.34484:  2  :  1.34484:22  :  .27988 
~  *59.82  :75.68  :80.29  :84.60  :94.79  :  .00  :  .00  *  I  :99.78  *  :  : 
~**********=********=********=********=********=********=*************l'~'**=************=********=***=********=***=********  *  .71662:  .48003:  .41170:  .35974:  .27202:  .31700:  .00000*  31130  :  .31700*  2  :  1.31200!  2  :  1.31200!22  :  .25900 
~  *57.17  :73.23  :78.37  :82.84  :94.72  :99.82  :  .oo  •  I  :s9.82  •  :  :  :  : 
~**********=********=********=********=********=********=*************I***=************=********=***=********=***=********  *  •  74990:  • 38090:  .35288:  .32294:  .26812:  .32606:  .00000*  31130  :  .32606*  2  :  1.24473:  2  :  1.24473:22 .:  .257l't 
~  *53.74  :73.55  :79.06  :83.64  :95.05  :99.84  :  .00  *  I  :99.64  *  :  :  :  :  : 
'**********=********=********=********=********=********=*************!***=************=********=***=********=***=********  *  .76550:  .41789:  .37539:  .33513:  .27107:  .31244:  .00000*  31130  :  .31244*  2 :  1.145GE:  2  :  l.l45Gti:22  :  .26157 
I  *55.26  :73.38  :78.75  :83.40  :94.71  :99.84  :  .00  *  I  :99.84  *  : 
'**********=********=********=********=********=********=*************I***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
•  .79102:  .41H04:  .36915:  .34085:  .26855:  .30119:  .ooooo•  32131  :  .31159*  2 :  1.1684C:  2  :  1.16840:22  :  .26129 
t  *55.13  :72.96  :78.55  :82.EO  :94.38  :99.61  :  .00  *  I  :9S.B4  * 
'**********!********=********=********!********=********=*************I***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
,..... 
.j::'- ,_. -3  E  V 0  l  U T  l  G N  0  t  l  A  C  C  N C  E  N T  H  A  T  I  G N 
****************************************************** 
*******************  *  TAblEAU  NO  3  * 
*  *  INDICES  liNDA  (l)  ET  RATIGS  DE  CCNCENTRATIUN  tCRJ 
************************************************* 
*  1Sc8  1972  * 
*  *  ******************* 
ITUT 
EUR  : 
EPRISES 
UNITED-KINGUOM 
lONDON  BUSINESS  SCHOCl  (PROF.J.B.HEATHt 
PHARMACEUTIQUE 
PAGE  I. 
************************************************************************************************************************** 
VARIABLE  :  04  BENEFICE  NET 
**************************************************************************************************************************  *  *  I  *  COURBt:S  L  *  INDICES  l  ET  CR  KELAllfS  A  N*  =  *  I  *************************************** 
T  *  *  I  ECHANTILLON*1E:R  MA  IMUM  :  2E:M  MAXIMUM:  foHNIMUM 
R  ****************************************************************  1------------•------------:-----~------:------------
~ *  :  :  :  :  :  :  * N  I  :  l  *N*  :  l  :N*  :  l  :N*  :  L  *  4  :  8  :  10  :  12  :  20  :  30  :  40  *  I  N*:  N*  * H<:  N*H<  :  H:  N*H  :  M:  N*M 
***********=••••••••:•••·····=········=········=······••:••***********1***=************=········=···=········=···=········  *  .83833:  .47394:  .41979:  .37787:  .37469:  .ooooo:  .00000*  30I29  :  .99596*  2  :  1.23541!  2  :  1.23541:18  :  .33354 
R  *60.97  :79.40  :84.69  :89.10  :98.29  :  .00  :  .00  *  I  :99.99  *  :  :  :  :  : 
***********=********=********=********=********=********=*************I***:************=********=***=********=***=******** 
•  .90482:  .54807:  .51536:  .48104:  .3~717:  .ooooo:  .ooooo•  30129  :  .67683*  3  :  1.19222:  3  :  1.19222:18  :  .38094 
R *65.08  :81.92  :86.07  :89.29  :97.99  :  .00  :  .00  *  I  :s9.94  *  :  :  :  : 
***********:********:********=********=********:********=*************I***:************:********=***=********=***=********  *  .912132:  .55599:  .56284:  .53989:  .47895:  .73618:  .00000*  31130  :  .73618*  2  :  1.38722:  2  :  1.38722:18  :  .46547 
R  *67.05  :&4.88  :aa.49  :91.19  :98.09  :99.93  :  .oo  •  I  :99.93  •  =  :  :  :  : 
***********=********:********=********=********=********=*************1***=***********•:••······=···=········=···=········  *  .85404:  .60914:  .61765:  .57201:  .47510:  .ooooo:  .00000*  29128  :  .66530*  2  :  1.31270:  2  :  1.31270:19  :  .47126 
R *68.64  :ss.o6  :sa.21  :so.91  :97.90  :  .oo  :  .oo  *  I  :99.93  •  :  : 
***********=********:********:********=********:********=*************1***:************=********=···=········=···=········ 
•  .aasos:  .57428:  .56376:  .5211&:  .37677:  .ooooo:  .ooooo•  30I29  :  .61312*  2  :  1.14811:  2  :  1.14871:21  :  .37452 
R  *67.12  :81.71  :85.35  :88.39  :97.47  :  .00  :  .oo  *  I  :99.95  *  :  :  :  :  : 
***********=********=********=********=********=********=*************I***=************=********:***=********:***:******** 
1-' 
.p.. 
N .-3  t  V 0  l  U T  I  0  N  D E  L  A  C 0  N C E  N T  R  A T  I  0  N 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
*******************  *  TABLEAU  NO  3  * 
INDICES  LINDA  (l)  ET  RATIOS  Dt  LGNCENTRATION  (CR) 
************************************************* 
•  *  1S68  *  1972  • 
•  *  ******************* 
, 
rnur 
rEUR 
~EPRISES 
UNITED-KINGDOM 
LONDON  BUSINESS  SCHOCL  (PRUF.J.B.HcATH) 
PHARMACEUTIQUE 
PAGE  ,, 
~·************************************************************************************************************************* 
VARIABLE  :  05  CASH  FLOW 
~**************************************************************************************************************************  *  *  I  *  COURSES  l 
L  *  INDICES  l  ET  CR  RELAllFS  A  N*  =  *  I  *************************************** 
ET  *  *  1  ECHANTilLON*1tR  MA  !MUM  :  2cM  MAXIMUM:  MI~IMUM 
CR  ****************************************************************  1------------•------------:------------:----~-------
~ *  i  :  :  :  :  :  *  N  [  :  l  *N*  :  l  :N*  :  l  :N*  :  l 
*  4  :  8  :  10  :  12  :  20  :  30  :  40  *  l  N*:  N*  *  H<:  lll*H<  :  H:  N*H  :  M:  N*M 
************=********=********=********=********=********=*************!***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
l  *  .85846:  .48281:  .42106:  .38508:  .34498:  .ooooo:  .00000*  30129  :  .74737*  2  :  1.12455:  2  :  1.12455:19  :  .33212 
CR  *60.92  :78.73  :84.23  :88.39  :97.79  :  .00  :  .00  *  1  :99.98  *  :  :  : 
************=********=********=********=********=********=*************!***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
L  *  .94259:  .55694:  .50876:  .48289:  .38025:  .57895:  .ooooo•  31130  :  .57895*  3  :  1.21845:  3  :  1.21845:21  :  .37665 
CR  *64.40  :80.92  :85.41  :88.55  :97.23  :99.94  :  .00  *  I  :99.94  *  :  :  :  : 
************=********=********=********=********=********=*************I***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
l  •  .93605:  .56749:  .55274:  .51697:  .43UO:  .61068:  .ooooo•  31130  :  .61068*  ;_  :  1.3037<;:  2.  :  L.30379:lS  :  .42451 
CR  *65.80  :83.02  !86.92  :€9.84  :97.45  :99.99  :  .00  *  I  :99.99  *  :  :  :  : 
'************=********=********=********=********=********=*************I***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
l  *  .92036:  .62021:  .. 61253:  .58235:  .40286:  .57090:  .00000*  31130  :  .57090*  2  :  1.12262:  2 :  1.1226.2:22  :  .39890 
CR  *66.93  :82.66  :86.01  :88.49  !96.77  :99.99  :  .00  *  I  !S9.99  *  :  :  : 
'************=********=********=********=********=********=*************!***=************=********=***=********=***:********  L  *  .70523:  .44848:  .44320:  .39318:  .31939:  .ooooo:  .ooooo•  3Ul29  :  .54537*  3 :  .91062:  ~  :  .91062:19  :  .31683 
CR  *61.94  :79.07  :83.30  :e7.36  :97.28  :  .00  :  .00  *  I  :S9.99  *  :  :  :  : 
~************=********=********=********=********=********=*************I***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
'"""'  ~ 
VJ /A-.3 
fS 
>TITUT 
:TEUR 
rREPRISES 
E  V 0  l  L  T  I  0  N  D  E  L  A  C 0  N C  E  N T  k  A  f  I  0  N 
********'********************************************* 
INDICES  LINDA  (LI  tT  RATIOS  DE  CGNCtNTRATIUN  (C~) 
************************************************* 
UNITED-KINGDOM 
LONDON  BUSINESS  SCHOOL  (PROF.J.o.MEATH) 
PHARMACEUTIQUE 
*******************  *  TABlEAU  ~0  3  * 
*  *  •  ISo€  1972  * 
*  *  ******************* 
PAGE  t&, 
'***************************************************************************•*********************************************** 
VARIAblE  :  07  CAPITAUX  PMOPRES 
'*************************************************************************************************************************** 
*  *  1  *  COlJRBES  l 
L  *  INDIC~S  l  ET  CR  RELATIFS  A  ~· =  *  I  *************************************** 
ET  *  *  I  !:CHANT lllON*  11:::R  MA  IMUM  :  lEH  MAXI klJfH  IU Nl MUM 
CR  ****************************************************************  I------------•------------:----------:-----------
1 *  :  :  :  :  :  :  * N  I  :  L  *N*  :  L  :N*  :  l  :N*  :  L 
*  4  :  8  :  10  :  12  :  20  :  30  :  40  *  I  N*:  N*  * H<:  N*H<  :  H:  N*H  :  ~:  N*M 
************=********=********=********=********=********=*************l***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
L  *  .51633:  .34447:  .31477:  .28624:  .33013:  .00000:  .00000*  30129  :  .71227*  3  :  .t54S~:~9  :  .71227:13  :  .26S4C 
CR  *55.93  :77.86  :84.34  :8<;.49  :98.14  :  .00  .:  .00  *  I  :99.98  *  :  :  :  :  : 
************=********=********=********=********=********=*************!***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
L  *  .61680:  .39271:  .35210:  .32514:  .35586:  .65542:  .00000*  31130  :  .65542*  3  :  .74717:  3  :  .74717:13  :  .30669 
~R *58.58  :78.42  :84.61  :€9.18  :97.86  :99.96  :  .00  *  l  :S9.S6  *  :  :  : 
•***********=*******•=********=********=********=********=*************I***=************=********=***=********=***=********  *  .55931:  .36coo:  .33111:  .Josza:  .32586:  .59556:  .. ooooo•  31130  :  .59556*  3  :  .o9877:  3  :  .69877:13  :  .29060 
:R  *57.12  :77.20  :83.50  :€8.28  :97.53  :99.95  :  .00  *  I  :99.SS  *  :  :  :  : 
P***********=********=********=********=********=********=*************I***=************=········=···=········=···=········ 
•  .suass:  .34747:  .32685:  .3oooo:  .29546:  .51998:  .ouoou•  31130  :  .51998*  3  :  .t24B6:  3  :  .62486:15  :  .27932 
;R  *56.13  :76.32  :82.24  :87.02  :97.00  :99.93  :  .00  *  l  :S9.93  *  :  :  :  :  : 
~**********=********=********=********=********=********=*************1***=************=········=···=········=···=········ 
•  .60784:  .39788:  .36023:  .33389:  .32341:  .57942:  .oouoo•  31130  :  .57942*  3  :  .74940:  3  :  .74940:21  :  .317GG 
:R  *59.28  :78.18  :84.15  :sa.6o  :97.56  :99.92  :  .oo  •  1  :s9.92  • 
'***********=********=********=********=********=********=*************I***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
1-' 
~ 
~ 'A-3 
·s 
,  TITUT 
.lEUR 
'REPRISES 
E  V 0  l  u T  I  U N  0  E  L  A  C 0  N C  E  N T  R  A r  I  G N 
········~············································· 
INDICES  liNDA  (LJ  ET  kATICS  DE  CLNCENT~ATIUN  (CR) 
************************************************* 
UNITED-KINGDOM 
LONDON  BUSINESS  SCHOCL  (PROF.J.B.HEATHJ 
PHARMACEUTIQUE 
~•*****************  *  TABlEAU  NG  3  * 
*  *  1S6t  *  1972  * 
*  *  ******************* 
PAGt:  ll 
'*************************************************************************************************************************** 
VARIABLE  :  08  EXPuRT. 
***************************************************************************************************************************  *  *  I  *  CGUk6ES  l 
l  *  INDICES  L  ET  CR  RELATIFS  A  ~* =  *  I  *************************************** 
ET  *  *  I  ECHANTlllON*1ER  MA  IHUM  :  2EH  ~AXIMUM:  MINIMUM 
CR  ****************************************************************  1------------•------------:------------:------------
~ *  :  :  :  :  :  :  * N  I  :  l  *N*  :  L  :~*  :  l  :N*  :  l 
*  4  :  t1  :  10  :  12  :  20  :  30  :  40  *  1  N*:  1\*  * H<:  N*H<  :  H:  N*H  :  fO,:  N*M 
************=*******~=********=********=********=********=*************!***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
L  *  .65127:  .37463:  .33891:  .30762:  .28422:  .ooooo:  .ooooo•  30129:  .~5151* 2: l.t2544:  2:  1.62544:11:  .271~4 
CR  *55.23  :75.25  :81.26  :86.21  :96.95  :  .00  :  .00  *  I  :S9.99  *  :  :  :  : 
************=********=********=********=********=****~***~*************!***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
L  •  .70148:  .38178:  .32231:  .2957d:  .26891:  .60122:  .oooou•  31I3D  :  .60122*  2  :  1.49487:  2  :  1.49467:21  :  .26541 
CR  *54.43  :73.22  :80.47  :€5.S4  :96.45  :99.98  :  .00  *  I  :99.98  *  :  :  :  : 
************=********=********=********=********=********=*************!***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
L  *  .71118:  .41650:  .32312:  .29727:  .2s9oo:  .ooooo:  .ooboo•  30129  :  .3a022*  2  :  1.34857:  2  :  1.34857:21  :  .28513  CR  *55.65  :72.91  :80.66  :85.96  :96.07  :  .00  :  .00  *  I  :99.98  *  :  :  :  :  : 
************=********=********=********=********=********=*************I***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
L  *  .77413:  .42875:  .34982:  .31531:  .29759:  .65328:  .00000*  31130  :  .65328*  2  :  1.41698:  2  :  1.41698:20  :  .29759 
CR  *56.42  :74.52  :81.47  !€6.68  :96.51  :99.99  :  .00  *  I  :S9.99  *  :  :  :  : 
************=********=********=********=********=********=*************1***=************=********=***=********=•••:•••••••• 
L  *  .67705:  .41392:  .33536:  .29824:  .2~650:  .64711:  .00000*  31130  :  .64711*  2  :  1.11381:  i  :  1.11381:13  :  .28738 
CR  *56.05  :74.13  :81.13  :e6.65  :96.67  :99.99  :  .00  *  I  :S9.99  *  :  :  :  : 
************=********=********=********=********=********=*************!***=************=********=***=********=***=******** 
1-' 
.1::-
Vl IV I A-3  CONCENTRATICN  INOUSTRIELLE 
**************************** 
TABLEAU  STRuCTUREL  UES  COURSES  LINDA 
************************************ 
*******************  * TABL~AU NO  3B1S  * 
******************* 
PAYS  UNHEO-KlNGOOM  PAGE  1'!-
INSTITUT  LUNDON  BUSIN~SS SCHOCL  IPROF.J.B.HEATH) 
SCCTEUM  PHARMACEUTIQUE 
ENTP.EPR!SES  ANNE!:  :  1S68 
******************************************************************************************************************** 
*  *  VARIABLE  * 
*  N*  *****!lt******"'**l!*********8:l'I'********M*********8"*********1't'J*********88*******************"**""*i************ 
*  * CHIFFRE  * EFFECTIF  *  MASSE  *BENEFICE  *  CASH  *  CAPITAUX  *  EXPGRT.  *  *  *  * 
*  *O'AFFAIRfS*  *SALARIALE  *  NET  *  FLUW  *  PROPRtS*  *  *  *  * 
~  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  • 
********************************~***************************************************************¥*******************  *  2  •  .98566  •  1.40583 *  1.34484  •  1.23547  •  t.l245S  •  .5~354 •  1.e2544 •  •  •  • 
*  *  •  ==-======  * =·======-=  *  =o==:=o:;==  * ======-==  *  * ===:==== *  *  •  • 
*  3  *  1.11170 *  .90956 *  .93171  *  1.04082  *  1.10570 *  .b54~3 *  -~17~8 *  *  *  * 
*  * ===:====  *  *  *  *  *  *  •  •  *  *  *  4  *  .68815  *  .8312~ *  .73065 *  .83833  *  .85846 *  .51633 *  .65127 *  *  •  * 
*  5  *  .72717 *  .72077 *  .t5197 *  .65771  *  .67132 *  .40887 *  .53830 *  *  *  * 
*  6  *  .63762  *  .63579 *  .55954 *  .55992  *  .59418 *  .36996 *  .47498 *  •  *  * 
*  7  *  .56278 *  .56553 *  .51158 *  .49389  *  .50952 *  .36512 *  .41C5S  *  *  *  * 
*  8  *  .50651  *  .57901 *  .50777 *  .47394  *  .48281  *  .34447 *  .37463 *  *  *  * 
*  ~ *  .45814 *  .55673 *  .48161  *  .45083  *  .44459 *  .31687 *  .25783 *  *  *  * 
* 10  •  .42579 *  .52050 *  .45085 *  .41979  *  .42106 *  .31477 *  .33891  *  *  •  * 
*  11  *  .41446 *  .48962  *  .41659  *  .39342  *  .40192 *  .30283 *  .32084 *  •  *  * 
•  12 *  .39485 *  .46494 *  .36827 *  .37787  *  .38508 *  .28624 *  .30762 *  •  •  * 
*  13 *  .37852 *  .43790 *  .37864 *  .35748  *  .36925 *  .26840 *  .2S644  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  * -------- *  *  *  *  *  *  14 *  .36163 *  .42775 *  .36867 *  .35057  *  .36424 *  .28940 *  .28S64 *  *  *  *  * 15  •  .35968  •  .41146 *  .35777  •  .34o28  *  .35595 *  .30996  •  .28605 *  *  •  * 
* 16 *  .35992 *  .39317 *  .34752  *  .335b7  •  .35020 *  .31890 *  .28318  •  *  *  * 
*  17 *  .35361  *  .37505 *  .33454 *  .33494  *  .33984 *  .31Y51 *  .27154 *  *  *  * 
*  *  •  *  *  *  *  * -------- *  •  •  •  * 18.  .34657  *  .36200 *  .32102  *  .33354 *  .33383 *  .32867 *  .28030  *  •  *  * 
*  *  *  *  * ------- *  *  *  *  *  •  • 
•  19 *  .34122  *  .34759 *  .30770  *  .35741  *  .33212 *  .33162 *  .28207 *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  * -------- •  *  *  *  *  *  * 20 *  .33470 *  .33575 *  .29981  *  .37469  *  .34498 *  .33013 *  .28422 *  •  •  * 
*  21  *  .32637 *  .32294 *  .29026 *  .38601  *  .35426 *  .34623 *  .2~115 *  *  •  * 
*  22  *  .32085 *  .31905 *  .27988  *  .39848  *  .36826 *  .36050 *  .29239 *  *  *  * 
*  * -------- *  * -------- *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * ?3 *  .33824  *  .31255 *  .29038  *  .44580 *  .37525 *  .39698 *  .30676 *  *  *  * 
*  *  * -------- *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 24 *  .35419 *  .31398 *  .29827 *  .48427  *  .39427  •  .43469.  .32173 *  *  *  * 
•  25  *  .36525  *  .31992 *  .30144 *  .52835  *  .44663 *  .49094  •  .33788 *  •  *  • 
•  26  *  .37216 *  .32360 *  .30217  *  .56777  *  .48530 *  .53545 *  .35539 *  *  *  • 
*  27 *  .J8241  *  .32508 *  .30362 *  .60508 *  .51496 *  .57119 *  .3t9S6 *  *  *  * 
•  28  •  • .19366  *  .3.3355 *  .30624 *  .6.77iH  *  .58436 *  .o2229 *  .409cd  •  •  *  * 
*  29 *  .40082 *  .33834 *  .31656 *  .995~6 *  .74737 *  .71227 *  .55151  •  *  *  * 
•  •  *  *  *  •  *  ========  *  *  •  •  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
******************************************************************************************************************** 
I-' 
~ 
0\ IV I A-3 
PAYS 
INSTITUT 
Sf.CTEUR 
ENT REPRISES 
CC;NCENTRATICN  I~OUSTRIELU: 
**************************** 
TABLEAU  STRUCTUkEL  UES  COUkdES  LINDA 
************************************ 
UN II fll-K I NGOOM 
LONDON  BUSINESS  SCHOCl  IPRUF.J.B.HEATHI 
PHARMACEUTI~UE 
ANNH  :  196<il 
~~~~~~~··~••******* 
*  TABLEAU  NO  361S  * 
******************* 
PAGE  IZ' 
*************************************************************************************************************~****** 
*  *  VARIABLE  * 
*  N*  *****$t*********3l*********f~*********34*********3~*********3~*********11************************************** 
*  * CHIFFRE  *  EFFECTIF  *  MASSE  *BENEFICE  *  CASH  *  CAPITAUX  *  EXPORT.  *  *  *  * 
*  *D'AFFAIR~S*  *SALARIAlE  *  NET  *  FLCW  *  PROPkES*  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  ******************************************************************************************************************** 
*  2 *  .89350 *  1.38758 *  1.31200 *  1.14692  *  1.06507 *  .61318 *  1.4<il487  *  *  *  * 
*  *  * ========  * ========  *  *  *  * ========  *  *  *  *  *  3  *  1.05665 *  .<ill572  *  .90230  *  1.19222  *  1.21645  *  .74717  *  .90716 *  *  *  * 
*  *  ========  *  *  *  ========  *  ========  *  ========  *  *  *  *  * 
*  4 *  .~9408 *  .85009 *  .71662 *  .90482  *  .<il4259  *  .61680 *  .70148 *  •  *  * 
*  5  *  .74533  *  .72809  *  .62670  *  .71817  *  .72332 *  .49394 *  .60CB4  *  *  *  * 
*  6  *  .63788  *  .63713 *  .53768 *  .64616  *  .64454 *  .44089  •  .51713 *  *  •  * 
*  7  *  .54979  *  .56621  *  .49334  *  .55ll58  *  .58056 *  .42711  *  .44147 *  *  *  * 
*  8  *  .~1421 *  .52317 *  .48003 *  .54807 *  .558<il4  *  .39271  •  .38178 *  *  *  * 
*  9  *  .48142  *  .50541 *  .44599 *  .53136  *  .51647 *  •  .:!5519  *  .:B293 *  *  *  *  *  10 *  .44707  *  .47562  *  .41170  *  .51536  *  .50876  *  .35210  *  .32231  *  *  *  * 
*  11  *  .43494 *  .44340  *  .38177  *  .50100  *  .4<il353  *  .33988 *  .30558 *  *  *  * 
* 12 *  .41156 *  .41406 *  .35974 *  .48104 *  .48289 *  .32514 *  .2<il578  *  *  •  * 
*  13 *  .38957  *  .J9714 *  .33'>16  *  .46212  *  .46371  *  ~30669 *  .2<il440  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  -------- *  *  *  *  * 
*  14 *  .37345 *  .37795  *  .31961  *  .44148  *  .44277  *  .30784  *  .28677  *  *  *  * 
*  15 *  .35437  *  .36079  *  .29963  *  .42141  *  .42651  *  .31885  *  .27151  *  *  *  * 
*  16 *  .35868 *  .35273 *  .29470 *  .409':10  *  .41043 *  .32710 *  .21634 *  *  *  * 
*  17 *  .35488 *  .34025 *  .28587 *  .39561  *  .39855 *  .33028 *  .2729C *  *  *  * 
*  18 *  .34915 *  .32972 *  .28236 *  .38094 *  .38764 *  .33892 *  .268<il4  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  * -------- *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
*  19  *  .34472  *  .31740  *  .27557  *  .38681  *  .37949 *  .35077  *  .27113  *  •  •  * 
* 20 *  .33812 *  .30519  •  .27202  *  .38717  *  .38025  •  .35586 *  .26891 *  *  •  * 
* 21  *  o33107  *  .29855 *  .26612  *  o40005  *  .37665 *  o3b796 *  .26541 *  *  *  + 
*  *  *  *  *  * -------- *  * -------- *  *  *  *  *  22  *  .32231 *  .29806 *  .25900 *  .40382  *  .38884 *  .37550 *  .21212 *  *  •  * 
*  * -------- *  * -------- *  *  •  *  *  *  *  *  * 23 *  .33033 *  .29511  *  .27249 *  .45818  *  .3':1494  *  .41121  •  .28947 *  •  *  * 
*  *  * -------- *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  •  * 24 *  .34434 *  .29643 *  .28030 *  .49738  *  .41851 *  .44979 *  •  30516 *  *  *  * 
* 25  *  .35544  •  .30624 *  .28489 *  .52721  *  .44892 *  .47475 *  .32017 *  *  •  * 
* 26 *  .36249 *  .31361 *  .2B879  *  .54606  *  .48071 *  .51.l940  *  .33754 *  *  *  *  * 27 *  .J7S64 *  .32240 *  .29141  *  .!>7519  *  .:.0358 *  .54943  •  .34795 *  •  *  * 
*  28  *  .38276 *  • 33021  *  .2<il282  *  .62170  *  .5254<il  *  .59044  *  .35474  *  *  *  * 
*  2<il  *  .39145 *  .33540  +  .3CU77  *  .67683  *  .5441!:>  *  .61802 *  .40614 *  +  *  *  * 30 *  .41243 *  .34692 *  .31700 *  *  .57895 *  .65542 *  .t:Ol2<1  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  •  *  *  *  *  *  ******************************************************************************************************************** 
1-'  .,.. 
'-1 IV/ A-3 
PAYS 
INSTITUT 
SECTEUR 
ENTREPRISES 
COI\CENTRAT IGN  INDUSTRIELU: 
**************************** 
TABLEAU  STRUCTUREL  DES  COURSES  LINOA 
************************************ 
UN ITE:O-K I t>IGDOM 
LUNDUN  BUSINESS  SCHOCL  (PRGF.J.B.HE:ATHJ 
PHARMACEUTIQUE 
AI\NH  :  1S70 
*******************  * TABLtAU  NO  ~tiiS * 
******************* 
PAGE:  If 
******************************************************************************************************************** 
*  *  VARIABLE  *  * N*  ****Hit*****  ****Gil!*********&!*******  **34  ****  * *  * *  t(to!i' *  ** ******9'1* ****  * ***  Cll****** ***** *  **  * *******  *******  t  t ******* 
*  *  CHIFFRE  * EFFECTIF  *  MASSE  *  BENEfiCE  *  CASh  * CAPITAUX  *  EXPuRT.  *  *  *  * 
*  *D'AFFAIRES*  *SAlARlAlE  *  NET  *  fLOW  *  PRUPRES*  *  *  t  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
******************************************************************************************************************** 
*  2  *  .87912 *  1.34418 *  1.24473 *  1.38722  *  1.30379 *  .53724 *  1.34857 *  *  *  * 
*  *  * ========  * ========  * ========  * ========  *  * ========  *  *  *  *  *  3  *  1.04743 *  .89843 *  .90448 *  1.24457  *  1.23403 *  .69877 *  .94848 *  *  *  * 
*  * ========  *  *  *  *  *  ========  *  *  *  *  *  *  4  *  .86745  *  .8277.5  *  .74990 *  .91282  *  .93605 *  .!>5931 *  .71118 *  *  *  * 
*  5 *  .77197 *  .66910 *  .58827 *  .72243  *  .72798 *  .46428 *  .C3534 *  *  *  * 
*  6  *  .65310 *  .57310 *  .48967 *  .62488  *  .62179 *  .41836 *  .54024 *  *  *  *  *  7  *  .55767 *  .51003 *  .41930 *  .54617  •  .56526  *  .40124 *  .47798 *  *  *  * 
*  8  *  .50149 *  .47759 *  .38090 *  .55599  *  .56749 *  .36600 *  .41650 *  *  *  * 
*  9  *  .47060 *  .43905 *  .36768 *  .54908  *  .53539 *  •.  H580 *  .36545 *  *  *  *  * 10 *  .43232 *  .42080 *  .35288 *  .56284  *  .55274 *  .33111 *  .32312 *  *  *  * 
*  11  *  .40430 *  .39882 *  .33103  *  .55748  *  -~3855 *  .31976 *  .30291 *  *  *  * 
* 12 *  .39198 *  .38165 *  .32294 *  •  539!-39  *  .51697 *  .30528 *  .29727 *  *  *  *  *  13 *  .37389  *  .37013  *  .31120 *  .51682  *  .50450 *  .29060 *  .29076  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  * ------- *  *  *  *  *  *  14 *  .35690 *  .35381 *  .29637 *  .49197 *  .48637 *  .29224  ~  .28597 *  *  *  * 
*  15 *  .34355 *  .34199 *  .28023  *  .48472  *  .46942 *  .2.9270 *  .28593 *  *  *  * 
* 16 *  .34400 *  .33594 *  .27606  *  .48568  *  .45057 *  .30608 *  .28649 *  *  *  * 
*  17 *  .34894 *  .32975 *  .27224 *  .47662  *  .43627 *  .30859 *  .29093 *  *  *  * 
*  18 *  .34965 *  .32101 *  .2"1211  *  .46547  *  .42845 *  .31609 *  .29205 *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  * ------- *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 19 *  .34472 *  .31200 *  .27102  *  .47127  *  .42451  *  .32028 *  .29051 *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  * ------- *  *  *  *  *  *  *  20 *  .33754 *  •  30208 *  .26d12  *  .47895  *  .43110 *  .32586 *  .28900 *  *  *  * 
* 21  *  .321HZ  *  .29507 *  .26271  *  .49B65  *  .43684 *  .32629 *  •  28~13 *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  * -------- *  *  *  *  *  22 *  .32701  *  .29238 *  .25714 *  .51072  *  .44455  *  .Jllb5 *  .2Sl89 *  *  *  * 
*  * -------- *  * -------- *  *  *  *  *  •  *  * 
*  23 *  .32972 *  .29231 *  .27005 *  .56019  *  .44718 *  .36900 *  .29343 *  *  *  * 
*  24 *  .34106 *  .29180 *  .27750  *  .59038  *  .46334 *  .39739 *  .30010  *  *  *  * 
*  *  * -------- *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 25 *  .35549 *  .30896 *  .28526 *  .60981  *  .48851 *  .42652 *  .30470 *  *  *  * 
* 26 *  .36488 *  .31838  *  .29164 *  .63130 *  .~1249 *  .47717 *  .31259 *  *  *  * 
*  27 *  .37799 *  .32428 *  .30064 *  .64331  *  •  .';i3581  *  .51650 *  .32832 *  *  *  *  * 28 *  .39114 *  .33433 *  .30649 *  .68376 *  .55109 *  .54492 *  .34153 *  •  *  * 
* 29  •  .39861  *  .34166  •  .31443  *  .71425  *  .56204  *  .5o744  •  .38022 *  *  *  * 
*  30 *  .41480 *  .3~284 *  .32606 *  .73618 *  .61068 *  •  .';i9556  *  *  *  *  * 
1-' 
..1:"-
00 .1¥1 p.-;J 
PAYS 
INSTITUT 
SECTEUR 
ENTREPRISES 
**************************** 
TABLEAU  STRUCTUREL  DES  CuURBES  LINDA 
************************************ 
UN ITED-K I NGOOM 
LUNUUN  .bUSINESS  SCHOCL  (PROF.J.B.HEATH) 
PHAkMACEUTIQU£: 
ANt-lEE  :  1  S7l 
* TABLEAU  Nu  3815  * 
******************* 
PAGE  I, 
*****************************************************************•**************************************************  *  *  VARIAHLE  * 
*  N*  *****lt*********8!** ****** *8.l*********M**** *****3" ******** *lt'l' *********Iii************************************** 
*  *  CHlfFRE  *  EFfECTIF  *  MASSE  *BENEFICE  *  CASH  *  CAPlTAUX  *  E:XPORT.  *  *  *  * 
*  *D'AFFAIMES*  *SALARIALE  *  NET  *  FLOW  *  PKUPRES*  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  •  * 
******************************************************************************************************************** 
*  2 *  .3576,3  *  1.25913 *  1.14508 *  1.31270 *  1.12262 *  .51891 *  1.4H:SS *  *  *  * 
*  *  * ========  *  ========  * ========  * ========  *  * ========  *  *  *  *  *  3  *  1.05233 *  .i.l9968  *  .89680 *  1.09717  •  1.09307 *  .62486 *  1.04169 *  *  *  * 
*  * ========  *  •  *  *  * ========  •  *  *  *  •  *  4  *  .85883 *  .83647 *  .76550 *  .85404  *  .92036 *  .50855 *  .77413 *  *  *  * 
*  5  •  • 76031  *  .70762 *  .63062  •  • 70312  *  •  7284.5  *  .44124 *  .  62583 *  •  *  * 
*  6 *  .64171 *  .61893  *  .51644 *  .62010  *  .64061  *  .39884 *  .54022 *  *  *  * 
*  7  *  .53945  •  .52985  *  .45645 *  .57995  *  .60803 *  .37954  •  .48578 *  *  *  * 
*  8  *  .48311  *  .50337  *  .41789 *  .60914  *  .62021  *  .34747 *  .42875  *  *  *  * 
*  9  *  .45614 *  .46117  *  .40070 *  .61643  *  .59594 *  .j2925 *  .37862 *  *  *  * 
•  10 *  .43110 *  .41805 *  .37~39 *  .61765  *  .61253  •  .32685  •  .34982 *  *  *  * 
*  11  *  .41701  *  .39526 *  .34841  *  .59578  *  .60216 *  .31142  •  .32292 *  *  *  * 
*  12 *  .39533 *  .3&424 *  .33513 *  .57201  *  .58235  •  .30000 *  .31531 *  *  *  *  * 13 *  .37773 *  .36706 *  .32190 *  .55690 *  .55423 *  .2U668 *  .30650 *  *  *  * 
•  14 *  .36328  *  .35458 *  .30563  •  .53898  *  .52344 *  .28553  •  .30826 *  *  *  * 
* 15 *  .35381  *  .34455  *  .29092  *  .51B57  *  .49378  *  .27932  *  .31036 *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  •  * ------'-- *  *  *  *  •  * 16 *  .35008 *  .33747 *  .28801 *  .49514 *  .47641 *  .29024 *  .30612 *  •  *  * 
* 17 *  .34588 *  •  32933 *  .28762 *  .47330  *  .45570 *  .£9167 *  •  30447 *  *  *  * 
•  18 *  .34318 *  .31900  *  .2&206 *  .4  7141  *  .43530 *  .29568  •  • 30334 *  •  *  * 
* 19 *  .34052 *  .31099 *  .27582 *  .47126  *  .41832 *  .29664 *  .30168 *  *  *  * 
*  *  •  *  * -------- *  *  *  *  *  *  •  *  20  *  .33401  *  .30294 *  .27107  *  .47510  •  .40286 *  .29546  *  .29159 *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  * -------- *  *  *  *  *  21  *  .33101  *  .29425  *  .26519 *  .48062  *  .39898  *  .29369  *  .3C017  *  *  *  * 
* 22  *  .32843  *  .29141  *  .26157  *  .49271  *  .39890 *  .28934 *  .31286  •  •  •  * 
*  * -------- * -------- * -------- *  * -------- *  *  *  *  *  *  *  23 *  .33191  *  .29331 *  .26877 *  .49456 *  .40674 *  •  .32448 *  .31814 *  *  •  * 
*  24 *  .34098 *  .29183 *  .27523  *  .50333  *  .41114 *  .~54S3 *  .32093 *  *  *  * 
* 25 *  .35181 *  .29760 *  .27888 *  .527o3  *  .41131 *  .38203 *  .;2934 *  *  *  * 
* 26 *  .35727 *  .30360 *  .28154 *  .56170  *  .42953 *  .41061 *  .33265 *  *  *  • 
*  27 *  .37325 *  .30546 *  .28653  *  .59580  *  .4590d *  .44324 *  .35329  *  *  *  * 
*  28 *  .38794 *  .30500 *  .25426  *  .66530  *  .48378 *  .4J060 *  .37910 *  *  •  * 
* 29 *  .39846  •  • 31667 *  .30522 *  •  .50773 *  .49087 *  .40627 *  *  *  *  * 30  *  .41546 *  .32911  *  .31244  *  •  .57090  *  .51998  *  .65328  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  ******************************************************************************************************************** 
I-' 
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PAYS 
!NSTITUf 
SFCTEUR 
HH  l<t:PRISES 
CDNCENTRAT IUN  INDUSTR lEllE 
*********************••~···· 
TABLEAU  STRUlTUkEL  DES  COURBES  llNCA 
************************************ 
UNITtU-K  lNGJOM 
LUNOON  bUSI~ESS SCHOCl  (PRGF.J.d.HEATH) 
PHARMACEUTIQUE 
ANl';EE  :  1972 
•******************  * TAblEAU  NO  3615  * 
******************* 
PAGE  18 
******************•***********************'*************************************************************************  *  *  VARIABLE  * 
*  N*  "" ****l)t*** *  *** *•l!l!* ** ***** *8:l** => *  *** *  *34**** *  *  *,. :t(l!J :t **** ****a<'J***** **** 81** ************* **** ** ** *  ****** *-**:t *  ** :t  *  * CHIFFR~  *  ~FfECTIF *  MASSE  * BENEFICE  *  CASH  * CAPITAUX  *  EXPORT.  *  *  *  * 
*  *D 1 AffAlRcS*  *SALARIALE  *  NET  *  FlLW  *  PKUP~ES*  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  ********************************************************************************************************************  *  2  *  .H0543 *  1.25870 *  1.16840 *  1.14871  *  .74992 *  .60792  0  1.11381  *  *  *  * 
*  *  * ========  * ========  * ========  *  *  * ========  •  *  *  •  *  3  *  l.U5697 *  .87266 *  .86S62  *  1.11409  *  .91062 *  .74940 *  .93478 *  *  *  * 
*  * ========  •  *  *  * ========  * ========  *  *  *  *  *  *  4 *  .88526  *  .81253  •  .79102  *  .88508  •  .70523  •  .60784 *  .67705 *  *  *  * 
*  5  *  • 77224  *  .6d6  71  *  .63804  *  .84500  *  .65494 *  .52941 *  •  56.,;4c *  *  *  * 
*  6  *  .65942 *  .60356 *  .54749  •  .72o't6  *  .5o917 *  .47427 *  .49430 *  *  *  * 
*  7  *  .55786 *  .55735 *  .46753  *  .63665  *  .49228 *  .42449  •  .46125 *  *  *  * 
*  8  *  .49841  •  .50440 *  .41804 *  .57428  *  .44848 *  .39788 *  .41392 *  *  *  * 
*  9  *  .44139 *  .45663  *  .39912  *  .57363  *  .46000 *  .36377 *  .36963 *  *  *  *  *  10 *  .42607 *  .41911  *  .36915 *  .56376  *  .44320 *  .36023 *  .33536 *  *  *  * 
* 11  *  .41480  •  .39631  *  .35771  *  .53642  •  .41773 *  .34542 *  .30929 *  *  *  * 
*  12 *  .39H03 *  .37784 *  .34085  *  .52118  *  .3<J318  *  •.  B389 *  .29824 *  *  *  * 
*  13 *  .37620 *  .35899 *  .32265 *  .49934  •  .37040 *  .32695  •  .28738 *  *  •  * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  -------- *  *  •  *  *  14 *  .36017 *  .34672 *  .3C694 *  .47580  *  .37101  *  .31994 *  .2S331 *  *  *  * 
*  15 *  .34722 *  .33145 *  .29045 *  .44986 *  .36204 *  .33021  •  .29407 *  *  *  * 
* 16 *  .34055 *  .32209  •  .28332  *  .42409 *  .35122 *  .33721 *  .29013 *  *  *  * 
* 17 *  .33~91 *  .31540 *  .28329  *  .40646  *  .3.3934 *  .33595 *  .28739 *  *  *  * 
*  18 *  .33794 *  .30953 *  .28053  *  .38830  *  .32670  *  .33012 *  .29241 *  *  *  * 
*  19 *  .33682  •  .30095 *  .27467 *  .38001  *  .31683 *  .32766 *  .29206 *  *  *  * 
•  *  *  *  *  * -------- •  *  *  *  *  *  * 20 *  .33112  *  .29201 *  .26855 *  .37677  *  .31939 *  .32341  •  .29650 *  *  •  * 
* 21  *  .32400 *  .28894 •  .26475  •  .37452  •  .31953  *  .31700 *  .29946  •  •  *  * 
*  * -------- *  *  * -------- *  * -------- *  *  *  *  *  * 22 *  .32600 *  .28538 *  .26129  *  .3~934  •  .33495 *  .36180 *  .29901  *  *  *  * 
*  *  *  * -------- *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 23 *  .32910  *  .28469 *  .26541 *  .41391  *  .35028  *  .39943 *  .30636 *  *  •  * 
* 24 *  .33200 *  .28441  *  .27114 *  .42300  *  .36171 *  .4<:!573  *  .32022 *  *  *  * 
*  *  * -------- *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 25 *  .34764 *  .29113 *  .27321  *  .43579  *  .38332  *  .44709 *  .33557 *  •  *  * 
*  26  *  .J61B"i  *  .29442  •  .28185  •  .45972  •  .41123 *  .4ov31 *  .35117  •  •  *  * 
* 27 *  .37805 *  .29940 *  .28549 *  .50542  *  .45234 *  •  .:>Oo95  *  .37425 *  *  *  * 
* 28 *  .3R922  *  .31437 *  .28921  *  .54165  *  .48277 *  .53563 *  .39119 *  *  *  * 
* 29 *  .40191  *  .32427 *  .29496  •  .61312  *  .54537 *  .55463 *  .43658 *  *  *  * 
*  30 *  .42313  *  .33038 *  .30119  *  *  *  .S7942  •  .64711 *  *  *  * 
,...... 
\.n 
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CUN~ENTRAllGN  INOUSTkiELLE 
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TABLEAU  REtAPITULAflf  DES  INDICES  l 
**************************~******** 
UNITED-KINGDOM 
LUNUON  bUSINESS  SCHOOL  (PROF.J.B.HEATHJ 
PHARMAC~UTIUUE 
*******************  *  TABLEAU  NU  4  * 
******************* 
PAGE  1~ 
*****•*****************************************************************************************************************  *  ANNEE  * 
*************~************************************************************************~*******************  *  1961:!  •  1969  *  1970  *  1911  *  1972  * 
A~LES  *  INDICES  *  INDICES  *  INDICES  *  INDICES  *  I~CICES  * 
********************************************************************************************************** 
*N*:  LN*M  :  LS  *N*:  LN*M  :  LS  *N*:  LN*M  :  LS  *N*:  LN*M  :  LS  *N*:  l~*M  :  LS  * 
*  M:  :  *  M:  :  * M:  :  * M:  :  * M:  :  * 
'***************=********=***********=********=***********=********=***********=********=···········=········=········· 
*  .  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  *  . 
'  l..l' tiff  AIRES  *22:  .32085:  .50457*22:  • 32231:  .50394*22:  .32701:  .49678*l2:  • .32843:  .4S337*21:  .32400:  .50029* 
*  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  *  [f  *2.3:  .31255:  • 53294*23!  .29511:  .50543*24:  • 29180:  • 46804*22!  .29141:  .4<:883*24:  .2H44l:  .46316* 
*  :  :  •  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  * 
:  SALARIALE  *22:  .27988:  .48863*22:  .25900:  .45533*22:  .25714:  .42474*22:  .26151:  .43515*22:  .26129:  .4382.6* 
*  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  * 
:E  NET  *18:  .33354:  .52<;44*18:  .::>8094:  .60324*16:  .46547:  .c543S*19:  .4712t::  .c:ozc•n:  .37452:  .59502* 
*  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  * 
:  :  * 
:  :  * 
FLCW  *19:  .33212:  .52470*21:  .37665:  .57006*19:  .424.51:  .62718*22:  .39890:  .6C4C1*1S:  .31683:  .48235* 
*  :  :  *  :  :  * 
:  :  *  :  :  * 
:  :  *  .JX  PkGPRI:S  *13:  .26840:  .39519*13:  .30669:  .45090*13=  .29060:  .41898*15:  .21'732:  .38132*21:  .31700:  .40115* 
* 
:  :  * 
:  :  *  :  :  * 
:  :  *  :  :  * 
r.  *1 "1:  .27754:  .48442*21:  .26541:  .43'318*21:  • 2~513:  .4481<i*20:  .29759:  .41991*13:  .28738:  .52203* 
* 
:  :  * 
:  :  *  :  :  * 
:  :  *  :  :  * 
*  :  :  *  :  :  * 
:  :  * 
:  :  *  :  :  *  * 
:  :  * 
:  :  *  :  :  * 
:  :  •  :  :  *  *  :  :  *  :  :  * 
:  :  *  :  :  *  .  :  *  . 
*  :  :  * 
:  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  * 
:  :  * 
*  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  * 
*  :  :  *  :  :  * 
:  :  *  :  :  * 
:  :  *  *  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  * 
:  :  *  :  :  *  * 
:  :  * 
:  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  *  :  :  * 
* 
:  :  * 
:  :  * 
:  :  *  :  :  *  .  .  *  .  . 
************************************************************************************************************************ 
I-' 
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1.  INDUSTRY  DEFINITION 
In the U.K.  the  industry definition which corresponds  most  closely  to 
NICE  313.2  is Photographic  Chemical Materials  (Standard Industrial Cla 
sification 297.7) which  embraces all types of  sensitised materials  of 
following  types:  plates for medical X rays,  micro  film,  cine  film, 
document  copying and  photography-.  The  industry also  includes  chemical 
products  for  film processing.  It is difficult to  separate  the chemica 
for  the photo  sensitive materials because  companies  do  not  separate  th 
activities in their accounts;  the  fact  that most  companies  regard  thes 
activities as  complementary is a  good  reason  for grouping  them  togethe 
2.  NOTES  ON  SOURCES 
The  industrial census  in 1971  identifies 12  enterprises  each employin: 
more  than  25  employees with aggregate  gross  sales  in 1971  of  £107  mill: 
with a  size distribution set out  in Table  1.  We  have  decided  to  inc: 
9 of these  companies  for  financial analysis.  The  comparison of our 
coverage  and  that of the  census  is also  indicated  in Table  1.  The 
discrepancy in coverage arises  from  the  fact that  the  census  is  based  < 
returns  from individual establishments whereas  our  figures  relate  to 
enterprises.  Despite  the  fact that we  have  included  fewer  companies  tl 
the census,  their aggregate  gross  sales  exceed  the census  figure.  Thif 
is probably due  to  the  inclusion of sales  of photographic  equipment  whj 
most  companies  in the  industry manufacture as well.  Where  possible we 
have  tried to isolate the photographic materials  component of  turnover. 
TABLE  1:  COVERAGE  OF  REPORT 
Number  of Employees  in 
Each Establishment 
25  -
300 -
299 
499 
500 - 1,499 
over  1,500 
TOTAL 
Scope of Industry 
Definition in Study used 
1971 
Number  of 
Establishments 
3 
4 
3 
3 
13 
Census  of  Production 
Number  of  Sales 
Enterprises  (£  'OOO) 
3  2,100 
3  15,700 
3  21,200 
3  68  200 
12  107,000 
9  135,000 155 
In general we  have  included  companies which  specialise  in photographic 
materials  and  excluded  those which  do  not.  Statistically speaking,  this 
is the  only sensible procedure,but there must  be  some  doubt about the 
economic  significance of the  aggregate  derived  in this way.  It happens 
that  the  companies  which provide the main  source of actual and potential 
competition  to  the  industry leader,  Kodak,  are excluded by  this procedure, 
namely,  Polaroid,  Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing,  and  the many  importers. 
But  photographic materials account  for only a  small  component of these 
companies'  sales,  so  that if they were all included in their entirety the 
'industry'  sales  in this industry would  have  been  roughly  twice as  large 
as  the known  market.  The  inference  to  be  drawn  from this difficulty is 
that the  industry definition adopted here  is of dubious analytical 
significance since it fails  to  group  companies  known  to be  in direct 
competition with each other. 
TABLE  2:  COMPANIES  IN  THE  INDUSTRY 
Company  1972  Sales 
(£  1000) 
Kodak 
Ilford 
(  98,500 
132,61 34,100 
Gratispool 
Smith & Nephew  Plastics 
Criterion Graphic 
Products 
G.A.F.  (Great Britain) 
H.P.L.  Johnsons*** 
Syn thi  te*~:* 
Kentmere 
Industry Sales  1972 
(£  '000) 
4,400 
2,500 
139,500 
1,700* 
900** 
700** 
600 
200** 
151,000 
Notes 
Subsidiary of Eastman Kodak. 
Subsidiary of Ciba-Geigy since 
1969. 
Wholesaler. 
Specialist manufacturers of 
plastic film. 
Subsidiary of Ozalid. 
Subsidiary of G.A.F.  u.s.A.; 
photographic materials  form a 
minor part of their U.K.  activities. 
Subsidiary of Hestair since 1971; 
primarily a  distributor. 
Subsidiary of Tennants. 
Primarily a  printing company. 
*  Annual  sales  based  on  nine months activities. 
11(* 
*** 
Estimated sales of photographic materials in cases where  this is a 
minor part of  the business. 
Primarily a  manufacturer  of chemicals  used  in photographic  film 
mt~nnfR.rture or orocessing. 156 
TABLE  3:  INDUSTRY  SALES 2  STRUCTURE  AND  PROFITABILITY 
The  Rest  of  t 
Industry  Kodak's  Profit**  Indus try's Pre 
Year  Salesi:  Kodak's  Share  on  Sales  on  Sales 
(£ mill)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
1968  107  63  22  5 
1969  114  64  26  7 
1970  125  64  22  6 
1971  135  64  22  3 
1972  151  65  21  5 
• 
*  Companies  in Table  2. 
Pre-tax pre-interest. 
Source:  Company  accounts. 
4.  MARKET  STRUCTURE 
As  is evident  from Table  2  and  Table  3,  any  discussion about  the 
British photographic  film industry is really a  discussion about Kodak. 
Kodak  accounts  for  65%  of  the  sales of  the  companies  mentioned  in 
Table  2.  Kodak's  precise  share of the U.K.  market is also high;  on 
the  basis  that  the U.K.  market is equal  to  the  industry's output,  less 
exports  plus  imports,  we  estimate  that  the U.K.  market  in  1971  was 
£80 million exclusive of  the  dealer's margins,  which  probably account 
for another  £20  to  £25  million.  Of  this market Kodak  accounted  for 
70  to  75%.  This  figure  is consistent with those  provided  by  indepen-
dent  sourc~s;  Table  4  shows  estimates of Kodak's  share  of  the  film 
markets  for  both still and  cine photography.  The  most  important  sectior 
of these  markets  is the  expenditure  on  amateur photography which was 
£110  million in 1971,  of which  £25  million was  accounted  for  by  films, 
£50  million by processing.  As  will  be  seen later,  Kodak  is heavily 
involved  in both activities. 157 
TABLE  4:  MARKET  SHARES  IN  PHOTOGRAPHIC  FILM  (%) 
1971 
Company 
Kodak 
Ilford 
Agfa-Gevaert 
Boots 
Gatispool 
Source:  I.P.C.  Marketing Manual. 
Still  Cine 
73  74 
13  10 
10  8 
5 
6 
.-.~------
10"= 
The  structure of  the industry,  indicated  in Table 
1973 
Still  Cine 
71  72 
8  7 
9  6 
7  5 
3  3 
-~--
-
2,  reveals  that of 
British manufacturing  com~nies, only  Ilford is of a  size  to have  a 
chance  of offering Kodak  any  serious  competition.  The  type  of com-
petition that it offers  and  the  reason  for it doing  so  are  discussed 
below.  The  remaining  companies  are  specialists;  film manufacturers  like 
Smith & Nephew  and Criterion Graphic;  chemicals manufacturers  and 
wholesalers  like Gatispool,  Johnsons  and  Sythite.  In a  number  of cases, 
the company  is mainly  engaged  in  some  other activity.  Apart from Ilford's 
black-and-white  film activities,  one  could  generalise  by  saying that 
Kodak's U.K.  rivals which fall within  the  industry definition compete 
either in films  for specialist uses  or  in photographic  chemicals,  a 
market which  in 1971  accounted  for  £6  million,  or less  than  10%  of  the 
total photographic materials market.  In other words,  they  live with 
Kodak  by  avoiding head-on competition. 
Kodak's  only  serious competition  comes  from abroad  and  from Polaroid. 
Imports  took around  30%  of  the U.K.  photographic  film market,  nearly 
half of which is accounted  for by  Kodak's  main  European  rival,  Agfa-
Gevaert.  In other words,  Agfa  hold  around  15%  of the U.K.  photographic 
film market,  to Kodak's  75%.  As  Table  5  indicates,  Kodak  is the  sole 
manufacturer of film for  the  mass  market in  the U.K.,  apart  from Ilford 
h .  h  .  1'  .  h  f'l (l)  E  th  .  h  t  h'  w  1c  spec1a  1ses  1n  monoc  rome  1  m  •  ven  e  maJor p  o  ograp  1c 
retailers,  Dixons  and  Boots,  which are the most accessible  market  for 
a  U.K.  supplier since  no  marketing  expenses  are  involved  in  supplying 
own-packet products,  obtain their sources  from abroad. 
(1)  Ilford P.xoort  some  colour film in an unbranded  form  to  the u.s.A. 158 
TABLE  5:  SOURCES  OF  COMPETITION  IN  THE  U.K.  PHOTOGRAPHIC  FILM  MARK 
Company  Product's  Cine 
Country  Black &  Black &  Cine 
Com2any  of Origin  White  Colour  White  Colour 
Kodak  U.K.  X  X  X  X 
Agfa-Gevaert  West  Germany  X  X  X 
Ilford  U.K.  X 
(CIBA-GEIGY) 
Fuji  Japan  X  X  X 
G. A. F.  u.s.A.  X 
Perutz  West  Germany  X  X 
Orwo  East Germany  X  X  X 
Free  Film 
Service  Italy  X 
Dixon*  Italy  X  X 
Boots*  u.s.A.  X  X 
*  U.K.  retailers. 
THE  MARKET 
The  largest  segment  of  the  industry's market  is provided by  amateur 
photography.  We  estimate  that  in 1971  this market absorbed  over  60%  c 
the  industry's output  so  it is trends  in  this market  that  are  of chie: 
interest.  It is not  a  high growth market.  In retail  terms,  expendit1 
on  amateur photography  rose  by  80%  to  £110  million in the  9  year peri< 
from  1962  to  1971,  growing at a  rate of  less  than  3%  a  year  in real  tc 
In  1968  probably  60%  of British households  owned  a  camera,  in  line wil 
most  European countries,  compared  to  10  to  15%  in 1945.  In  1968  the 
camera-owning  population of  14  million was  split as  follows: 
Serious  amateurs 
Amateurs 
'Snapshotters' 
TOTAL 
0.8 million 
3.5 million 
9. 7  million 
14.0 million 
6% 
25% 
69% 
100% 
This market was  served by  the  following outlets:  1,800 photographic 
dealers,  13,500 chemists  and  7,700  stores/kiosks,  making a  total of 
""l  "'""'  - _.___  1  • 159 
The  significant changes  in  recent years  have  been as  follows: 
(1)  The  decline of  photography as  a  hobby  and with  it the  high  cost/ 
low  volume  cameras  with  their  sophisticated controls.  Over  the 
period  1965  to  1971,  total apparatus  sales  fell  Jj%  from  £39  million 
to  £25  million.  Sales  of still cameras  in  terms  of units  sold  fell 
as well. 
(2)  Associated with  (1)  is a  diminished  need  for  photographic  dealers 
capable  of  serving  this market.  Many  of  the  dealers  have  switched 
insteadrto electronic  equipment  which  has  tended  to  replace  serious 
photography. 
(3)  The  development  of  cheap,  easy-to-use  cameras  which  are  regarded  by 
consumers  as  a  simple,  convenient,  cheap  accessory,  rather  than  a 
piece of  equipment  of  interest in its own  right. 
(4)  The  replacement of  black-and-white  photography with colour  photo-
graphy.  Between  1965  and  1969  expenditure  on  colour photography 
rose  by  over  100%  of  £55  million  in  1969  while  expenditure  on 
black-and-white  photography  fell  by  40%  to  less  than  £10  million  in 
1969.  Colour  photography is  the  only  growth  element  in this market. 
These  trends  have  been variously interpreted: 
(1)  The  Photographic Dealers Association  regard price-cutting  in the 
retail market  as  the  reason for  the  decline.  Low  returns  have 
driven many  dealers  out of business  or  forced  others  to  abandon  the 
technical  back-up  that  serious photographers  require,  both  of which 
are  held  to  encourage  the latter to  drift away  into other  consumer 
durable  markets. 
(2)  Another  view  is  that  heavy advertising has  encouraged  'passive' 
pastimes  such  as  listening  to audio  equipment,  at the  expense  of 
the  'creative'  pursuits  such  as  photography which,  being  a  fragmented 
industry,  is unable  to  organise  the advertising needed  to  combat 
these  forces. 160 
Neither  interpretation is very  plausible.  The  simple  truth  is  that  much 
of  the  dealer  population  in  the  mid-1960s  was  superfluous,  buoyed  up  as 
it was  by  margins  of  33%,  which are  justified  in  a  specialist equipment 
business  but  not  in  a  straightforward  high-volume  cameras  and  film 
business which any  retailer is  equipped  to  handle.  A more  probable 
explanation  for  the  switch  from  specialist photography  to  convenience 
photography  and  electronics lies  in  the  technical  progress  in  photography. 
The  perfection of  automatic  exposure  and  films  \vhich  are  faster,  sharper 
and  more  tolerant of  errors  in  camera  settings  have  tended  to  demystify 
photography,  rendering  redundant  many  of  the  technical  skills of both 
photography  enthusiasts  and  photographic  dealers alike,  at  a  time  when 
technical  developments  were  making  audio  equipment  more  interesting to 
those  to whom  complex  equipment  has  an appeal. 
KODAK'S  DOMINANT  POSITION 
The  most  interesting feature  of  the  industry is,  of  course,  the  position 
of  Kodak;  how  it achieved market  leadership,  how  it maintains it,  and 
the  implications  that  these  phenomena  have  for anti-trust policies.  It 
is useful  to  consider first  some  of  the  reasons  for  Kodak's  success, 
which  is apparent  from Table  3,  which  shows  that Kodak's  profit margin 
on  sales has  been maintained above  20%,  compared  to  5%  for  the  rest of 
the  industry.  Kodak's  corporate  strategy  is  composed  of  three  main 
elements:  technical  leadership,  exploitation of  growth  markets  and 
market  leadership. 
TECHNICAL  LEADERSHIP 
Kodak  has  maintained  a  technical  lead for  nearly  100 years.  The  company 
was  founded  in  the  U.S.A.  in  1880 by  George  Eastman who  invented roll 
films,  daylight loading  and  cheap  cameras  before  1900.  Kodak  Limited, 
the U.K.  subsidiary,  was  founded  in 1898.  Between  the wars  Kodak 
experimented  for  a  long  time,  like many  other photographic  film companies, 
to  perfect colour film.  In  1935  it produced  a  significant development 
on which  the  company's  present  supremacy  in colour  film is ultimately 
based  - Kodachrome.  This  product  embodied  a  system whereby  the  dyes  were 
introduced at  the  processing stage  - known  as  the  non-substantive  system, 161 
unsuccessfully,  to  develop,  whereby  the  dyes  were  contained within  the 
layers  of emulsion  of  the  film itself.  Later  Kodak  perfected  this 
process  too,  leading  to  Kodacolour  and  Ektachorme.  There  are  two  other 
strands  to  Kodak's  technical  development,  processing and  cameras. 
During  the  Second  World  War  Kodak's  research efforts were  directed 
towards  simplifying and  automating  the  processing  stage  so  that  it could 
be  carried out  by  armed  forces  in  field  conditions.  This  led  to  the 
development  of Ektachrome  which  unlike  most  other  Kodak  films  was,  and 
still is,  sold  exclusive  of processing  costs,  intended  for  use  by 
enthusiasts who  would  either  do  their own  processing  or  use  the  services 
of professional  finishers.  Kodak  supply  the  processing kits  for  this 
purpose.  When  Kodak  introduced Kodacolor  the  company  realised  that  the 
processing costs,  using  the  equipment  then available,  would  inhibit 
sales and  accordingly it developed  a  semi-automatic  printing machine 
which  it later made  available  to  finishers. 
Kodak  also  tackled  cameras  themselves.  They  are  reputed  to  spend  £0.5 
million on  market  research  in Britain annually.  One  result of this 
research was  the  finding  that  the  loading of  the  camera  presented  the 
casual  photographer with more  problems  than  any  other  aspect  of  photo-
graphy.  Accordingly,  Kod~k developed  and  introduced  the  Instamatic 
range of still cameras,  exclusively  designed  to  accept  Kodak  film 
cartridges,  followed  by  Instamatic  cine  cameras  and  self-threading 
projectors,  all  in  the  1960s.  Some  of Kodak's  inventions  are patented 
and offered  to  competitors  under  licence.  Others  remain  private  to 
Kodak;  for  example,  the processing  technique  used  in connection with 
Kodak's  best selling colour film,  Kodachrome,  is maintained  a  secret  by 
Kodak's  practice of  reserving  to  itself the  processing of this  film.  By 
the  time Kodak's  patents  expire  the  company  has  usually  developed  a  new 
film with new  processing  requirements. 
GROWTH  MARKETS 
Kodak  make  good  use  of their technical  capability by directing it into 
profitable high  growth areas.  There  are  two  elements here: 
(1)  Identifying high-growth  high-volume  markets  for  simpler,  more 162 
(2)  Seeing  to  it that Kodak's  developments  in  the  three  segments  of it 
business  - cameras,  films  and  processing - are  mutually  reinforcin) 
The  market  trends  mentioned  earlier indicate  that colour  film is  the 
growth  sector in  an  otherwise  stagnant market.  It was  also  shown  that 
photography was  becoming  simpler  for  the  amateur  and  that  this  trend wal 
rendering  redundant  a  good  many  of  the  specialist photographic  dealers, 
whose  livelihood  depended  on  the  need  for  technical  advice.  Kodak 
anticipated  and  accelerated both  these  trends,  being  first-to-market  wi1 
colour  film  in  1935,  one  year  before Agfa,  and  maintaining  its  lead  eve: 
.  (1) 
s1nce 
Kodak's  operations  reinforce  each  other.  Put at its crudest,  a  camera 
is a  vehicle  for selling film and  films  are  a  vehicle  for  selling  proces· 
sing.  Kodak's  Instamatic  range  of  cameras  are  designed  exclusively for 
Kodak's  easy-to-load cartrides.  Kodak's  films  are usually  sold  inclusi' 
of processing;  in  1964  the processing of its  three main  colour  films  brc 
Kodak  business  equal  to  75%  of  the  sales value of  these  films  themselve: 
In respect of  films  which  Kodak  does  not process,  the processing tech-
nology,  chemicals  and  apparatus  is made  available to  the  photographic 
finishing  trades. 
MARKET  LEADERSHIP 
Kodak  does  not  aim to sell its products  at the  lowest  price  in  the 
market;  it aims  at a  price which  renders  its product the best value for 
money  in  the  market.  The  British Consumers'  publication,  'Which?', 
tested 17  colour  films  available  in Britain in 1975  in collaboration 
with consumer associations in five  other European countries.  Tests  werE 
carried out  in 35  mm  film in a  laboratory and  in open air conditions, 
in winter and  summer.  Films were  sent for processing at  the manufacturE 
own  laboratories.  Colour  slides were  analysed  in  the  laboratory by  a 
panel of viewers  in respect of  several dimensions  - sharpness,  grainine1 
exposure  latitude and  colour correctness.  The  quality of the  slides wa1 
(1)  History  repeats itself.  In  the  Consumers'  Association  report on  cc 
film,  referred  to  more  fully  later in  the  text,  it was  noted  that  ' 
were also able  to  buy  the  new  Kodachrome  25  and  Kodachrome  64  film~ 
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assessed  in  the  light of  the  unit  cost,  taking  into account  the  proces-
sing cost where  this was  not  included  in  the  price  of  the  film. 
Table  6  summarises  the  results of  this report.  Kodak  emerged  the  best 
from  these  tests,  even allowing  for  the  fact  that it 'entered more 
competitors'  than  any other company.  The  35  mm  films  are  the  chief 
interest here  as  they were  the  subject  of  the  tests;  other film sizes 
are  simply  different versions of  the 35  mm  variety.  The  report singles 
out  four  films  out  of  seventeen as  being best value  for  money,  Kodak 
being  responsible  for  three of  them. 
TABLE  6:  VALUE  FOR  MONEY  IN  COLOUR  FILM 
Number  of  Number  Selected 
Size  of  Film  Manufacturer  Varieties Offered  by  Consumers'  Panel 
35  mm  Kodak  6  3 
Others  11  l 
126  Kodak  3  2 
Others  7  0 
110  Kodak  3  2 
Others  0  0 
120  Kodak  2  l 
Others  3  l 
Source:  'Which?',  August  1975,  Consumers'  Association,  London. 
The  only non-Kodak  film selected was  Orwochrome  from East  Germany.  It 
owed  its selection to  its cheapness  rather  than its quality,  which was 
in fact  fairly ordinary.  One  suspects  that its cheapness was  determined 
more  by  the Comecon  desire  for  foreign  exchange  than  by  its production 
costs.  This  is not  to  say  that it is not value  for money;  simply  that 
in the  context of this  comparison between companies'  ability to offer 
value  for  money  in competitive conditions this  item should  be discounted. 
The  reason  for Kodak's price  strategy is its desire  to  build up  volume. 
Once  having  launched  a  product,  Kodak  tends  to maintain a  stable price 
over  a  number  of years.  Thus,  for  example,  Kodak  prices on  colour  film 
remained  stable during  the  seven  year period  1958  to  1964,  over which 
___ .J_.J  a..1..-.  n_...,.~.:1  n-.:,..,.  Tn~n.v  ,..naa  n,,  I.J.O'"l  MnrP  rPc~ntlv the orice  index 164 
of  photographic  film  rose  by  32%  between  1970  and  1974  while  the  Retail 
Price  Index  rose  over  SOZ.  The  accumulated  volume  that  these  pricing 
policies  generate  enables  Kodak  to  reduce  its unit costs.  A policy  of 
holding  the  price  for  each  product  fairly  stable while  reducing unit 
costs  as  volume  accumulates  tends  to  result  in  increasing profitability 
for  each  product  during  its  commercial  life,  It is  noticeable  from  data 
compiled  by  the  Honopolies  Corrunission ( 1)  that  the  relative profitability 
of Kodak's  three  main  colour  films  bore  some  relation  to  their maturity. 
Kodachrome,  v7hich  was  introduced  to  the British market  soon after  the  war 
earned  35%  on  sales  in  1964;  Ektachrome  and  Kodacolor,  introduced  10  year: 
.. 
later,  earned  24%  and  18%  respectively. 
Kodak  reinforces  its dominant  position  through  its  leverage with  its 
dealers.  Kodak  sales  representatives are  able  to  ensure  that  photographic 
dealers  give  its products  a  prominent display.  Withdrawal  of  supply  of 
Kodak  products  spells  the  end  of  a  dealer's business. 
Most  students  of business would  endorse  Kodak's  strategy as  the  correct 
one;  it ensures  long  run  profitability,  growth  and  market  leadership, 
It makes  an  optimal  use  of Kodak's  technical  superiority because  by  the 
time  rivals  have  caught  up  with any particular technical  innovation 
they will  be  unable  to  match  Kodak's  unit manufacturing  and  processing 
costs,  which  by  that  time will  have  been  reduced  as  a  result of  the 
volume  achieved  and  the  experience acquired  in  the  intervening years. 
In  this way  Kodak  combines  high profitability with market  leadership. 
THE  INVESTIGATION  OF  KODAK  BY  THE  MONOPOLIES  COMMISSION 
The  resounding  success  of  this  strategy attracted  the attention of  the 
British Government  and  in  1965  the  supply of colour  film (i.e.  Kodak)  was 
f  d  h  M  1 .  C  .  .  f  .  .  .  ( 2)  I  19 64  K d  k  re  erre  to  t  e  onopo  ~es  omm~ss~on  or  ~nvest~gatwn  •  n  o  a 
accounted  for  77%  of the  U.K.  market  for  colour film;  there was  only  one 
other  indigenous  competitor,  Ilford, with  a  market  share  of less  than  4%. 
In  the  six previous  years,  1959  to  1964,  Kodak's profit mar-gin  on  the 
supply  and  processing of colour film moved  in  the  range  of  26  to  31%, 
its return  on  capital  in  the  range  of  37  to  56%. 165 
The  Monopolies  Corrunission  came to  the  follm:ing  conclusions: 
(1)  Kodak's  success with colour  film  in  the  U.K.  was  due  to  its 
reputation,  enterprise and  efficiency  and  its  innovations  in colour 
film.  It was  also  due  to  the  adverse  effects of  the  Second World 
War  on  the  competition  and  the  20/o  tariff surrounding  the  U.K. 
market  in  1965. 
(2)  Kodak's  high profits were  in part  due  to  its monopoly  position  and 
were  argued  to  be  against  the  public  interest. 
(3)  Kodak's  policy of  selling colour film on  a  process-inclusive  basis 
was  contrary  to  the  public  interest. 
The  Commission  made  five  main  recommendations; 
(1)  The  tariff on  colour  film  should  be  abolished,  to  permit  greater 
competition  from Kodak's  overseas  rivals. 
(2)  Kodak  should  reduce  its prices  on  colour  film. 
(3)  Kodak  should  reduce  the distributors'  margins  on  colour  film. 
(4)  Kodak  should  make  its colour  film available  to  any  dealer  subject 
to  the usual  creditworthiness considerations. 
(5)  Film should  be  sold  in  such  a  way  as  to  enable  retailers  to  sell 
on a  process  paid  basis or not,  as  the  customer  required. 
All  except  the last of  these  recommendations  were  fulfilled  to  a  greater 
or  lesser degree,  for  a  variety of  reasons,  The  intervention of  the 
British Government  resulted  in a  reduction of Kodak's  prices.  Tariffs 
were  reduced  as  a  result of  the  Kennedy  Round  and  later by  the entry of 
the U.K.  into  the E.E.C.  Distributors margins were  reduced as  a  result 
of the enaction of  the  Resale Price Maintenance Act  1964 which prohibited 
suppliers  from  stipulating  the retail price of  their products  and  opened 
the way  for price  competition at  the  retail level.  Kodak  did  in  fact 166 
because  of  the  change  in strategy  in  favour  of high-volume  low-cost 
photography,  follmving  the  successful  introduction of  the  Instamatic 
range  of cameras. 
Two  aspects  of  the Honopolies  Commissim 's analysis are  commented  on 
here- the  conclusion  that high  profitability is due  to Kodak's  monopoly 
position  and  the  recommendation  that Kodak  should  cease  to  quote  prices 
for colour  film on  a  process-inclusive  basis,  In  arguing  that market 
dominance  was  the  cause  of excessive  profits  the  Commission  did  not 
fully appreciate  the  origins of  these  profits.  They  did  not arise  from 
Kodak  first  gaining  a  dominant position and  then putting up  its prices 
to  exploit  that position;  they arose  from  the combination of  technical 
leadership  and  its exploitation  through  low  and  stable prices,  designed 
to  achieve  a  high market  penetration.  The  accumulated  volume  and 
experience  derived  from  this strategy reduced  unit costs,  yielding 
above-average  profits.  The  implications of  this are discussed  below. 
PROCESS-INCLUSIVE  PRICES 
Like  many  other colour  film suppliers,  Kodak  has  reserved  the  processing 
of  colour  film  to  itself by  selling  some  of  its films  only at a  process-
inclusive price.  The  Monopolies  Commission  argued  thatfuese  terms  of 
sale operated  against  the public  interest  since it excluded  competition 
from processing.  This  is  a  material point  for,  as we  have  seen,  amateur 
photographers  spend  twice  as  much  on  processing as  on  the  films  themselve 
Eastman  Kodak  in  the U.S.A.  was  compelled under  the  Sherman Act  to  sell 
Kodachrome  and  Kodacolor  exclusive of processing.  Its u.s.  rivals are 
under  no  such  obligation.  The  Monopolies  Commission  recommended  that 
Kodak  be  asked  to  abandon  inclusive prices  in  the U.K.,  but  this has  not 
occurred.  There are  four  reasons  for  the practice:  to maintain proces-
sing standards,  to  safeguard process  technology,  to  ensure  a  sufficient 
volume  of processing  to bring  down  the  unit processing costs and,  of 
course,  to  secure  profitable business at no  additional marketing cost. 
The  Monopolies  Commission  argued  against this practice  on  principle,  the 
principle apparently being  that it is undesirable  to  exclude  competition 
from an  important market.  But  the  substantive  issue  is whether  the 167 
would  otherwise  make,  and  whether  it raises  the  price  of  processing. 
Neither  is very  probable;  as  to  the  question of choice,  Kodak  caters 
for  the  enthusiasts who  wish  to  develop  film  themselves  Hith Ektachrome. 
As  regards  the  cost of  processing  to  the  public,  the  likelihood  that 
professional  processors would  be  able  to  improve  on  Kodak's  quality 
and  price  is  remote  indeed.  The  history of  the  industry  indicates  that 
technical advances  in processing have  invariably derived  from  the  film 
makers,  who  can afford  the  extensive  research,  and  not  from  the  fragmented 
independent  processing  industry.  Furthermore,  Kodak  can  secure  scale 
economies, by  virtue  of  its position as  a  film manufacturer,  not available 
to finishers,  even if films were  not  sold  at a  process-inclusive price. 
The  practice  is  fairly  common  in the  industry,  which  regards  processing 
as  an  integral  part of  the  business of producing  finished  colour prints -
a  process  in which  the  customer's  purchase  and  use  of  film is merely  an 
intermediate  step.  It is not  only  the  established suppliers which  sell 
on  this basis;  a  recent  new  entrant into  the  U.K.  market,  the  Free  Film 
Service,  offering very cheap Italian film,  also  links  the  purchase  of 
the  film and  processing,  but does  so  in  the  reverse  direction.  The 
customer  only pays  for  film processing and,  when  he  does  so,  receives  a 
'free film'.  This  is an  ingenious marketing  gambit  because  the  film is 
apparently  free  and  its presentation  to  the  customer  commits  him  to  more 
processing,  which  in turn provides  him with  another  film,  and  so  on.  In 
short,  the  practice is  a  custom  in  the  trade,  has  many  technical  features 
to  recommend  it,  and  is probably harmless  from  the  competition point of 
view  in that it places  a  restriction on  a  development which is unlikely 
to  occur  in  any  case. 
THE  EFFICIENT  MONOPOLIST  SITUATION 
This case  is interesting because it provides  a  perfect illustration of 
the  basic paradox of anti-trust policy.  The  paradox  is  this:  competition 
is regarded  as  desirable  because it encourages  growth  and profitability 
through efficiency.  But  if it succeeds  too well  one  company  eventually 
emerges  as  more  efficient than all the  rest and will  tend  to drive out 
its competitors.  What  should anti-trust authorities  do  about  this?  If 
the monopolist's  dominant  position is maintained  by anti-competitive 168 
lies open  to  the authorities if the  dominant  position is  the  result of 
superior efficiency?  If  the  monopolist  is  ordered  to  cut prices  the  few 
rivals  that  remain will  be  driven  out  of business.  This  is precisely wha 
happened  in  this  industry.  The  price  reductions  which  were  made  as  a 
result of  the  Honopolies  Commission  recom:nendations  hastened  the  departur 
of Kodak's  one  remaining  British competitor  in  the  colour  film business, 
Ilford,  which  withdrew first  from  retailing,  supplying  instead  the  larger 
retail chains;  it now  supplies  the  'free film'  market  indirectly and 
specialises  in  monochrome  film and  chemicals.  One  consequence  of  the 
anti-trust measure,  then,  was  to contribute  to  the  elimination of  the 
indigenous  competition. 
Anti-trust authorities  have  ultimately  to  decide  whether  they wish  to 
preserve  competition  or  regulate  prices.  They  cannot  do  both  as  there 
is  a  trade-off  be~'een these  two  objectives.  If,  as  in  this  case,  com-
petition is already  too  weak,  price  regulation  can  be  regarded  as 
substitute  for  effective competitors.  The  disadvantage  of  this  option 
is  that  in  the  long  run it inhibits  the  real  benefits  that  the  public 
derives  from  the  growth  of  large efficient competitors.  As  \ve  have 
seen,  Kodak  owes  its position  to  the  fact  that its unit costs  are  lower 
than  those  of its rivals.  Part,  but  not all,  of  this  reduction  in unit 
cost  is passed  on  tofue  consumer;  but  regardless  of what  proportion  is 
passed  on,  the  savings  in  resource  cost  is entirely a  benefit  to  the 
community.  These  kinds  of benefits  may  be  foregone  to  some  extent if 
Government  agencies  interfere with  the  competitive  process;  that  is  to 
say,  if the  efficient monopolist anticipatesfuat anti-trust action will 
deprive it of  some  of the  rewards  of  the  penetration price/scale 
economies  strategy outlined above,  it may  instead  opt  for  a  different 
strategy altogether,  namely,  milking profits  from  its  technical  develop-
ments  as  rapidly as  possible with high prices,  before anti-trust 
investigations  can  be  initiated and  completed.  The  community  would  lose 
the  unit-cost advantages  if dominant  companies  were  driven  in this 
direction.  These  considerations  indicate  that there  is  no  simple or 
clear answer  to  the  problem which  the efficient monopolist  poses  to 
anti-trust authorities. Belgique  - Belgie 
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